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Scholl v. Ethicon, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Charleston Division

December 14, 2016

SHERI SCHOLL, Plaintiff,
ETHICON, INC., et al., Defendants.



         Pending before the court is the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 83]. As set forth below, the defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

         I. Background

         This case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to the court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat pelvic organ prolapse (“POP”) and stress urinary incontinence (“SUI”). In the seven MDLs, there are more than 58, 000 cases currently pending, approximately 28, 000 of which are in Ethicon, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson, Inc. (“Ethicon”) MDL, MDL 2327. In an effort to efficiently and effectively manage this massive MDL, the court decided to conduct pretrial discovery and motions practice on an individualized basis so that once a case is trial-ready (that is, after the court has ruled on all summary judgment motions, among other things), it can then be promptly transferred or remanded to the appropriate district for trial. To this end, the court ordered the plaintiffs and defendants to submit a joint list of 200 of the oldest cases in Ethicon MDL that name only Ethicon, Inc., Ethicon, LLC, and/or Johnson & Johnson, which would then become part of a “wave” of cases to be prepared for trial and, if necessary, remanded. See Pretrial Order No. 193, In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-002327, Aug. 19, 2015, available at I completed this process four times and selected Mrs. Scholl's case as a Wave 1 case.

         On December 23, 2010, Mrs. Scholl was surgically implanted with the Ethicon's TVT-Obturator (“TVT-O”) and Prosima (“Prosima”), products manufactured by Ethicon. Am. Short Form Compl. ¶¶ 9-10 [ECF No. 4]. Mrs. Scholl's surgery occurred at Mary Washington Hospital in Fredericksburg, Virginia. Id. ¶ 11. Mrs. Scholl claims that as a result of implantation of these devices she has experienced multiple complications. She brought the following claims against Ethicon: (I) negligence, (II) strict liability - manufacturing defect, (III) strict liability - failure to warn, (IV) strict liability - defective product, (V) strict liability - design defect, (VI) common law fraud, (VII) fraudulent concealment, (VIII) constructive fraud, (IX) negligent misrepresentation, (X) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (XI) breach of express warranty; (XII) breach of implied warranty, (XIII) violation of consumer protection laws, (XIV) gross negligence, (XV) unjust enrichment, (XVI) loss of consortium[1] (XVII), punitive damages, and (XVIII) discovery rule and tolling. Id. ¶ 13.

         II. Legal Standards

         A. Summary Judgment

         To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).

         Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict” in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion. See Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013); Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1997).

         B. Choice of Law

         Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, this court has authority to rule on pretrial motions in MDL cases. The choice of law for these pretrial motions depends on whether they concern federal or state law:

When analyzing questions of federal law, the transferee court should apply the law of the circuit in which it is located. When considering questions of state law, however, the transferee court must apply the state law that would have applied to the individual cases had they not been transferred for consolidation.

         In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). To determine the applicable state law for a dispositive motion, the court generally refers to the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction where Mrs. Scholl first filed her claim. See In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Ger., 81 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Where a transferee court presides over several diversity actions consolidated under the multidistrict rules, the choice of law rules of each jurisdiction in which the transferred actions were originally filed must be applied.”); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill., 644 F.2d 594, 610 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Digitek Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:08-md-01968, 2010 WL 2102330, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. May 25, 2010).

         If a plaintiff files her claim directly into the MDL in the Southern District of West Virginia, however, as Mrs. Scholl did in this case, the court consults the choice-of-law rules of the state where the plaintiff was implanted with the product. See Sanchez v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 202787, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 17, 2014) (“For cases that originate elsewhere and are directly filed into the MDL, the court will follow the better-reasoned authority that applies the choice-of-law rules of the originating jurisdiction, which in our case is the state in which the plaintiff was implanted with the product.”). Mrs. Scholl underwent the Prosima and TVT-O implantation surgery in Virginia. Thus, the choice-of-law principles of Virginia guide the court's choice-of-law analysis.

         Virginia adheres to the principle of lex loci delicti for tort actions: the place where the harm occurred provides the substantive law. Vicente v. Obenauer, 736 F.Supp. 679, 690 (E.D. Va. 1990); see also Jones v. R. S. Jones & Assoc., 246 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Va. 1993). As stated above, Mrs. Scholl was implanted with the two products at issue in Virginia. Thus, the court applies Virginia's substantive law to this case.

         III. Analysis

         Ethicon argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Mrs. Scholl's claims because her legal theories are either without evidentiary or legal support. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 1, [ECF No. 84]. Mrs. Scholl agrees that this court should dismiss several of the counts listed in her Amended Short Form Complaint because they are not recognized by Virginia law or because Mrs. Scholl is no longer pursing the cause of action. Pl.'s Resp. Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. 1, [ECF No. 96]. Mrs. Scholl contends that only (Count I) negligence, (Count XI) breach of express warranty, (Count XII) breach of implied warranty, (Count VI) common law fraud, (Count VII) fraudulent concealment, (Count VIII) constructive fraud, and (Count XIV) gross negligence survive the motion. Id.

         Accordingly, Ethicon's Motion with regard to all other claims is GRANTED: negligent manufacturing (part of Count I); (Count II) strict liability - manufacturing defect; (Count III) strict liability - failure to warn; (Count IV) strict liability - defective product; (Count V) strict liability - design defect; (Count IX) negligent misrepresentation; (Count X) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (Count XIII) consumer protection; and (Count XV) unjust enrichment. Below, the court applies the summary judgment standard to each remaining claim.

         A. Negligence (Failure to Warn) (Count I)

         In Virginia, a manufacturer has a duty to warn users of known dangers posed by its products. Micjan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-855, 2016 WL 4141085, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016). The ...

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