United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CLAUDE
M. HILTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
THIS
MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Objections to the
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge dated
September 27, 2017. Plaintiff William Perry petitioned this
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review
of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration ("Defendant") denying his
claim for disability insurance benefits and social security
insurance under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security
Act. Both Plaintiff and Defendant filed motions for summary
judgment. Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) provides that a magistrate
judge may hear a dispositive motion, without the consent of
the parties, and recommend the disposition of the matter to a
district judge. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). Additionally, the Rule
requires a district judge to whom a case is assigned to make
a de novo determination on the record, or receive
additional evidence, on any portion of the magistrate
judge's disposition, to which a party has made a specific
written objection. Id. Further, a party must make
any objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation
within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the
order or waives its right to appellate review.
Under 4
2 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court's review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is limited to
determining whether there is substantial evidence to support
the Commissioner's findings of fact and whether those
findings were reached by application of the proper legal
standards. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th
Cir. 2012). After a thorough review and analysis of the
administrative record and Plaintiff's assignments of
error, the Magistrate Judge found that the Commissioner's
decision was supported by substantial evidence. The
Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment be denied, and that Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment be granted. The Magistrate Judge further
found that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike was not properly
presented, and therefore recommended that the Motion to
Strike be denied.
Plaintiff
filed timely objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636,
Rule 72(b), and Local Rule 7, challenging the Magistrate
Judge's recommendation regarding the cross motions for
summary judgment. Having conducted a de novo review
of the administrative record and the controlling case law,
and after considering the Plaintiff's objections, this
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation.
Plaintiff
raises five objections to the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation. Plaintiff argues (1) that the Magistrate
Judge erroneously affirmed the findings of the Administrative
Law Judge (the "ALJ") despite the fact that the ALJ
failed to mention or weigh multiple severe impairments; (2)
that the Magistrate Judge erroneously rejected
Plaintiff's argument that he established an unrebutted
prima facie case, where the only contrary evidence was
opinions of non-examining physicians; (3) that the ALJ could
not rely on the opinions of non-examining physicians; (4)
that the ALJ found limitations of Plaintiff's
concentration existed, but failed to reflect those in the
hypothetical question given to the vocational expert; and (5)
that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational
expert failed to include other limitations that the ALJ found
credible.
Plaintiff's
first objection, that the Magistrate Judge erred in failing
to conclude that the ALJ committed reversible error by not
discussing certain other impairments from which Plaintiff
allegedly suffered, is without merit. The ALJ followed the
five-step sequential analysis required for evaluation of a
Social Security disability's claimant's eligibility.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.92
0(a)(4). That sequential analysis requires the ALJ to
consider whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an
impairment that equals a condition contained within the
Social Security Administration's official Listing of
Impairments; (4) has an impairment that prevents past
relevant work; and (5) has an impairment that prevents him
from any substantial gainful activity. Id.
Plaintiff's
first objection challenges the ALJ's step two findings by
arguing that the ALJ did not discuss all of the
Plaintiff's impairments. However, nearly all of the
various impairments that Plaintiff alleges the ALJ omitted
from her decision were related to and derived from
Plaintiff's cerebral hemorrhage/stroke, which the ALJ did
discuss in great detail and found to be a severe impairment.
Additionally, although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should
have found anxiety to be a severe impairment, the Magistrate
Judge correctly noted that Plaintiff never alleged anxiety
when he applied for disability, and Plaintiff's counsel
at the administrative hearing expressly represented that
there was "no reference to depression or anxiety in the
record." Furthermore, after finding that the cerebral
hemorrhage/stroke constituted a severe impairment, the ALJ
advanced Plaintiff's application beyond step two of the
sequential analysis. Thus, the ALJ did not commit reversible
error in her step two analysis of Plaintiff s impairments,
and her findings were supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff
further objects in Objections 2 and 3 to the Magistrate
Judge's conclusion that the ALJ properly afforded weight
to the opinions of state agency physicians, which Plaintiff
maintains were unsupported by and inconsistent with the
record. The Magistrate Judge addressed and rejected this
argument, noting that opinion evidence is relevant, that the
ALJ is required to consider and give weight to such, and that
the ALJ properly did so in this case. This Court agrees with
the Magistrate Judge's conclusion.
Finally,
in Objections 4 and 5, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate
Judge's conclusion that the hypothetical provided by the
ALJ to the vocational expert for determining whether
Plaintiff's impairments would prohibit him from
performing any substantial gainful activity was proper.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to reflect
multiple material limitations in the hypothetical.
The
ALJ's hypothetical was based on her determination that
Plaintiff could perform unskilled work in a non-production
oriented work setting. The ALJ made this determination after
considering and assigning weight to the evidence presented in
the record. This Court finds that the ALJ's determination
was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ considered
Plaintiff's limitations in determining Plaintiff's
residual functioning capacity ("RFC"), and the
hypothetical provided to the vocational expert instructed him
to assume an individual of Plaintiff's age, education,
work experience, and with the same RFC assigned to Plaintiff.
Thus, the record indicates that the ALJ did consider and
properly include Plaintiff's limitations in the
hypothetical provided to the vocational expert.
Based
on a de novo review of the evidence in this case,
having reviewed the Report and Recommendation and the
Plaintiff's Objections, it appears to the Court that the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is neither
clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Accordingly, this
Court affirms the findings of the Magistrate Judge.
For the
foregoing reasons, this Court finds that summary judgment
should be granted in favor of Defendant. ...