United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARK S. DAVIS, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, filed by FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., ("Defendant" or "FedEx") pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 6. Also pending before the Court are two associated motions addressing the fact that the brief in opposition to dismissal filed by Orbit Corp ("Orbit") and Gary Simon ("Simon, " and collectively with Orbit, "Plaintiffs") exceeds the page limit established by this Court's local rules. ECF Nos. 10, 14; see E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(F)(3) (limiting responsive briefs to thirty pages).
As to the briefing dispute, the Court accepts Plaintiffs' initial brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss; however, consistent with Plaintiffs' proposed amended brief, the Court will not consider the pages in the original brief presenting a detailed recitation of the facts. Instead, the Court will rely on the facts incorporated by reference from the amended complaint. Such ruling GRANTS in part, and Denies in part, both Defendant's motion to strike, ECF No. 10, and Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended brief, ECF No. 14.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
As alleged in Plaintiffs' amended complaint, Orbit is a Virginia corporation which owns and operates trucking equipment. Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 3. Gary Simon is the president of Orbit and acted as a FedEx driver performing home deliveries from November 2011 through May 2013. Id. Defendant FedEx is a Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 2.
In April of 2012, FedEx and Orbit entered into a written contract ("the Operating Agreement") whereby FedEx hired Orbit, through its president Gary Simon, to perform home delivery services of FedEx packages in Virginia. Id. ¶¶ 7, 30-35. The parties vigorously dispute whether the Operating Agreement and the parties' business relationship rendered Simon, and Orbit's other drivers, "employees" of FedEx or "independent contractors." Plaintiffs' amended complaint, however, alternatively seeks relief irrespective of which classification is deemed to apply.
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs opposed dismissal of the majority of the counts in the amended complaint, but affirmatively moved to withdraw Counts I, II, VI, and VII. ECF No. 9, at 33. Defendant's motion is fully briefed and ripe forreview.
II. Standard of Review
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Rule 12(b)(1)
A party may, at any time, move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The party asserting jurisdiction "has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists." Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
B. Plausible Right to Relief - Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a complaint, or a claim within a complaint, based on the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, " Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), so as to "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, '" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8 (a) as requiring that a complaint include enough facts for the claim to be "plausible on its face" and thereby "raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555, 570 (internal citations omitted). The plausibility requirement is "not akin to a probability requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility" that a defendant is liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 663. Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of a complaint without resolving factual disputes, a district court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint' and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Montgomery County, 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting E.I, du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)).
A. Withdrawn Claims
Defendant's motion to dismiss invokes Rule 12(b)(1) to seek dismissal of Count VII of the amended complaint, and invokes Rule 12(b) (6) to seek dismissal of all remaining counts. In response to such motion, Plaintiffs affirmatively withdraw their claims for relief contained in Counts I, II, VI and VII of the amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court hereby deems Counts I, II, ...