United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
SUNDARI K. PRASAD, Plaintiff,
KARN ART INC. et al., Defendants.
Hannah Lauck, United States Distort Judge.
K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in for ma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. By Memorandum Order entered on July 20,
2017, the Court directed Prasad to file a particularized
complaint. (ECF No. 11.) Prasad has complied with that
directive and the Particularized Complaint (ECF No. 14) is
before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the
Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or
(2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first
standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably
meritless legal theory, " or claims where the
"factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
(1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994).
The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5 A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and
the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with
complaints containing only "labels and conclusions"
or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level, " id.
(citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible
on its face, " id. at 570, rather than merely
"conceivable." Id. "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all
the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,
309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United
States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,
while the Court liberally construes pro se
complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151
(4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate
and develop, sua sponte, statutory and
constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise
on the face of his or her complaint. See Brock v.
Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J.,
concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
action proceeds on Prasad's Particularized Complaint
("Complaint, " ECF No. 14).
names Karn Art, Inc, Sean Karn, and Athena Karn, as
Defendants ("Defendants"). (Id. at 1.) In
her section titled, "Statement of Claim, " Prasad
Sean Karn, a Hampton Roads tattoo artist - and I dated in
2010 - 2011. During this time - he sexually and physically
abused me, emotionally abused me, slandered and libeled me,
invaded my privacy, threatened to kill me, got me a DUI
conviction, raped me and put the video online on social media
as well as sold the video for profit, and funded a company
using my middle name: Karma - to slander me, under his
company name: Karn Art, Inc. His wife, Athena Karn, assisted
him with this, and also threatened to kill me with him - and
did so on social media - that my attorney, Judith Collier has
proof of - as well as threatened to assault [and] batter me
online and "knock my teeth out" - which she sent
people to do in 2015 - in an actual assault and battery - all
of this is criminal, but since 1 have been incarcerated since
2015 on false charges from Hendrix, I cannot prosecute and
have to do civil suits to pursue my civil rights as well. She
also threatened the life of my two year-old son - then an
contends that this conduct violated federal and state
criminal law, including "revenge porn laws" and
"obscenity laws" (id. at 2), the Americans
with Disabilities Act, copyright and trademark law,
"human rights, " and the First,  Fifth,
Ninth,  Tenth,  Thirteenth, and, Fourteenth Amendments.
(Id. at 2-5.) Prasad seeks "declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief of 43 million dollars."
(Id. at 8.)
both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended
discussion of Prasad's theories for relief. See
Cochran v. Morris,73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)
(emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is
consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of
frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing
Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))).
Although Prasad's Complaint has many legal infirmities,
it ultimately will be ...