United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior United States District Judge.
Valentine Awe, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, had filed
a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and other various federal and Virginia laws. On account of
Plaintiffs "three strikes" under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g), I had referred, inter alia, his application
to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee to the
magistrate judge for a report and
recommendation. The magistrate judge has issued that
report, recommending, inter alia, denying the
application, and Plaintiff has objected. (ECF No. 36.) I
overrule the objections, adopt the report and recommendation,
deny Plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment, deny as
moot all pending motions, and dismiss the case without
Mullens and Dr. H. Smith, who are both doctors for inmates in
the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections, had
allegedly refused to treat Plaintiffs life-threatening heart
condition caused by cholesterol. During an evidentiary
hearing before the magistrate judge, Plaintiff claimed to
have high LDL cholesterol that placed him in danger of
life-threatening heart disease. Plaintiff said that he was 49
years old and that he had suffered from high LDL cholesterol
since the age of 20. Plaintiff testified that a number of his
male ancestors had died young of heart disease or arterial
sclerosis. He said that plaque buildup in his arteries had
required his father to undergo quadruple cardiac bypass
surgery at age 38. He said his father died of congestive
heart failure at age 53. Plaintiff said that both his
paternal grandfather and his great-grandfather had died
young, but he was not certain of the causes of their deaths.
general objection to the report and recommendation is merely
a reiteration of his testimony before the magistrate judge.
He repeats that tests from the late 1980s showed that he
carried a "gene/marker" of increased sensitivity to
dietary cholesterol. Plaintiff disagrees with Dr. Mullens
characterization of the cholesterol as "near
optimal" and instead deems his cholesterol level as
"high." Plaintiff also alleges that "all"
his paternal relatives died from "heart failures."
district court must review de novo any part of a
report and recommendation to which a party objects, and it
must provide its independent reasoning when a party raises
new evidence or a new argument in an objection. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The reasoning need not be elaborate
or lengthy, but it must provide a specific rationale that
permits meaningful appellate review. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2009). Notably, de novo review is not required
"when a party makes general or conclusory objections
that do not direct the court to a specific error in the
magistrate judge's proposed findings and
recommendations." Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47. A
district court is also not required to review any issue when
no party has objected. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Camby v. Davis,
718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983).
objection is overruled. Plaintiff admitted that he had never
been diagnosed as suffering from a heart attack or heart
disease; had never been told that he had any blockages in his
heart arteries; and had never undergone any diagnostic
testing such as a heart catheterization or radiographic
imaging to diagnose plaque buildup in his heart arteries. As
of November 22, 2016, Plaintiffs total cholesterol level was
203 mg/dl; his HDL cholesterol level was 44 mg/dl; his LDL
cholesterol level was 136 mg/dl; and his triglycerides level
was 116 mg/dl. Plaintiff last saw Dr. Mullens in November
2016, and Dr. Mullens had said that the HDL levels would
offset the LDL levels.
Mullens stated that Plaintiffs November 2016 LDL cholesterol
level of 136 was "near optimal" and did not put
Plaintiff at imminent risk of a serious medical event. Dr.
Mullens stated that a "Risk Calculator" showed that
Plaintiff had a 3.3% chance of suffering a stroke or heart
attack within the next 10 years. Although Plaintiff had been
prescribed a statin medication to reduce his LDL cholesterol
levels in the past, a statin medication was not reordered
because it was not medically indicated for Plaintiff unless
his chance of stroke or heart attack was greater than 5%. Dr.
Mullens stated that statins were not justified because their
risks of serious side effects, such as breakdown of muscle
tissue and liver and kidney damage, outweighed any benefit
Plaintiff might receive.
accordance with the report and recommendation, I find that
Plaintiff does not qualify for the exception to the
"three-strikes" rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Consequently, the report and recommendation is adopted,
Plaintiff is denied leave to proceed without prepayment of
the filing fee,  and the complaint is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to pay. See, e.g., Dupree v.
Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2002) (reasoning
that the filing fee is due upon filing a civil action when in
forma pauperis provisions do not apply to plaintiff
and that the court is not required to permit plaintiff an
opportunity to pay the filing fee after recognizing plaintiff
is ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis). All
pending motions are denied as moot. See, e.g.,
Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Ferris, 179 U.S. 602,
606 (1900). If Plaintiff pays the $400 filing fee within ten
days, the court will reopen the action.
 I also stayed adjudication of the
complaint until the filing fee was resolved. Nonetheless,
defendants filed a dispositive motion. Because resolution of
the filing fee disposes of the case, the dispositive motion
is dismissed as moot.
 Besides the one timely objection,
Plaintiff later filed a response in opposition to
defendants' dispositive motion. Plaintiff filed the
response beyond the time to object to the report and
recommendation and did not request to file it as an objection
out of time. Cf Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1). Accordingly, I do not
consider the late filing as an objection to the report and
recommendation. See, e.g.. Caldwell v. Jackson, 831
F.Supp.2d 911, 914 (M.D. N.C. 2010) (recognizing that any
attempt to introduce new evidence after the magistrate judge
has acted is disfavored).
 The court had previously warned
Plaintiff in this case and many others that a conditional
filing order about proceeding without prepayment of the
filing fee would be rescinded if the court determines that
Plaintiff has "three-strikes." Any such order