United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Big Stone Gap Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAMELA MEADE SARGENT, Magistrate Judge.
In this employment discrimination and retaliation action, the court is asked to rule on a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, (Docket Item No. 40) ("Motion"). The Motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rules 54(d)(2)(D) and 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Based on the reasoning set out below, I recommend that the court grant the Motion, but reduce the amount of fees and costs awarded to a total of $82, 212.57.
Billy Joe Wolfe filed this action in July 2014 claiming that his employer, the Virginia Department of Transportation, ("VDOT"), discriminated and retaliated against him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. At a settlement conference held before the undersigned on October 10, 2014, the parties settled Wolfe's claims against VDOT with the exception of his claim for attorneys' fees and costs, which the parties agreed would be decided by the court. By the Motion, counsel for Wolfe seeks an award against the defendant of attorneys' fees of $130, 560.00 and costs of $36, 697.14, for a total of $167, 257.14. (Docket Item No. 40.) VDOT has responded to the Motion, not objecting to the plaintiff's request for an award of fees and costs, but objecting to the amount requested. (Docket Item No. 41.) The Motion was heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge by telephone conference call on February 3, 2015.
Section 706(k) of Title VII provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter[, ] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee... as part of the costs...." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). VDOT agrees that Wolfe should be considered a "prevailing party" eligible to receive an award of a reasonable attorney's fee. Furthermore, a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action ordinarily should be awarded attorneys' fees. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
In Hensley, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." 461 U.S. at 433. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has long recognized the use of the 12 factors set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), to determine the reasonableness of a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the attorney's fee statute for the Civil Rights Act. See Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978) (adopting the 12 Johnson factors). These factors include: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity cost in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between the attorney and the client; and (12) attorney's fees in similar cases. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
In this case, I will first address whether the attorney and paralegal hourly rates sought are reasonable. Wolfe's attorneys seek to be compensated at an hourly rate of $300. VDOT argues that Wolfe's counsel should be compensated at an hourly rate of no more than $235.00. The party seeking a fee award bears the burden of proving that the hourly rate sought is reasonable. See McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 91 (4th Cir. 2013). In determining the reasonableness of the requested hourly rate, the court must consider the prevailing market rate in the relevant community, taking into account the experience of the individual lawyers whose rate is being reviewed. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1989); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1994); Johnson, 488 F.2d at 719. The prevailing market rate may be established through affidavits reciting fees of counsel with similar qualifications, information concerning fee awards in similar cases and evidence of counsel's billing practices. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987).
In this case, both of Wolfe's attorneys have submitted affidavits which outline their educational background and professional experience. (Docket Item Nos. 40-1, 40-2.) According to his affidavit, Thomas Strelka was admitted to practice law in Virginia in 2007. Mr. Strelka worked one year as a law clerk for the late Judge James C. Turk of this court and one year as a law clerk for Justice Lawrence L. Koontz of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Mr. Strelka began his practice focusing on plaintiffs' employment cases in 2009.
According to her affidavit, Leigh Strelka was admitted to practice law in Virginia in 2006. She, too, worked as a law clerk for Judge Turk for one year. Mrs. Stelka began her practice in labor and employment law in 2007 with the Roanoke firm of Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, primarily representing corporate defendants. In 2011, Mrs. Strelka left the law firm and began working independently with Mr. Strelka on plaintiffs' employment cases.
Both affidavits state that plaintiff's counsel are familiar with the market in Virginia for legal services in litigation arising under federal employment statutes, such as Title VII. Both attest that the hourly rate they request for their services in this case, $300 per hour, "falls within the range of prevailing market rates charged and collected by Virginia attorneys of similar educational background and experience for work in litigation arising under federal employment statutes or in similarly complex matters." Plaintiff's counsel also have provided affidavits from attorneys Jonathan Rogers, Edward G. Stout, Paul Beers and Arthur P. Strickland. Each of these attorneys, through his affidavit, states that an hourly rate of $300 is reasonable and/or consistent with the rates charged by employment lawyers in the Western District of Virginia with the qualifications and expertise of the Strelkas.
In response, VDOT has provided the court with five affidavits filed by attorneys in other cases in this court. At least one of these affidavits includes a request for fees for legal services performed as far back as 2004. These affidavits show that attorneys with similar years of experience as the Strelkas have sought to be compensated for their legal services performed in this court at hourly rates ranging from $150 to $285. These affidavits also show that attorneys with significantly more experience than the Strelkas have sought to be compensated at hourly rates ranging from $200 to $425. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the court used the hourly rate requested to calculate the fee to be awarded. In the one exception, the court reduced the senior attorney's hourly rate from the requested $425 an hour to $375.
Based on the above, I find that plaintiff's counsel have met their burden to show that their requested $300 hourly rate is within the range of the prevailing market rate in the Western District of Virginia for lawyers of similar experience and expertise handling similar cases. Insofar as defense counsel argues that the hourly rate for attorneys who appear in the Abingdon division of the court should be less than those appearing in the Roanoke division, I specifically reject that argument.
Plaintiff's fee request also includes the costs of employing three law students at the rate of $80 an hour to perform work reviewing the electronic records produced by the defendant in response to the plaintiff's discovery requests. The court notes that "it is not proper to award a full attorney rate for activities that should more effectively be performed by nonlawyers." Chapman v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3764009, at *1 (W.D. Va. Nov. 9, 2009) (citing Spell, 824 F.2d at 1401-02). Additionally, "purely clerical tasks are ordinarily part of a law office's overhead and should not be compensated for at all." Chapman, 2009 WL 3764009, at *1 (citing Keith v. Volpe, 644 F.Supp. 1312, 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1986)). In Chapman, this court found that it is proper to award a reduced hourly rate for nonattorney time spent "on the theory that their work contributed to their supervising attorney's work product, was traditionally done and billed by attorneys, and could be done effectively by nonattorneys under supervision for a lower rate, thereby lowering overall litigation costs." 2009 WL 3764009, at *1 (quoting Cook v. Brown, 68 F.3d 447, 453 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). While the defendant has raised no objection to the $80 hourly rate for nonattorney work performed in this case, this court routinely recognizes $75 as a reasonable hourly rate for nonattorney time. See Chapman, 2009 WL 3764009, at *2 (citing Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997) (paralegal services compensated at $65 per hour where lead counsel compensated at $225 per hour and associate counsel at $100 per hour). Therefore, any nonattorney time awarded in this case will be awarded at the rate of $75 an hour.
The court now turns its attention to addressing the reasonableness of the number of hours incurred by the attorneys and nonattorneys working on this case. In this case, plaintiff seeks an award of fees for 435.2 hours of attorney time and 383.8 hours of nonattorney time. Based on counsel's concession at the February 3 hearing that the nonattorney time in this case also was included in its entirety in the fee request in the related case, Atkins v. VDOT, 1:13cv00057, the court will reduce the nonattorney hours by one-half to 191.90 hours. Wolfe's counsel also conceded that the attorney time spent preparing, conducting and reviewing all depositions in August 2014 was billed in its entirety to both cases. Therefore, the attorney time requested will be reduced by 38.65 hours or one-half of the total time billed for these activities in this case,  leaving 396.55 hours of attorney time.
The 191.90 remaining hours of nonattorney time billed in this case would amount to an employee working full-time for almost five weeks. The Motion, however, offers no explanation of how this time was spent other than "search, review, organization, analysis and memo creation necessary for the 700, 000 pages of [electronic] documents produced." The Motion also seeks fees for 85.2 hours of attorney time for "Review of VDOT ESI." The attorney time entries make no mention of reviewing any analysis or memoranda created from the nonattorneys' review of the documents. The Motion also offers no information with regard to what, if any, relevant information was gleaned from the review of the electronic documents. In plaintiff's reply brief, counsel states only that "hundreds of thousands ...