United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
SUNDARI K. PRASAD, Plaintiff,
DELTA SIGMA THETA SORORITY, INC., Defendant.
K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. The matter is before the Court for
evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2) and
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the
Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or
(2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first
standard includes claims based upon '"an
indisputably meritless legal theory/" or claims where
the '"factual contentions are clearly
baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417,
427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), qff'd, 36 F.3d 1091
(4th Cir. 1994). The second standard is the familiar standard
for a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and
the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give
the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."' Bell Ail. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with
complaints containing only "labels and conclusions"
or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level, " id.
(citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible
on its face, " id. at 570, rather than merely
"conceivable." Id. "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing BellAtl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all
the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.
2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States,
289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court
liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not
act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua
sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the
inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her
complaint. See Brockv. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243
(4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
action proceeds on Prasad's Particularized Complaint
("Complaint, " ECF No. 13). In her Complaint,
In and around 1997-2004, 1 was a member of Delta Sigma Theta
Sorority, incorporated [at Virginia Commonwealth University].
During "pledge" period, I was subjected to very
harsh treatment [and] vicious trauma in the form of
"hazing" - which [was] physical, mental, and
emotional. "Sisters" (other members) would have us
complete various tasks that were physical such as exercises,
buy them items using our money, some performed sexual favors,
some were yelled at, screamed at, suffered loss of sleep,
loss of meals, etc.
During "pledge" period, several letters were
written to the elder of our pledge group to tell of our
hazing - this was blamed on three of us - all three of us
were "legacy" - [meaning] our mothers were sorority
sisters and we were automatically granted membership by
"bloodline." The other sorority sisters considered
us "pauper" as if we meant nothing. All during this
"process" as they called it, we were denied food,
sleep, showers, talking to our families, and other rights,
and were harassed, and some beaten and forced to undergo
"process" daily to "cross the burning
sands." Us three "legacies" were not included
- but were still initiated. I refused to participate in the
hazing as it was against PanHellenic rules. In 2004, they
kicked me out of the sorority - for no reason at all - after
I stood up to the hazing [and] still reported it, [and]
complained about them violating my [Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA")] rights, etc. In jail - I
had flashbacks of this trauma.
The Defendants have defiled the Plaintiffs human [and] civil
rights by demeaning her to no less than a slave. "We
have to break you down to build you up." Then kicking
her out of [the] sorority [because] she complained about the
hazing. They are against [her because] she is disabled (Eta
Tau joked about her mental illness of depression often).
alleges violations of the ADA, "human rights, " and
the First,  Thirteenth, Fourteenth,  and
Fifteenth Amendments. (Id. at 2-3.) Prasad
seeks injunctive relief as well as monetary damages.
(Id. at 3-4.)
both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended
discussion of Prasad's theories for relief. See
Cochran v. Morris,73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)
(emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is
consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of
frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing
Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))).
Although Prasad's Complaint has many legal infirmities,
it ultimately will be dismissed as ...