United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
JOEL C. HOPPE, Magistrate Judge.
This case was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for the purpose of conducting a felony guilty plea hearing. ECF No. 25. This report and recommendation is submitted to the presiding district judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Gheen waived his right to plead before a United States District Judge and consented to proceed before the undersigned magistrate judge.
On October 6, 2014, Gheen appeared with counsel before the magistrate judge, who personally addressed the defendant in open court and admonished the defendant pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1)(A)-(O) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Discussing the district judge's role of determining a sentence, the Court explained to the defendant that the sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, which are advisory, not mandatory, would not be determined until a presentence report is written and a sentencing hearing held, that the district judge had the authority to impose a sentence more or less severe than called for in the guidelines, and that the sentence the defendant receives may be different than any estimate given by his attorney. The Court also admonished the defendant that if the district judge does not accept a recommendation set forth in the plea agreement, the defendant will still be bound by his plea and will have no right to withdraw it. Gheen stated that he understood the Court's admonishments.
The attorney for the Government stated the essential terms of the plea agreement, which has been filed with the Court, and the defendant and his counsel agreed that those in fact were the terms of the agreement. The defendant further stated that he had read the plea agreement and understood it. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the defendant understands the charge to which he is pleading guilty and that his plea was knowingly made. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1).
The Court also addressed Gheen personally as to his competency to plead and the voluntariness of his plea, specifically whether it resulted from force, threats, or promises other than promises made in a plea agreement or open court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). Based on this discussion, the undersigned found the defendant to be sufficiently competent to enter a plea, that he desired to plead guilty, and that his plea was voluntary.
The Government presented a statement of facts, which has been filed with the Court, regarding the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty. The defendant testified that he read and discussed the statement of facts with his attorney, agreed that the statement of facts was accurate, and did not contest those facts. Having reviewed the statement of facts, I find that a sufficient factual basis exists for the defendant's guilty plea as to each essential element of the offense charged. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
The defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of willfully failing to truthfully account for and pay over a tax imposed by Title 26 of the United States Code, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202, as alleged in Count 1 of the Indictment, ECF No. 4. At the plea hearing, the attorney for the Government represented on the record that Counts 2, 3, and 4, of the Indictment would be dismissed at sentencing.
The magistrate judge finds the following:
1. The defendant's guilty plea was taken by the undersigned subject to the acceptance of the plea and sentencing by the assigned district judge and after the defendant consulted with an attorney and executed oral and written waivers;
2. The defendant fully understands the nature of the charges and relevant penalties;
3. The defendant fully understands the terms of the plea agreement;
4. The defendant fully understands his constitutional and statutory rights and wishes to waive those rights;
5. The defendant's guilty plea was freely and voluntarily tendered;
6. The defendant is sufficiently competent to enter a ...