United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Newport News Division
KIMBERLY T. LOVETT, Plaintiff,
v.
TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT COMMISSION OF HAMPTON ROADS, d/b/a HAMPTON ROADS TRANSIT, Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER
HENRY
COKE MORGAN, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter comes before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff Kimberly
T. Lovett's ("Plaintiffs" or
"Lovett's") Motion to Stay. Doc. 4. For the
reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS the
Motion to Stay.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed her Complaint in this Court on June 30, 2017. Doc. 1
("Compl."). She alleged that Defendant
Transportation District Commission of Hampton Roads d/b/a
Hampton Roads Transit ("Defendant" or
"HRT") violated the Equal Pay Act ("EPA")
and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). See
generally id.
Plaintiff
filed the instant Motion to Stay on October 26, 2017. Doc. 5.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 30, 2017. Doc.
6. After receiving an extension from the Court, Defendant
responded in opposition to the instant Motion to Stay on
November 15, 2017. Doc. 14. Plaintiff replied in support of
the instant Motion to Stay on November 21, 2017. Doc. 17.
Plaintiff
also amended her Complaint, with Defendant's consent, on
November 28, 2017. See Doc. 19 ("Am.
Compl."). She alleged the same two (2) claims for relief
that she previously alleged. See id.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
"The
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for the litigants." Landis v. N. Am.
Co.. 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). "[P]roper use of
this authority calls for the exercise of judgment which must
weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance."
Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F.2d 124,
127 (4th Cir. 1983) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). "The party seeking a stay must justify it by
clear and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm
to the party against whom it is operative."
Williford, 715 F.2d at 127. "Specifically, a
district court should consider three factors: '(1) the
interests of judicial economy; (2) hardship and equity to the
moving party if the action is not stayed; [and] (3) potential
prejudice to the non-moving party.'" Sehler v.
Prospect Mortg., LLC, No. I:13cv473, 2013 WL 5184216, at
*2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2013) (quoting Johnson v. DePuv
Orthopaedics. Inc., No. 3:12cv2274, 2012 WL 4538642, at
*2 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012)).
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
requests a stay until March 5, 2018. Doc. 5 at 1. She states
that she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on
September 3, 2017, regarding a Title VII claim based on the
same facts as this litigation. Id. at 1. 4. She
seeks the stay until the first business day following the
expiration of the one hundred eighty (180) days for the EEOC
to investigate the charge. Id. at 1.
Plaintiff
has met her burden of demonstrating the need for a stay. The
cases that Defendant cites where courts denied stays involve
clearer patterns of delay. See, e.g.. Arora v.
James, No. 5:14cv18, 2015 WL 1352097, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar.
24, 2015) (case pending for almost a year). Here, the delay
was only two (2) months, and the shortness of that delay
suggests that negligence is more likely the cause of the
delay than any intentional attempt to prolong the
case.[1] Plaintiff is also correct that judicial
economy favors combining claims that are based on essentially
the same facts and that she could suffer claim preclusion in
the absence of a stay. See, e.g.. Wilkes v. Wy.
Dep't of Employment Div. of Labor Standards, 314
F.3d 501, 505 (10th Cir. 2002), as amended (Jan. 14, 2003)
(applying claim preclusion to a Title VII claim in light of
judgment on EPA and FLSA claims). Plaintiff is incorrect in
her assertion that she cannot seek an early Right to Sue
letter, as there is no binding authority on point, and while
the Western District of Virginia case she cited
supports her argument, courts in the Eastern
District of Virginia have thus far adopted the opposite view.
See Taylor v. Cardiology Clinic. Inc., No.
4:14cv00046, 2015 WL 770439, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2015)
(finding that the EEOC cannot issue early right to sue
letters, as Plaintiff asserts, and citing the relevant
Eastern District authority with which it disagreed).
Nevertheless, Defendant also cites no authority that seeking
an early letter is a mandatory prerequisite to seeking a
stay. See Doc. 14 at 2-3. Plaintiff need not seek unusual
remedies such as early letters in order to meet the standard
for a stay, especially where she only seeks a stay for the
one hundred eighty (180) day period. Because judicial economy
and the risk of severe prejudice to Plaintiff both clearly
favor a stay, and because Defendant will suffer minimal
prejudice from a short delay, the Court GRANTS the instant
Motion to Stay.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the
reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS the
Motion to Stay, Doc. 4, and STAY this case
until March 5, 2018. The Court further
ORDERS Plaintiff to file a
status report regarding the Right to Sue letter on March 5,
2018.
The
Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of this
Opinion & Order to all ...