United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION (DISMISSING CASE FOR LACK OF
E. Hudson United States District Judge
MATTER is before the Court on its own initiative. Plaintiff
Michael Dilday ("Plaintiff) brings this action against
DIRECTV, LLC ("DIRECTV") and Equifax Information
Services, LLC ("Equifax") alleging violations of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15U.S.C. § 1681 et
seq. (See generally Compl., ECF No.
affirmative defense, DIRECTV asserted that Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring this action because he has not suffered a
concrete and particularized injury. (DIRECTV'S Answer
¶ 36, ECF No. 10.) Because this calls into question
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court ordered the parties to
submit memoranda addressing Plaintiffs standing. (ECF No.
to the Court's Order, Defendants filed a joint opening
brief on February 13, 2017, arguing that this Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff has suffered no
injury and thus has no standing. (ECF No. 14.) At Plaintiffs
request, the Court granted him a two-week extension to file
his response brief, yet he has failed to do so. (See
ECF No. 18.) Despite Plaintiffs lack of response, the Court
finds that the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the Court. The Court will
also dispense with oral argument, which would not aid in the
decisional process. E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(J).
reasons that follow, the Court finds that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction and therefore must dismiss this
three-count Complaint filed on December 21, 2016, Plaintiff
avers that DIRECTV obtained his consumer report from Equifax,
despite the fact that he never had an account with DIRECTV.
(Compl. ¶¶9, 10.) The Complaint, however,
conspicuously omits any factual allegation regarding why
DIRECTV obtained his credit report or how DIRECTV allegedly
contends that Equifax "did not have a lawful or
reasonable basis to believe, let alone know, that DIRECTV had
a permissible purpose to obtain and use [his] consumer
report" and that it lacked reasonable procedures to
"assume the proper use of and lawful purpose for such
reports." (Id. ¶¶ 12, 19.) Therefore,
Plaintiff asserts in a conclusory manner that he is
"entitled to recover actual damages" because
Equifax "provided and published" his consumer
report to DIRECTV. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17, 21.)
Plaintiff has failed to plead what those "actual
damages" are. And, when presented with the Court's
concern over whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction in
this case (see ECF No. 13), Plaintiff neither took
steps to defend the sufficiency of his factual allegations
nor attempted to file an amended complaint bolstering his
bedrock constitutional principle of our Federal Government is
the division of powers between its branches. As such, it is
well settled that judicial power is limited to the extent
that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only over
"cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const,
art. Ill. §2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction
requires a justiciable case or controversy within the meaning
of Article III of the United States Constitution. See
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) abrogated
on other grounds by Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014).
Standing constitutes one component of justiciability.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Whether a plaintiff has
standing presents a "threshold question in every federal
case, determining the power of the court to entertain the
suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975). "The objection that a federal court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction ... may be raised by a party, or
by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the
litigation Arbaugh v. Y&HCorp., 546 U.S. 500,
Supreme Court has established that the "irreducible
constitutional minimum" of standing includes three
elements: (1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the alleged misconduct; and (3) a
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. Lujan, 504 U.S at 560-61 (citations
omitted). Because Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court's
jurisdiction, he bears the burden of establishing all three
elements. Id. at 561. "Where, as here, a case
is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must 'clearly ...
allege facts demonstrating' each element."
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016),
as revised(May 24, 2016) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)).
Spokeo, the Supreme Court reiterated the basic
tenants of the standing doctrine. 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547
(2016). It noted that to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement, a plaintiff must show '"an invasion of
a legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and
particularized' and 'actual and imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.'" Id. at 1548
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
satisfy the particularization requirement, the plaintiff
"must allege a distinct and palpable injury to
himself." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (citations
omitted). The injury must "affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560 n.l. Claims asserting "'generalized
grievance[s]' shared in substantially equal measure by
all or a large class of citizens ... normally do ...