United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
TIMOTHY W. ALMARODE, Plaintiff,
JEFFERY L. NEWTON, Superintendent, MAJOR DOUGLAS UPSHAW, and MAJOR DAWN FLIPPIN, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION (Granting Defendants' Motion
E. Hudson United States District Judge
a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an
array of purported constitutional violations arising from
what Plaintiff perceives to be his unlawful detention by
officials at the Riverside Regional Jail in Prince George,
Virginia. His wide swath of claims include violations of the
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The
circumstances underlying Plaintiffs claims are difficult to
discern solely from the face of his inartful Complaint. It
appears, however, that the crux of his grievance is his
contention that personnel at the Riverside Regional Jail held
him in custody beyond his court ordered release date. In
support, he states that "the judge made clear my time
was done." (Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff, who
is pro se, seeks $1, 000, 000 in damages.
case is presently before the Court on the Defendants'
collective Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by a memorandum
supporting their position, and an appropriate notice
articulating the admonitions required under Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) (ECF Nos. 4, 5,
6, respectively). Plaintiff has filed no response to the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. This Court, nevertheless,
is obligated to ensure that dismissal is proper even when a
motion to dismiss is unopposed. See Stevenson v. City of
Seat Pleasant, Md, 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir.
addition to challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiff s claim
under the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the Defendants
also contend that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction or, alternatively, that the Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity. Because Plaintiffs claims are
grounded in constitutional violations, the Complaint facially
satisfies the federal question requirement for subject matter
jurisdiction. This Court need not reach the issue of whether
the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity since
Plaintiffs claims founder at the starting gate. Plaintiffs
claims are predicated on his misunderstanding of both the
underlying facts and applicable law.
of the stream of conscious nature of Plaintiff s marginally
decipherable Complaint, this Court is constrained to
reconstruct the relevant events by referring to the certified
public records appended to the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss. "Ordinarily, a court may not consider any
documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly
incorporated therein, on a motion to dismiss."
Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d
549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Braun v. Maynard,
652 F.3d 557, 559 n.l (4th Cir. 2011)). However, the court
may consider documents attached or incorporated into the
complaint, "as well as those attached to the motion to
dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and
authentic." Philips v. Pitt County Mem. Hosp.,
572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
to Plaintiffs claims is his contention that the Riverside
Regional Jail misconstrued orders of the Chesterfield County
General District Court in requiring him to remain confined
beyond his release date. Furthermore, these documents are
certified as accurate by the clerk of that court. Because
these documents are integral to his claim and have not been
objected to by the Plaintiff, they will be considered by the
Court in evaluating the plausibility of his constitutional
to the Complaint, Plaintiff was arrested on February 3, 2014
for driving while intoxicated, assault on a police officer,
and operating a motor vehicle with an open container of
alcohol. (Compl. ¶ 4; Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss, Exs. 1, 2, 8, ECF Nos. 5-1, 5-2, 5-8.) He was
released on bond on February 5, 2014. On April 11, 2014, the
Chesterfield County General District Court issued a capias
(attachment of the body) requiring the Plaintiff to be taken
into custody for failing to obey the conditions of pretrial
release. (Compl. ¶ 4; Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss, Ex. 5.) Following his arrest on May 3, 2014, on that
capias, he appeared again in the Chesterfield County General
District Court. At that time, he was ordered held without
bond. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 6.) On May 7,
2014, he was transferred from the Chesterfield County Jail to
Riverside Regional Jail. (Compl. ¶ 4.)
31, 2014, the Plaintiff appeared again before the
Chesterfield County General District Court. The Plaintiff
pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of alcohol and was sentenced to twelve months in jail, all of
which was suspended for three years, and fined $1, 000 with
payment of $750 suspended. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss, Ex. 2.) That same day, the charge of assaulting a
law enforcement officer was amended to simple assault, to
which Plaintiff pled guilty. He was immediately sentenced to
twelve months of confinement with the execution of six months
suspended for a period of three years on that charge.
(Id. at Ex. 1.)
respect to the capias, on which Plaintiff was then being held
in custody, the court on July 31, 2014 ordered the underlying
charge dismissed. (Id. at Ex. 5.) This discharged
Plaintiff from any further obligation on that charge.
(Id. at Ex. 7.)
asserts in his Complaint that he was advised by the court on
July 31, 2014 that he was receiving "time served."
(Compl. ¶ 5.) He bolsters this contention by stating
that several of the officials at the Riverside Regional Jail
concurred that he should have been released. (Id.
¶¶ 6-7.) The named Defendants, however, disagreed
and the court's records support their
position. Plaintiffs claims are the product of
Court's review of a motion to dismiss filed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is both informed and
constrained by the well-pleaded facts contained in the
complaint-and here, official public records integral to
Plaintiffs claims. In considering a motion to dismiss,
Plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true, and
the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff. T.G. Slater & Son, Inc. v. Donald P.
& Patricia A. Brennan LLC, 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th
Cir. 2004). Important to the task at hand, legal conclusions,
however, enjoy no such deference by the reviewing court.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In
reviewing the complaint for facial sufficiency, the court
must parse out legal conclusions and enriching commentary. As
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
pointed out in Francis v. Giacomelli, "naked
assertions of wrongdoing necessitate some factual enhancement
within the complaint to cross the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief." 588 F.3d
186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing BellAtl Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). "[A] court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a complaint must
allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, " Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, stating a claim that is "plausible on its
face." Id. at 570. A claim has facial
plausibility "when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
while the Court liberally construes pro se
complaints, it will not act as the inmate's advocate.
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978). "Principles requiring generous construction
of pro se complaints are not... without
limits." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
authenticated records of the Chesterfield County General
District Court-on which Plaintiffs claims turn-conclusively
demonstrate the implausibility of his allegations. Plaintiff,
in effect, received "time served" on the violation
of the terms of his pretrial release, not his conviction for
simple assault. The six months' sentence about which he
now complains was imposed on that separate offense.
(Defs.' Mem. Support Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1.) No credit was
given toward the satisfaction of that sentence for the time
served for violating the terms of his pretrial release.
Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff fails to plead a
plausible claim that the Defendants are liable for the
misconduct alleged. Because no legal or factual amendment can
resuscitate his ...