FROM
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG F. Patrick Yeatts,
Judge
Yvonne
Z. Schewel (Yvonne Z. Schewel LLC, on brief), for appellant.
John
I. Jones, IV, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Alston and AtLee Argued by
teleconference
OPINION
RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR., JUDGE
A judge
of the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg sentenced
Terrance Kevin Hall to three mandatory minimum periods of
incarceration in connection with his pleas of guilty to
certain drug distribution offenses. On appeal, Hall argues
that the circuit court erred when it imposed those mandatory
minimum sentences. We disagree, and affirm.
I.
Background
The
evidence is undisputed. On three dates in late 2014, Hall
sold cocaine. The Commonwealth charged him with three counts
of distribution of cocaine, second or subsequent offense, in
violation of Code § 18.2-248, and the circuit court
later convicted him of those offenses.[1] Sentencing
occurred in February 2017. On the day of sentencing, just
before Hall's hearing was to begin, his attorney provided
the Commonwealth a copy of a two-page summary of the three
drug transactions that formed the basis for his charges. The
document was handwritten by Hall, and the last paragraph
stated:
I'm sorry I don't have any information as far as the
supplier goes. The only knowledge I had of the man was a
phone number. We did not really associate on a personal
level[;] the relationship was purely business. I only called
and placed an order and I'd meet him, that was the extent
of our relationship. He would only be recognizable to me by
sight.
During
the sentencing hearing, Hall moved the circuit court not to
impose the mandatory minimum periods of incarceration
("the mandatory minimums") otherwise required upon
a conviction of a second or subsequent offense of
distribution of cocaine. Hall provided a written motion to
the circuit court, which included the handwritten document as
an attachment.
Code
§ 18.2-248(C) contains a five-factor test ("the
safety valve provision"). If a trial court finds that a
defendant has complied with all five factors, the mandatory
minimums do not apply. Hall's motion addressed each
factor, and he argued that because he had satisfied all five
factors, the mandatory minimums were inapplicable. The only
factor about which the parties disagreed was subpart "e,
" which requires that "[n]ot later than the time of
the sentencing hearing, the person has truthfully provided to
the Commonwealth all information and evidence the person has
concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same
course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan." The
circuit court denied Hall's motion, finding that
"the motion is not timely and there has not been
compliance with the statute." For each of the three
counts of cocaine distribution, second or subsequent offense,
the circuit court sentenced Hall to five years in the
penitentiary, with two years suspended, for a total sentence
on those charges of fifteen years in the penitentiary with
six years suspended. Hall then noted this appeal.
II.
Analysis
We
review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 Va.App. 561, 567, 760
S.E.2d 132, 135 (2014). When those decisions "involve
the interpretation of a statute or the common law, such an
interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo
on appeal." Id. at 568, 760 S.E.2d at 135. In
this case, the circuit court convicted Hall of three counts
of distribution of cocaine, second or subsequent offense, in
violation of Code § 18.2-248(C). That subsection
provides that any person convicted of a second or subsequent
offense of distribution of cocaine "may, in the
discretion of the court or jury imposing the sentence, be
sentenced to imprisonment for life or for any period not less
than five years, three years of which shall be a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment to be served consecutively with
any other sentence." However, later in Code §
18.2-248(C), the safety valve provision states as follows:
The mandatory minimum term of imprisonment to be imposed for
a violation of this subsection shall not be applicable if ...