United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Danville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HON.
JACKSON L. KISER SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
me is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
of the United States Magistrate Judge recommending that I
grant the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF
No. 15]. The R&R was filed on August 29, 2017 [ECF No.
17], and Plaintiff Sabrina Carrico filed objections on
September 11, 22017 [ECF No. 18]. The Commissioner did not
respond and the matter is now ripe for review. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). After careful review and consideration,
and for the reasons stated below, I will overrule
Plaintiff's objection and grant the Commissioner's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June
15, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental
security income pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security
Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f (2016).
(R. 169-177.) In her application, Plaintiff alleged that she
had been disabled since May 25, 2012, due to a combination of
anxiety, depression, arthritis in her hips and shoulders, and
hearing loss in her left ear. (See, e.g., R. 72.)
The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's claims initially on
October 4, 2012, and again upon reconsideration on April 8,
2013. (See R. 72-92.)
On
August 12, 2014, Plaintiff appeared with her attorney before
Administrative Law Judge H. Munday (“the ALJ”).
(R. 35-71.) Both Plaintiff and a vocational expert, James
Gannow, testified. (Id.) In a written decision dated
November 7, 2014, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Act. (See
generally R. 19-30.) He found that Plaintiff suffered
from “anemia, back disorder, depression and anxiety,
” all of which qualified as serious impairments. (R. 21
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)).) ALJ Munday found that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination or
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one
of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (R. 23(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d),
416.925, 416.926).)
After
consideration of the entire Record, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. § 416.967(b), with some limitations.
(See R. 25.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was
capable of performing past relevant work as a motel cleaner,
and that she would be able to perform jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, such as price
maker, garment sorter, and hand packer. (R. 28-29 (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1565(a), 416.969, 419.969(a).)
Accordingly, he concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Act. (R. 30.) The Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review, and the decision
of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner on
February 9, 2016. (R. 1-4.)
On
March 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court to
challenge the final decision of the Commissioner. (Compl.
[ECF No. 2].) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I
referred the case to the United States Magistrate Judge for
consideration. The Commissioner filed a motion for summary
judgment, and Plaintiff filed relevant evidence in support of
her claim for benefits. (See Pl.'s Br., Aug. 15,
2016 [ECF No. 14]; Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Sept. 9, 2016
[ECF No. 15].) On August 29, 2017, Judge Hoppe filed his
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”),
recommending that I grant the Commissioner's motion for
summary judgment and affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
(R&R, Aug. 29, 2017 [ECF No. 17].) On September 11, 2017,
Plaintiff filed her pro se objection to the R&R.
(Pl.'s Obj., Sept. 11, 2017 [ECF No. 18] [hereinafter
“Pl.'s Obj.”].) The Commissioner did not
respond, so the matter is ripe for review.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress
has limited the judicial review I may exercise over decisions
of the Social Security Commissioner. I am required to uphold
the decision where: (1) the Commissioner's factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standard. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2014); Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit has long
defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171,
176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In other words, the substantial
evidence standard is satisfied by producing more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence.
Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1966).
The
Commissioner is charged with evaluating the medical evidence
and assessing symptoms, signs, and findings to determine the
functional capacity of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527-404.1545 (2014); see Shively v. Heckler,
739 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that it is the role
of the ALJ, not the vocational expert, to determine
disability). The Regulations grant the Commissioner latitude
in resolving factual inconsistencies that may arise during
the evaluation of the evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527, 416.927 (2014). Unless the decision lacks
substantial evidence to support it, the ultimate
determination of whether a claimant is disabled is for the
ALJ and the Commissioner. See id. §§
404.1527(e), 416.927(e); Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987). If the ALJ's resolution of the
conflicts in the evidence is supported by substantial
evidence, then I must affirm the Commissioner's final
decision. Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. In reviewing the
evidence, I must not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting
evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [my]
judgment for that of the Secretary, ” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 176 (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 589), or
the secretary's designate, the ALJ, Craig, 76
F.3d at 589 (quoting Walker, 834 F.2d at 640).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's
pro se objections to the R&R make no specific
complaints about Judge Hoppe's review of the Record.
Rather, she asks that someone “look at [her] case
again.” (Pl.'s Obj., pg. 2.) Although Plaintiff is
now proceeding pro se, I am confined by the
applicable law. Mere repetition of those arguments made to
and rejected by Magistrate Judge Hoppe is generally not
sufficient to state an objection under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72. As has been stated before:
The issues that Plaintiff raises in her general objection
have already been addressed by Magistrate Judge [Hoppe] when
they were before him in Plaintiff's summary judgment
brief. Allowing a litigant to obtain de novo review
of her entire case by merely reformatting an earlier brief as
an objection “make[es] the initial reference to the
magistrate useless. The functions of the district court are
effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the
district court perform identical tasks. This duplication of
time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving
them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates
Act.”
Veney v. Astrue, 539 F.Supp.2d 841, 845-46 (W.D. Va.
2008) (quoting Howard v. Sec'y ofHealth and
Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, I
will grant her review of Judge Hoppe's R&R for clear
error. Cf. Diamond v. Colonial ...