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White v. Chapman

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division

July 14, 2015

MAURICE WHITE, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES C. CACHERIS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Maurice White's ("White" or "Plaintiff") Notice of and Request for Hearing on Defendants' Objections to Magistrate Judge's Ruling on Motions to Seal. [Dkt. 219.] For the following reasons, the Court will overrule the objections.

I. Background

Familiarity with the facts is presumed. ( See 4/3/15 Mem. Op. and Order on Summ. J. [Dkt. 186].) As relevant here, White brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wade Phillips ("Deputy Phillips"), a deputy sheriff with the Loudon County Police Department, and Michael Chapman ("Sheriff Chapman") (collectively "Defendants"), Sheriff of Loudon County, Virginia stemming from an August 11, 2013 traffic stop. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.) White alleges that Deputy Phillips maliciously orchestrated White's arrest and prosecution on three charges. ( Id. ¶ 1.) According to White, Deputy Phillips made false statements to secure an arrest warrant and to initiate White's prosecution as retaliation for a complaint White and his wife filed regarding Phillips' behavior during a traffic stop. ( Id. ) As a result of his arrest, White suffered several injuries, including suspension from his job as a federal police officer for eight months. ( Id. ) Pursuant to § 1983, White alleged one count of false arrest ("Count I") and two counts of malicious prosecution (assaulting a police officer ("Count II") and reckless driving and disorderly conduct ("Count III")) against Phillips. He also asserted two counts of malicious prosecution under Virginia law against Phillips (assaulting a police officer ("Count IV") and reckless driving and disorderly conduct ("Count V")) and one count of malicious prosecution under Virginia law based on both strict liability and the doctrine of respondeat superior against Chapman ("Count VI").

Defendants filed for summary judgment. A hearing on the motion was held on March 20, 2015 before the Honorable U.S. District Judge Gerald Bruce Lee. [Dkt. 183.] Judge Lee denied the motion. [ Id. ]. On the same day, the Honorable U.S. Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis held a hearing on various motions to seal documents in this case. [Dkt. 182.] As relevant here, Judge Davis denied Defendants' motion to seal internal affairs reports related to Phillips. (3/24/15 Order [Dkt. 184].) Judge Davis stayed his ruling to allow the parties to appeal.[1] ( Id. ) On April 3, 2015, Defendants[2] filed objections to Judge Davis's ruling, arguing the internal affairs reports should remain sealed. (Objections to Order on Motion to Seal [Dkt. 185].) It was set for a hearing on April 30, 2015.[3]

On April 27, 2015 Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling or, in the alternative, to take an interlocutory appeal on the question of whether Sheriff Chapman is entitled to sovereign immunity. (Defs.' Mot. for Reconsideration [Dkt. 191].) On April 29, the Court granted leave to take an interlocutory appeal and stayed this case. (4/29/15 Order [Dkt. 195].) An appeal was noticed and docketed. [Dkts. 197-202.] After the appeal was docketed, the parties informed the Court that White had accepted Defendants' Offer of Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. (Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment [Dkt. 203].) The appeal was dismissed, vesting this Court with jurisdiction. [Dkts. 207-209.] Judgment was entered in favor of White against Deputy Phillips in his individual capacity in the amount of $275, 000, and judgment was so entered. [Dkts. 209, 216.]

White now moves the Court to lift the stay on Judge Davis's ruling unsealing Deputy Phillips's internal affairs reports. (Notice [Dkt. 219].) Both Defendants oppose this request, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction lift Judge Davis's stay, or, in the alternative, that his ruling should be vacated. ( See Phillips Opp'n [Dkt. 220], Chapman Opp'n [Dkt. 221].) Having been fully briefed and argued, this motion is ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a magistrate judge to hear and decide non-dispositive motions. Rule 72(a) also permits a party to submit objections to a magistrate judge's ruling on such motions, like discovery orders. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. Elec. Comm'n v. The Christian Coal., 178 F.R.D. 456, 459-60 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citation omitted)).

Only if a magistrate judge's decision is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" may a district judge modify or set aside any portion of the decision. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The alteration of a magistrate judge's order is "extremely difficult to justify." Bruce v. Hartford, 21 F.Supp. 3d 590, 593 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citing 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3069 (2d ed. 1997)).

The "clearly erroneous" standard applies to questions of fact. In applying this standard, a reviewing court will not reverse a lower court's findings of fact "simply because we would have decided the case differently." Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Rather, a reviewing court must ask whether, on the entire evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The "clearly erroneous" standard is therefore deferential. The Christian Coalition, 178 F.R.D. at 460.

Where pure questions of law are involved, "that review is plenary under the contrary to law' branch of the Rule 72(a) standard.'" HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n v. Resh, No. 3:12cv668, 2014 WL 317820, at *7 (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2014) (citing PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2010) (collecting cases)). "This means that, for questions of law, there is no practical difference between review under Rule 72(a)'s contrary to law' standard and [a] de novo standard.'" Id. (citing PowerShare, 597 F.3d at 15). Therefore, the Court will review the factual portions of the magistrate judge's order under the clearly erroneous standard but will review the legal conclusions de novo.

III. Analysis

Though this case has proceeded to judgment, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal of Judge Davis's sealing order. The Fourth Circuit has held that jurisdiction to review sealing orders is not impacted by resolution of the merits of the underlying case. See Rosenfeld v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Schs., 25 F.Appx. 123, 131 (4th Cir. 2010) ("The caselaw establishes that our jurisdiction to review a district court's sealing orders is based not on our jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying claims addressed by the district court, but on the public right of access, under the common law or the First Amendment, to judicial documents.... The dismissal of the [plaintiffs'] claims on standing grounds thus does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the sealing order below[.]"); In re Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254, 94-2341, 1995 WL 541623, at *2 n.3 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995) (noting that settlement did not moot appeal of sealing order because "the right of access to judicial records and documents is independent of the disposition of the merits of the case."); Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. ...


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