United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division
C. CACHERIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Defendant Darryl Hunter's
position on supervised release violations. [Dkt. 49.]
Defendant argues that the period between when the arrest
warrant was issued in March 2005 and when it was executed in
May 2017 was not “reasonably necessary” and,
therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(i) to impose punishment for his supervised
release violations. [Id.] For the reasons set forth
below, the Court disagrees. It retains jurisdiction and will
impose punishment for Defendant's admitted violations.
January 26, 1994, Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
846. [Dkt. 19.] The Court initially sentenced Defendant to
262 months' imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of
supervised release. [Dkt. 22.] Pursuant to a Rule 35 motion,
the Court later reduced Defendant's sentence to 120
months, followed by the same five-year term of supervised
release. [Dkt. 38.]
was released from BOP custody in June 2004. On March 25,
2005, the U.S. Probation Office filed a Petition on
Supervised Release with this Court, alleging that Defendant
violated the terms of his supervised release by committing a
new crime, failing to report in person to the probation
office upon being released from custody, and using a
controlled substance. [Dkt. 39.] On March 28, 2005, this Court
issued a warrant for his arrest.
April 20, 2005, Defendant's probation officer contacted
his mother via telephone and left a message for Defendant to
call the office. Defendant returned the call that same day.
His probation officer personally informed him that an arrest
warrant had been issued and instructed Defendant to turn
himself in the next day. Defendant failed to do so. On April
22, 2005, the probation officer again contacted
Defendant's mother in an attempt to reach Defendant, but
was unsuccessful. On May 20, 2005, the probation officer sent
a letter to Defendant's last known address on file,
instructing Defendant to report on June 2, 2005. Again,
Defendant did not show up. On July 8, 2005, the probation
officer contacted Defendant's mother for a third time.
His mother informed the probation officer that she had not
been in recent contact with Defendant and did not know his
the next twelve years, the United States Marshals attempted
to locate Defendant in order to execute the arrest warrant.
In March 2007, an investigator interviewed Defendant's
mother at her home. She stated that she had not seen or heard
from her son. That same month, an investigator also
interviewed the manager at Defendant's last known place
of employment. The investigator discovered that Defendant had
not worked there since December 2005. In May 2007, a Deputy
U.S. Marshal investigated Defendant's last known address
by interviewing the residents currently living there. They
had no knowledge of Defendant. A database search conducted in
May 2007 also revealed a second possible address. However,
the address turned out to be a demolished building. From 2010
until 2012, law enforcement learned no further information
about Defendant's whereabouts from its databases.
four years later, in November 2016, a database check finally
revealed a new potential address for Defendant. Investigators
interviewed the leasing office personnel at that address and
learned that a family unrelated to Defendant had been living
there since March 2016. That same month, investigators
learned that the social security number on file for Defendant
was currently being used by another individual in Maryland.
Through confidential witness interviews, the investigators
also obtained a new telephone number for Defendant. That
number was ultimately registered to an individual named
“Leroy White, ” however. The Government alleges
that Defendant fraudulently used this name. Finally, on May
4, 2017, due to the assistance of confidential informants,
the Marshals executed the warrant successfully. Defendant was
arrested at an apartment complex in Maryland; however, he was
not, and never had been, listed on the unit's lease.
made his initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Michael
Nachmanoff on May 10, 2017. [Dkt. 41.] He then appeared
before this Court for a Supervised Release Revocation Hearing
on May 18, 2017. [Dkt. 52.] That hearing was continued to May
25, 2017, to allow for further briefing on Defendant's
jurisdictional challenge, as well as to provide the Court
with additional information on the efforts of the U.S.
Marshals to locate Defendant over the past twelve years.
Having been fully briefed and argued, this matter is now ripe
3583 explains the Court's power to revoke a term of
supervised release after that term has expired. It states, in
relevant part, as follows:
The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release
for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to
order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment and,
subject to the limitations in subsection (h), a further term
of supervised release, extends beyond the expiration of the
term of supervised release for any period reasonably
necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before
its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or
summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (emphasis added). In other words, as
long as a warrant issues during a defendant's term of
supervised release for alleged violations of that
supervision, and any delay in bringing the defendant into
custody is “reasonably necessary, ” the Court
retains its jurisdiction to impose punishment. See United
States v. Sherry, ___F.Supp.3d. ___, 2017 WL 1823118, at
*3 (E.D. Va. May 5, 2017) (discussing the Court's
retained jurisdiction under a similar statute-18 U.S.C.
§ 3565(c)-regarding probation violations).
instant case, no one disputes that the arrest warrant issued
well before the expiration of Defendant's term of
supervised release. Although Defendant claims that he was
“easily locatable” and living with his mother
from 2004 until 2012, this seems far from credible,
especially in light of the evidence that his mother told U.S.
Marshals more than once that she had no knowledge of his
whereabouts. Furthermore, Defendant had been personally
informed by his probation officer that there was an active
warrant out for his arrest, but instead of self-surrendering,
he chose to abscond from supervision. Defendant's many
false addresses, as well as a telephone number registered in
an allegedly fake name, show an intentional ...