United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division
January 4, 2017
BRIAN C. DAVISON, Plaintiff,
LOUDOUN COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al., Defendants.
C. CACHERIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Phyllis Randall, Chair of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors, blocked Plaintiff Brian Davison from what
Plaintiff claims is her official County Facebook page.
Plaintiff alleges that this violated his First Amendment and
Due Process rights. Defendant Randall has moved to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims against her [Dkt. 35], and Plaintiff
has in turn moved for summary judgment on those claims [Dkt.
39]. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny both
detailed discussion of the events giving rise to this case
can be found in the Court's Memorandum Opinion [Dkt. 11]
granting in part and denying in part a previous motion to
dismiss. As such, the Court repeats here only what is germane
to its rulings on the present Motions.
is a resident of Loudoun County, Virginia, who takes
“an interest in rules of ethics for public
officials.” Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 1. He filed suit
against the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and its
individual members after the Board allegedly ratified a
subordinate's decision to delete his comments from the
Board's official Facebook page.
original Complaint referenced a previous incident during
which Defendant Randall allegedly blocked Plaintiff from
commenting on her official Facebook page. See id.
¶¶ 24, 33. That incident, however, was not the
subject of any of Plaintiff's claims.
Defendants - including Defendant Randall - moved to dismiss
Plaintiff's original Complaint. In a Memorandum Opinion,
the Court granted that Motion in part and denied it in part.
As relevant here, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims
against the individual members of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors, but permitted Plaintiff's First Amendment
and Due Process claims to proceed against the Board itself.
In doing so, the Court found Plaintiff had plausibly alleged
that Loudoun County's Social Media Comments Policy,
see Compl. Exh. 11 [Dkt. 1-11], serves to designate
the Board's official Facebook page as a limited public
forum under the First Amendment.
then filed an Amended Complaint [Dkt. 33] adding claims
against Defendant Randall based on the incident mentioned in
Plaintiff's original Complaint. To wit, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Randall utilizes an official Facebook page in
connection with her duties as Chair of the Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors. See Am. Compl. [Dkt. 33]
¶¶ 5-6. He claims that Defendant Randall uses her
Facebook page to communicate with her constituents, and
through it “solicit[s] and allow[s] public comments and
discussions.” See id. ¶¶ 5-6, 9. He
further contends that, as an official County social media
website, the County's Social Media Comments Policy
applies to Defendant Randall's Facebook page. See
id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 10; Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶¶
claims that on February 3, 2016, Defendant Randall blocked
him from posting comments to her official Facebook page.
See Am. Compl. [Dkt. 33] ¶ 15. She allegedly
did so because Plaintiff had made “comments critical of
either Randall's actions or those of other government
officials of Virginia.” Id. Defendant Randall
later acknowledged that she had blocked Plaintiff from her
Facebook page. See id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff argues
that this violated his First Amendment and Due Process
November 17, 2016, Defendant Randall filed a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's claims against her [Dkt. 35].
Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [Dkt. 39] with respect to his new claims.
judgment is appropriate only if taking the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, ‘no material facts
are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.'” Henry v. Purnell, 652
F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ausherman v. Bank
of Am. Corp., 352 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir.2003)). An
unresolved issue of fact precludes summary judgment only if
it is both “genuine” and “material.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party” on that issue.
Id. at 248. It is material if it “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Id. “In the end, the question posed by a
summary judgment motion is whether the evidence ‘is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.'” Lee v. Bevington, 647 F. App'x
275 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,
” drawing “all reasonable inferences” in
the plaintiff's favor. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.
2011) (citations omitted). Generally, the Court may not look
beyond the four corners of the complaint in evaluating a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. See Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015).
“A court has wide discretion to exclude matters outside
of the pleadings” in evaluating such a motion.
Norfolk Fed'n of Bus. Districts v. Dep't of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 932 F.Supp. 730, 736 (E.D. Va.),
aff'd sub nom. Norfolk Fed'n of Bus. Districts v.
City of Norfolk, 103 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 1996).
Court is mindful that Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter
pro se. A “document filed pro se is
‘to be liberally construed, ' and ‘a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)).
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
first to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[Dkt. 39], the Court notes that the Motion does not cite to
any evidence of record. Indeed, it does not appear that there
is, at this point, any record to speak of in this case.
Plaintiff amended his Complaint on November 3, 2016, to
include for the first time the claims that are the subject of
the instant Motions. Defendant Randall has not yet filed an
answer to the Amended Complaint and no discovery has taken
of record evidence, Plaintiff cites to the allegations of his
own Amended Complaint. Those allegations do not establish a
factual basis for summary judgment. As Defendant notes, many
of Plaintiff's allegations are disputed and, at this
point, remain only allegations. Material issues of fact - for
example, who maintains Defendant Randall's Facebook page
and for what purpose - are left unsettled on the record now
before the Court.
party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
“informing the district court of the basis for its
motion, ” and identifying the evidence “it
believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Because Plaintiff's Motion is
supported by mere allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has not met his initial evidentiary burden. His Motion must
therefore be denied.
Court notes that both parties submitted Affidavits [Dkts. 50,
52] in connection with Plaintiff's Motion. Both, however,
did so after the close of briefing, and on the eve of the
hearing on this matter. Neither party had an opportunity to
meaningfully address the allegations included in the
other's Affidavit. Neither party makes any excuse for
their late filing. The Court therefore declines to consider
the Affidavits in ruling on Plaintiff's Motion.
Defendant Randall's Motion to Dismiss
to Defendant Randall's Motion to Dismiss, Defendant
argues first that Plaintiff's new claims against her
should be barred because his previous claims against her were
dismissed with prejudice. It is not clear why this should be
so. Plaintiff did not, before now, bring claims based on
Defendant Randall's conduct with respect to her own
Facebook page. Indeed, in dismissing Plaintiff's prior
claims against Defendant Randall, the Court expressly noted
that the claims Plaintiff now brings were not among those at
issue. See Mem. Op. [Dkt. 11] at 18 n.3
(“Defendants also argue at considerable length that
Defendant Randall did not violate Plaintiff's First
Amendment rights by deleting comments Plaintiff made on her
own Facebook page. But that incident, while mentioned in
passing in Plaintiff's Complaint, is neither the subject
of this suit, nor particularly relevant to the instant
Motion.”). That Plaintiff's prior claims against
Defendant Randall were dismissed does not bar Plaintiff from
bringing tangentially related claims against her now.
Failure to State a First Amendment Claim
Randall next argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead a
violation of his First Amendment rights.
County maintains a Social Media Comments Policy governing
“Loudoun County social media sites.” See
Compl. Exh. 11 [Dkt. 1-11]. The Court has already found that
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the Policy, as applied to
official County Facebook pages, creates a limited public
forum under the First Amendment. See Mem. Op. [Dkt.
11] at 16-18. Indeed, Defendants appeared to concede as much
in their first Motion to Dismiss. See Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 4] at 13-14. The Attorney for the
Commonwealth for Loudoun County has likewise admitted that
the policy serves such a function in a related case.
See Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 10]
at 2, Davison v. Plowman, No. 1:16-cv-180 (E.D.
Court has also previously found that, when County officials
suppress comments in violation of the County's Social
Media Comments Policy, their actions implicate the
commenters' First Amendment rights. See Mem. Op.
[Dkt. 11] at 16-18. “Once it has opened a limited
forum, ” the government “must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set.” Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995).
does not contend that her actions were consistent with the
County's policy. Instead, she denies that the
County's policy applies to her Facebook page at all.
support of this contention, Defendant Randall notes first
that she is not individually capable of binding the Loudoun
County Board of Supervisors. The significance of that fact
eludes the Court. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Randall is
an elected Loudoun County official who uses her Facebook page
to conduct County business, such as corresponding with her
constituents about her work in the local government.
See Am. Compl. [Dkt. 33] ¶¶ 5-6. Whether
or not Defendant is capable of unilateral action on behalf of
the Board, the Loudoun County Social Media Comments Policy
can easily be construed to cover such use of social media by
an elected County official.
Randall next contends that she maintains the Facebook page at
issue in her personal capacity, and that Plaintiff's
allegation that it is her “official” Facebook
page is conclusory. Plaintiff, however, has incorporated an
image of Defendant Randall's Facebook page into his
Complaint. See Compl. Exh. 18 [Dkt. 1-18]. Based on
that image, one might reasonably - indeed, easily - infer
that Defendant Randall maintains the Facebook page at issue
in her capacity as Chair of the Loudoun County Board of
website is not Defendant Randall's personal Facebook
profile. Rather, it is a Facebook “Page” - a
public-facing platform through which public figures and
organizations may engage with their audience or constituency.
See Matt Hicks, Facebook Tips: What's the
Difference between a Facebook Page and Group?,
http://tinyurl.com/jtb5hoa (Feb. 24, 2010) (last visited
December 9, 2016); see also Bland v. Roberts, 730
F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Sept. 23,
2013) (“Facebook is an online social network where
members develop personalized web profiles to interact and
share information with other members, ” and that can be
used by “businesses, organizations and brands . . . for
similar purposes.”) (citations omitted). The Court
notes that Defendant Randall's page is visible to the
general public without the need to first register for a
page in question is titled “Chair Phyllis J. Randall,
Government Official.” See Compl. Exh. 18 [Dkt.
1-18]. The “About” section of the page reads
“Chair of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors” and includes a link to Defendant
Randall's profile on Loudoun County's website.
See id. It does not include any information of a
personal nature. The top of the page features an image of a
plaque reading “Phyllis J. Randall Chair-At-Large,
” as well as an image of what the Court presumes to be
Defendant Randall sitting behind the same plaque in front of
a United States flag. See id.
image appended to Plaintiff's Complaint includes four
posts by Defendant Randall. The two most recent are
specifically addressed to “Loudoun, ”
Plaintiff's constituency. See id. All pertain to
matters of public, rather than personal, significance.
Besides one warning of poor weather conditions in Loudoun
County, all posts visible in the image involve
Defendant's duties as Chair of the Loudoun County Board
of Supervisors. See id. They note recent events in
the local government and solicit attendees for local
government meetings. See id.
short, the image of Defendant's Facebook page
substantiates Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Randall
uses the “Chair Phyllis J. Randall, Government
Official” Facebook page in connection with her official
duties. Drawing “all reasonable inferences” in
Plaintiff's favor, E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 637 F.3d at 440 (4th Cir. 2011), Plaintiff has
adequately plead that Defendant Randall's Facebook page
is a “Loudoun County social media site[ ], ”
Compl. Exh. 11 [Dkt. 1-11], governed by the County's
Social Media Comments Policy.
Court notes that many of Defendant's arguments attempt to
answer the wrong question. The Court is not required to
determine whether any use of social media by an
elected official creates a limited public forum, although the
answer to that question is undoubtedly “no.”
Rather, the issue before the Court is whether a specific
government policy, applied to a specific government website,
can create a “metaphysical” limited public forum
for First Amendment purposes. See Rosenberger v.
Rector, 515 U.S. at 830. That answer to that narrower
question is undoubtedly “yes.”
public forums are characterized by ‘purposeful
government action' intended to make the forum
‘generally available'” for certain kinds of
speech. Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson
Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 250 (4th
Cir. 2003)). At the time of the events giving rise to this
suit, the County maintained a Policy stating that “the
purpose of Loudoun County social media sites is to present
matters of public interest in Loudoun County.” Compl.
Exh. 11 [Dkt. 1-11]. The Policy provided that visitors were
“encourage[d] to submit questions, comments and
concerns, ” but that “the county reserve[d] the
right to delete submissions” that violated enumerated
rules, such as comments that include “vulgar
language” or “spam.” Id. Such a
policy evinces the County's purposeful choice to open its
social media websites to those wishing to post
“questions, comments and concerns” within certain
networking sites like Facebook have . . . emerged as a hub
for sharing information and opinions with one's larger
community.” Liverman v. City of Petersburg,
No. 15-2207, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 7240179, at *4 (4th Cir.
Dec. 15, 2016). The Fourth Circuit has recently described
Facebook as “a dynamic medium through which users can
interact and share news stories or opinions with members of
their community” in a manner “[s]imilar to
writing a letter to a local newspaper.” Id. at
*5. That Court has repeatedly affirmed the First Amendment
significance of social media, holding that speech utilizing
Facebook is subject to the same First Amendment protections
as any other speech. See id.; Bland, 730
F.3d at 385-86.
Randall contends further that the fact Facebook retains a
degree of ownership and control over her Facebook page
“demonstrates the unique and non-traditional
circumstances under which even an acknowledged
‘official' Facebook page can be deemed a
governmental public forum, limited or otherwise.” Mem.
in. Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 36] at 9. But as discussed
above, the County has expressly adopted a policy that governs
official Loudoun County social media websites. As also
discussed above, speech online is treated no differently from
speech offline under the First Amendment. See
Bland, 730 F.3d at 386 n.14. A
“metaphysical” forum created by a government
policy like the County's social media policy, see
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995), is subject to the
same First Amendment analysis regardless of whether that
policy is applied to online speech. See Liverman,
2016 WL 7240179, at *3 (“What matters to the First
Amendment analysis is not only the medium of the speech, but
the scope and content of the restriction.”).
Defendant Randall contends that “[n]o individual has
the right to hi-jack an individual's Facebook page by
relentlessly posting his or her comments at will, negative or
otherwise, or demand that their comments remain posted
indefinitely, just because the person is also a County
official or employee.” Mem. in. Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss [Dkt. 36] at 9. This argument both assumes that the
Facebook page in question is maintained by Defendant in her
individual capacity - an argument the Court has rejected for
purposes of the present Motion - and obscures the relatively
narrow issue now before the Court. The Court is only tasked
here with determining whether Plaintiff has adequately pled
that Defendant Randall's Facebook page is governed by the
County's Social Media Comments Policy, and that her
actions failed to comport with that policy. The Court finds
that Plaintiff has adequately plead as much, and so has
stated a claim under the First Amendment.
Failure to State a Due Process Claim
to Plaintiff's claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Defendant contends first that
“[t]he Supreme Court has made a distinction between
cases in which there has been prior restraint[ ]” of
speech “as opposed to facts such as raised in this case
where no such action occurred and the alleged disruption is
de minimis.” Mem. in. Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
[Dkt. 36] at 9. Plaintiff, however, has alleged that
Defendant imposed a prior restraint on his speech. Moreover,
the case Defendant Randall cites - Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972) -
does not recognize a due process exception for “de
minimis” invasions of First Amendment rights.
Rather, the Supreme Court in that case held that no
constitutional right was implicated by the facts before the
Court. See id.
next contends that due process required only “a
post-deprivation opportunity to voice . . . objections,
” and Plaintiff was afforded that opportunity insofar
as he complained of Defendant Randall's actions to other
government officials. Rep. in. Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt.
36] at 6-7. Regardless of whether a post-deprivation
opportunity to be heard would have satisfied Due Process in
this instance, no such opportunity was provided Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's unilateral complaints to other government
officials did not constitute “process” provided
him by Loudoun County any more than did Plaintiff's
filing of this lawsuit. In short, Defendant's Motion
provides no reason to dismiss Plaintiff's Due Process
Court notes further that Defendant Randall's Reply
implies it would be have been impracticable to provide
Plaintiff with any form of process. Shortly after
Defendant Randall filed the instant Motion, however, Loudoun
County adopted a new social media policy that employs the
The county's social media platforms are administered by
designated staff. When one of the county's social media
administrators suspects a violation of the Loudoun County
Social Media Comments Policy, he or she will contact the
Public Affairs and Communications Division of the Office of
the County Administrator, which will review and authorize
removal of a comment when appropriate. When appropriate and
if possible, a social media administrator will contact the
commenter regarding a violation of the county's Social
Media Comments Policy to notify the commenter and/or to
request voluntary removal of the comment. Appeals regarding
the Public Affairs and Communications Division's decision
to remove a comment may be submitted via email or phone at
703-777-0113; the Public Affairs and Communications Division
will respond to appeals within two business days.
Loudoun County Social Media Comments Policy,
visited Dec. 22, 2016). It therefore appears that affording
Plaintiff process might not have been as impracticable as
Defendant Randall contends.
Official Capacity Claims
next argues that Plaintiff's claims against her in her
official capacity should be dismissed because (1) the Court
dismissed Plaintiff's prior official-capacity claims
against Defendant Randall and (2) the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors is already a party to this action. As to the
former argument, again, the dismissal of Plaintiff's
prior claims against Defendant Randall has no bearing on
Plaintiff's ability to bring his new claims.
the latter argument, Defendant misapprehends the nature of an
official-capacity suit. By suing Defendant in her official
capacity, Plaintiff is bringing “a suit against [her]
office, ” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), which is to say the
office of the Chair of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors. That office is distinct from the Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors itself. And while it is true that a
claim against a government officer in her official capacity
may be dismissed when duplicative of claims against a larger
governmental body already named in the suit, see
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of Loudoun Cty.
Library, 2 F.Supp.2d 783, 790-91 (E.D. Va. 1998), that
is not the case here.
argues further that she is entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to Plaintiff's claims against her in her
government official is entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to suits against her in her individual capacity
unless “(1) the allegations underlying the claim, if
true, substantiate the violation of a federal statutory or
constitutional right; and (2) this violation was of a clearly
established right of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall
Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006). Defendant
contends that the law was not “clearly
established” here in light of “the pleaded and
acknowledged control and ownership all Facebook pages by
Facebook, which imposes its own terms and conditions and
possesses licensed software which allows for deletion of
postings or blocking of individuals by third parties as well
as Facebook.” Mem. in. Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt.
36] at 9.
however, does not explain the manner in which this left the
law unsettled. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has long
rejected the proposition that speech online is subject to a
different First Amendment standard than speech offline.
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870,
117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997). The Fourth Circuit
has already applied this principle to speech on Facebook.
See Bland, 730 F.3d at 385-86; see also
Liverman, 2016 WL 7240179, at *6-7 (finding a police
chief not entitled to qualified immunity for violating a
police officer's First Amendment rights in connection
with the officer's Facebook comments).
equally well established that the government may create a
“metaphysical” forum for speech by promulgating a
policy like the County's Social Media Comments Policy.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. These principles
in combination would put a reasonable government official on
notice that suppressing public comment in violation of that
policy would run afoul of the First Amendment - particularly
where, as here, Defendant is alleged to have engaged in
viewpoint discrimination, something the First Amendment
proscribes in virtually all contexts. See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377,
385-86 (1992). That being so, a reasonable government
official would also be on notice that depriving an individual
of their First Amendment rights without warning or recourse
implicates that individual's Due Process rights. See
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, 408 U.S. at 575 n.14;
see also Mem. Op. [Dkt. 11] at 19-20.
Defendant contends that “[t]here is no distinction
between the court's finding in favor of the Sheriff on
his entitlement to qualified immunity in Bland
[v. Roberts] and [Defendant's] entitlement to
qualified immunity in this case.” Rep. in. Supp. of
Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 36] at 8. In Bland, the Fourth
Circuit found that a sheriff who declined to reappoint a
deputy in retaliation for the deputy's act of
“liking” a political rival's Facebook page
was entitled to qualified immunity. See 730 F.3d at
391. The Court's decision, however, rested entirely on
its finding that its prior precedent regarding when sheriffs
may discharge deputies “sent very mixed signals.”
precedent has no application here. In short, Defendant is not
entitled to qualified immunity simply because this case
involves a relatively new technology. The Court confines its
qualified immunity analysis to the brief argument that
Defendant Randall has put forward, and reserves the question
of whether Defendant Randall is in fact entitled to qualified
immunity on other grounds or on a more fully developed
record. The Court declines, however, to supply arguments
Defendant Randall has not made.
foregoing reasons, the Court will deny both Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 39] and Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 35].
appropriate order will issue.
 Plaintiff's Motion also
occasionally cites “Ex 24.” The exhibit in
question, however, was not submitted to the Court prior to
the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion. As such, Defendant
Randall had no opportunity to address it. The exhibit appears
to be an image of Defendant Randall's Facebook page - one
including less detail than the image already appended to
Plaintiff's Complaint. See Compl. Exh. 18 [Dkt.
1-18]. It is not clear that the exhibit is properly before
the Court on the present Motions, but even assuming it is,
the image does not warrant summary judgment standing
 The Court emphasizes that it does not
now hold the County's Social Media Comments Policy does,
in fact, apply to Defendant Randall's Facebook page.
Rather, based on the allegations of and exhibits to
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly
pled that Defendant Randall's Facebook page is subject to
that policy. Courts “look[ ] to the policy and practice
of the government to ascertain whether it intended to
designate a [non-traditional forum] . . . as a public
forum.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). The record, at
this point, lacks information regarding the practice of the
Loudoun County government with respect to its social media