United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division
C. CACHERIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant Sheltercare
Program's ("Sheltercare") Motion to Dismiss
[Dkt. 16], Defendants Governor Terrence Richard McAuliffe
("McAuliffe") and the Commonwealth of
Virginia's ("Commonwealth") Motion to Dismiss
[Dkt. 25]. Defendant Eighteenth District Court Service
Unit's ("Eighteenth District") Motion to
Dismiss [Dkt. 37], and Defendant Elaine Buchavich's
("Buchavich") Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 51].
Collectively, the Court will refer to these Defendants as
"Defendants" and the motions they have filed as
"Defendants' Motions to Dismiss." For the
following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss and dismisses Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint [Dkt. 8] as against Defendants with prejudice.
motion to dismiss stage, the Court must read the complaint as
a whole, construe the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and accept the facts alleged in the complaint
as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The facts below are taken from Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint and the public record, and are accepted as
true only for purposes of these motions.
1987, Plaintiff Anthony James Crews ("Crews" or
"Plaintiff") was arrested and accused of drug
possession. (Sec. Am. Compl. [Dkt. 12] at 6.) Because
Plaintiff was 12 years old at the time, he was taken to a
juvenile detention center. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
that he spent weeks there without receiving an attorney or
being served any court papers. (Id.) When he was
released, Plaintiff was taken to Defendant Sheltercare in
Alexandria, Virginia. (Id.) Plaintiff stayed at
Sheltercare for several months. (Id.)
several months, Plaintiff was taken by his probation officer,
Elaine Buchavich, and another, unidentified lady to
Winchester Virginia to visit a school called Timber Ridge.
(Id.) Plaintiff claims he was told he was going
there to see if would like it. (Id.) During a tour
of the school, Plaintiff was provided with lunch in the
school's dining hall. (Id.) While he was eating
lunch, Buchavich left. Plaintiff claims that he "was
left at the school for 2 years." (Id.)
claims that he was never advised of his rights in connection
with his juvenile offense and his stay at Timber Ridge, and
that he was denied any opportunity to see a judge or other
official to plead his case. (Id.) Plaintiff claims
that while he was at Timber Ridge, his "teeth were
intentionally broken by the dentist." (Id. at
7.) Fillings were then put in place "to cover the
damage." (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he
received "little to no services" from Timber Ridge
in the way of education, was denied a basic education, and
that he was set back in school by 2 years during his time at
Timber Ridge. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that
Timber Ridge deprived him of money he had earned while
working in the dining hall. (Id. at 6-7.)
Plaintiff claims that at the end of his time at Timber Ridge,
he "was not returned to [his] family and as a result
mistreated, starved, and used for illegal activity that lead
to a juvenile conviction as an adult in the State of
Maryland." (Id.) Plaintiff claims that as a
result of the wrongs he suffered at Timber Ridge, he
"cannot find meaningful employment despite graduating
college with a masters degree, as an adult."
filed this lawsuit on April 12, 2016, alleging violations of
his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Twelfth Amendments. (Compl. [Dkt. 1], Sec. Am. Compl. at 4.)
Plaintiff has responded to each of the Motions to Dismiss
filed in this case, and a combined oral argument on the
Motions to Dismiss was heard on July 7, 2016. The Motions to
Dismiss are now all ripe for adjudication.
move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1).
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] does
not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a
claim, or the applicability of defenses." Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). While
the court must accept well-pleaded allegations as true when
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court need not accept
as true legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679-81 (2009).
Therefore, a pleading that offers only a "formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). Nor will a
complaint that tenders mere "naked assertion[s]"
devoid of "further factual enhancement."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557. In the instance where sufficient facts are alleged in
the complaint to rule on an affirmative defense, such as the
statute of limitations, the defense may be reached by a
motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6). This principle
only applies, however, if all facts necessary to the
affirmative defense "clearly appear[ ] on the face
of the complaint." Goodman v. Praxair,
Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in
original); see also 5B Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1357.
motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure challenges the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction over the pending action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
Defendants may attack subject matter jurisdiction in one of
two ways. As relevant here, the assertion of immunity is
properly addressed by the Court on a motion filed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1). Smith v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th
Cir. 1995)). In this instance, all facts alleged in the
complaint are presumed to be true. Adams, 697 F.2d
at 1219; Virginia v. United States, 926 F.Supp. 537,
540 (E.D. Va. 1995). The burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff. McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936);
Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. "Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and we presume that a cause
lies outside this limited jurisdiction.
burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction." Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v.
Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, ...