United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division
C. CACHERIS COURT JUDGE
matter is now before the Court on Defendants United States
Attorney Dana J. Boente (“Boente”) and United
States Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch’s
(“Lynch”) Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 68]. For the
following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss and dismiss Plaintiff Anthony James Crews’
(“Crews” or “Plaintiff”) Second
Amended Complaint [Dkt. 8] with prejudice as against the
motion to dismiss stage, the Court must read the complaint as
a whole, construe the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and accept the facts alleged in the complaint
as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The facts below are taken from Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint and the public record, and are
accepted as true only for purposes of this motion.
1987, Plaintiff was arrested and accused of drug possession.
(Am. Compl. at 6.) Because Plaintiff was 12 years old at the
time, he was taken to a juvenile detention center
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he spent weeks there
without receiving an attorney or being served any court
papers. (Id.) When he was released, Plaintiff was
taken to Defendant Sheltercare in Alexandria, Virginia.
(Id.) Plaintiff stayed at Sheltercare for several
several months, Plaintiff was taken by his probation officer,
Elaine Buchavich, and another, unidentified lady to
Winchester Virginia to visit a school called Timber Ridge.
(Id.) Plaintiff claims he was told he was going
there to see if would like it. (Id.) During a tour
of the school, Plaintiff was provided with lunch in the
school’s dining hall. (Id.) While he was
eating lunch, Buchavich left. Plaintiff claims that he
“was left at the school for 2 years.”
claims that he was never advised of his rights in connection
with his juvenile offense and his stay at Timber Ridge, and
that he was denied any opportunity to see a judge or other
official to plead his case. (Id.) Plaintiff claims
that while he was at Timber Ridge, his “teeth were
intentionally broken by the dentist.” (Id. at
7.) Fillings were then put in place “to cover the
damage.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he
received “little to no services” from Timber
Ridge in the way of education, was denied a basic education,
and that he was set back in school by 2 years during his time
there. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that he was
deprived of money he had earned while working in the Dining
Hall by Timber Ridge. (Id. at 6-7.)
Plaintiff claims that at the end of his time at Timber Ridge,
he “was not returned to [his] family and as a result
mistreated, starved, and used for illegal activity that lead
to a juvenile conviction as an adult in the State of
Maryland.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that as a
result of the wrongs he suffered at Timber Ridge, he
“cannot find meaningful employment despite graduating
college with a masters degree, as an adult.”
filed this lawsuit on April 12, 2016, alleging violations of
his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Twelfth Amendments. (Compl. [Dkt. 1], Sec. Am. Compl. at 4.)
Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss on July 8, 2016.
Plaintiff filed his response to this motion to dismiss on
July 13, 2016. Having been fully briefed, the Motion is now
ripe for adjudication on the papers.
move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the pending
action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The burden of proving subject
matter jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff. McNutt v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936); Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.
1982). “Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, and we presume that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction. The burden of establishing the contrary
rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”
Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio
Valley, Inc., 683 F.3d 577, 583-84 (4th Cir.
2012)(internal citations omitted). As relevant here, the
assertion of immunity is properly addressed by the Court on a
motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Smith v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir.
2001) (citing Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d
299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995)). In this instance, all facts
alleged in the complaint are presumed to be true.
Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219; Virginia v. United
States, 926 F.Supp. 537, 540 (E.D. Va. 1995).
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] does
not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a
claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Edwards
v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir.
1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While the court must accept well-pleaded allegations as true
when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court need not
accept as true legal conclusions disguised as factual
allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679-81
(2009). Therefore, a pleading that offers only a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
(2007). Nor will a complaint that tenders mere “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. In the instance where
sufficient facts are alleged in the complaint to rule on an
affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, the
defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under
Rule 12(b)(6). This principle only applies, however, if all
facts necessary to the affirmative defense “clearly
appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.”
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th
Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original); see also 5B
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §
considering a motion to dismiss, a court is limited to
considering the pleadings, documents attached to the
pleadings, documents integral to, relied on, or referenced to
within the pleadings, and official public records pertinent
to the plaintiff’s claims. See Philips v. Pitt
County Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2009);
Witthohn v. Fed. Ins. Co., 164 F.App'x 395, 396
(4th Cir. 2006); Gasner v. County of Dinwiddie, 162
F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D. Va. 1995).