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Prasad v. Karn Art, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division

November 2, 2017

SUNDARI K. PRASAD, Plaintiff,
v.
KARN ART INC. et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          M. Hannah Lauck, United States Distort Judge.

         Sundari K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in for ma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.[1] By Memorandum Order entered on July 20, 2017, the Court directed Prasad to file a particularized complaint. (ECF No. 11.) Prasad has complied with that directive and the Particularized Complaint (ECF No. 14) is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

         I. Preliminary Review

         Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory, " or claims where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

         "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5 A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, " id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face, " id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

         II. Prasad's Complaint

         The action proceeds on Prasad's Particularized Complaint ("Complaint, " ECF No. 14).

         Prasad names Karn Art, Inc, Sean Karn, and Athena Karn, as Defendants ("Defendants"). (Id. at 1.) In her section titled, "Statement of Claim, " Prasad alleges:[2]

Sean Karn, a Hampton Roads tattoo artist - and I dated in 2010 - 2011. During this time - he sexually and physically abused me, emotionally abused me, slandered and libeled me, invaded my privacy, threatened to kill me, got me a DUI conviction, raped me and put the video online on social media as well as sold the video for profit, and funded a company using my middle name: Karma - to slander me, under his company name: Karn Art, Inc. His wife, Athena Karn, assisted him with this, and also threatened to kill me with him - and did so on social media - that my attorney, Judith Collier has proof of - as well as threatened to assault [and] batter me online and "knock my teeth out" - which she sent people to do in 2015 - in an actual assault and battery - all of this is criminal, but since 1 have been incarcerated since 2015 on false charges from Hendrix, I cannot prosecute and have to do civil suits to pursue my civil rights as well. She also threatened the life of my two year-old son - then an infant.

         (Compl. 1-2.)

         Prasad contends that this conduct violated federal and state criminal law, including "revenge porn laws" and "obscenity laws" (id. at 2), the Americans with Disabilities Act, copyright and trademark law, "human rights, " and the First, [3] Fifth, [4] Ninth, [5] Tenth, [6] Thirteenth, [7]and, Fourteenth[8] Amendments. (Id. at 2-5.)[9] Prasad seeks "declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief of 43 million dollars." (Id. at 8.)

         III. Analysis

         It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of Prasad's theories for relief. See Cochran v. Morris,73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))). Although Prasad's Complaint has many legal infirmities, it ultimately will be ...


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