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Kitlinski v. Sessions

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division

November 9, 2017

DAREK KITLINSKI and LISA KITLINSKI, Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, et al., Defendants.

          Hon. Ivan D. Davis Judge

          MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

          Liam O'Grady United States District Judge

         On October 2, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 101). This memorandum opinion accompanies the Court's Order (Dkt. No. 127).

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiffs Darek and Lisa[1] Kitlinski are former employees at the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). Darek joined DEA in 1998 and Lisa joined in 1997. In 2010, Darek was a supervisory special agent in DEA's San Diego Field Office and Lisa was a supervisor and forensic chemist in the Southwest Laboratory in Vista, California. Lisa subsequently applied for a position as a Program Manager in the Quality Assurance Section of the Office of Forensic Sciences in DEA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. She was selected for the position effective July 3, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Darek began to apply to DEA's Career Board for a transfer to the Washington, D.C. area pursuant to DEA's Married Core Series Transfer Policy ("MCSTP"). Darek ultimately filed a multitude of transfer requests, which have been addressed at length in the pleadings and in prior Orders of this Court. Thus the Court will not review each job application in detail here. It may be useful, however, to provide brief overview of the circumstances which gave rise to this action.

         From March 1, 2011 to June 4, 2014, Darek applied for transfer to the D.C area seven times. Darek filed his first request to transfer on March 1, 2011. The request was denied by the Career Board on April 27, 2011. Darek submitted the transfer request for reconsideration on June 20, 2011. This request was denied by the Career Board on June 29, 2011. On August 2, 2011, Darek submitted an informal Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint, claiming that DEA had denied his first two MCSTP requests because of his gender.

         On September 1, 2011, Darek filed a formal EEO complaint with DEA, again claiming that DEA had denied his transfer requests due to his gender. The DEA investigated this complaint and issued a decision on June 12, 2012 denying all Darek's claims. Darek appealed the decision to the Office of Federal Operations ("OFO"). On March 9, 2015, the OFO issued a decision finding that DEA had failed to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying Darek's transfer requests under the MCSTP. OFO denied DEA's request for reconsideration on August 11, 2015.

         In January, May, and September of 2012, Darek submitted his third, fourth, and fifth MCSTP requests. The DEA Career Board denied all these requests. Darek subsequently filed an informal EEO complaint, claiming that his fourth and fifth requests were denied because DEA was retaliating against him because of prior protected activity. He alleged that members of the Career Board knew of Darek's protected activity when he submitted his fourth and fifth transfer requests.

         In June of 2014, Darek filed another MCSTP request for transfer to Washington, D.C. As part of this application, Darek claimed a need to be transferred under the Rehabilitation Act due to medical hardship. He claimed he had injured his Achilles tendon and needed ongoing care in Washington, D.C. DEA denied this request, concluding that comparable care could be provided for Darek in San Diego. In August 2014, Darek filed an informal complaint of gender discrimination and reprisal based on the denial of this transfer request.

         On September 23, 2014, Darek went to DEA Headquarters for a deposition regarding one of his EEO claims. Darek and Lisa traveled together, and parked their car in the DEA Headquarters garage. After the deposition, they returned to their home in Alexandria, Virginia. They claim that when they returned home, Darek discovered a Blackberry cellular telephone wedged under the hood of their vehicle. The phone was ultimately determined to belong to Human Resources Section Chief Donna Rodriguez. Lisa contacted DEA OPR to report the discovered phone. OPR asked Lisa to appear for an interview regarding the phone. Lisa initially refused to appear. When she did appear, she refused to answer questions, asserting marital communication privilege and attorney-client privilege. DEA instructed Darek to appear for an interview regarding the Blackberry, but he refused. Ultimately, the DEA terminated Plaintiffs for their refusal to cooperate with the internal investigation.

         Plaintiffs brought this action before this Court in January 2016, alleging a series of violations in eleven counts. This Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' Counts 2, 8, and 9. See Dkt. No. 51 (dismissing Counts 8 and 9); Dkt. No. 53 (dismissing Count 2). On August 1, 2017, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Counts 1, 3-7, 10, and

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "A genuine issue of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2010). "It is an axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court "must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it is ultimately the nonmovant's burden to persuade [the Court] that there is indeed a dispute of material fact." CoreTel Va., LLC v. Verizon Va., LLC, 752 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 2014). That showing requires "more than a scintilla of evidence-and not merely conclusory allegations or speculation-upon which a jury could properly find in its favor." Id.

         The function of the Court at the summary judgment stage is not to determine the truth of a.matter or to weigh credibility, but to determine whether there is any genuine issue of fact that can only properly be resolved by a finder of fact because it could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Washington Sport Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). One of the principle purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).

         III. ANALYSIS

         As an initial matter, Plaintiffs failed to respond sufficiently to many facts set forth in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. The Local Rules instruct that a party responding to a Motion for Summary Judgment "shall include a specifically captioned section listing all material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated and citing the parts of the record relied on to support the facts alleged to be indispute" Local. Civ. R. 56(B) (emphasis added). In determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its listing of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion. The Fourth Circuit has explained that a party opposing a, motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, " but must "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue ...


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