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International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

February 15, 2018

INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD MASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants - Appellants. and ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED, Plaintiffs, THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; ALABAMA; IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE; ARKANSAS; ARIZONA; FLORIDA; KANSAS; LOUISIANA; MISSOURI; OHIO; OKLAHOMA; SOUTH CAROLINA; TEXAS; WEST VIRGINIA, Amici Supporting Appellant, T.A., A U.S. Citizen of Yemeni Descent; RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER; NEW YORK; CALIFORNIA; CONNECTICUT; DELAWARE; ILLINOIS; IOWA; MAINE; MARYLAND; MASSACHUSETTS; NEW MEXICO; OREGON; RHODE ISLAND; VERMONT; VIRGINIA; WASHINGTON; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; CATO INSTITUTE; MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE; MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL; COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, California; IMMIGRATION EQUALITY; THE NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT; THE NATIONAL QUEER ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER ALLIANCE; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW YORK; LESBIAN AND GAY BAR ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO; GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS; BAY AREA LAWYERS FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM; IMMIGRATION LAW PROFESSORS ON STATUTORY CLAIMS; CITY OF CHICAGO; CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE; THE AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS; SCHOLARS OF IMMIGRATION LAW; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; PROFESSORS OF FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND IMMIGRATION LAW; COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES; INTERFAITH GROUP OF RELIGIOUS AND INTERRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CLERGY MEMBERS; TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES; INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS; KAREN KOREMATSU; JAY HIRABAYASHI; HOLLY YASUI; FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW & EQUALITY; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR; CITY OF NEW YORK; MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNSEL, INC., Amici Supporting Appellee. IRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JOHN DOE #6; IRANIAN STUDENTS' FOUNDATION, Iranian Alliances Across Borders Affiliate at the University of Maryland College Park, Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; L. FRANCIS CISSNA, in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants - Appellants. THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; ALABAMA; IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE; ARKANSAS; ARIZONA; FLORIDA; KANSAS; LOUISIANA; MISSOURI; OHIO; OKLAHOMA; SOUTH CAROLINA; TEXAS; WEST VIRGINIA, Amici Supporting Appellant, T.A., A U.S. Citizen of Yemeni Descent; RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER; NEW YORK; CALIFORNIA; CONNECTICUT; DELAWARE; ILLINOIS; IOWA; MAINE; MARYLAND; MASSACHUSETTS; NEW MEXICO; OREGON; RHODE ISLAND; VERMONT; VIRGINIA; WASHINGTON; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; CATO INSTITUTE; MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE; MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL; COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, California; IMMIGRATION EQUALITY; THE NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT; THE NATIONAL QUEER ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER ALLIANCE; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW YORK; LESBIAN AND GAY BAR ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO; GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS; BAY AREA LAWYERS FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM; IMMIGRATION LAW PROFESSORS ON STATUTORY CLAIMS; CITY OF CHICAGO; CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE; THE AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS; SCHOLARS OF IMMIGRATION LAW; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; PROFESSORS OF FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND IMMIGRATION LAW; COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES; INTERFAITH GROUP OF RELIGIOUS AND INTERRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CLERGY MEMBERS; TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES; INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS; KAREN KOREMATSU; JAY HIRABAYASHI; HOLLY YASUI; FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW & EQUALITY; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR; CITY OF NEW YORK; MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNSEL, INC., Amici Supporting Appellee. EBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3, Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants - Appellants. THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; ALABAMA; IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE; ARKANSAS; ARIZONA; FLORIDA; KANSAS; LOUISIANA; MISSOURI; OHIO; OKLAHOMA; SOUTH CAROLINA; TEXAS; WEST VIRGINIA, Amici Supporting Appellant, T.A., A U.S. Citizen of Yemeni Descent; RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER; NEW YORK; CALIFORNIA; CONNECTICUT; DELAWARE; ILLINOIS; IOWA; MAINE; MARYLAND; MASSACHUSETTS; NEW MEXICO; OREGON; RHODE ISLAND; VERMONT; VIRGINIA; WASHINGTON; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; CATO INSTITUTE; MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE; MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL; COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, California; IMMIGRATION EQUALITY; THE NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT; THE NATIONAL QUEER ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER ALLIANCE; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW YORK; LESBIAN AND GAY BAR ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO; GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS; BAY AREA LAWYERS FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM; IMMIGRATION LAW PROFESSORS ON STATUTORY CLAIMS; CITY OF CHICAGO; CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE; THE AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS; SCHOLARS OF IMMIGRATION LAW; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; PROFESSORS OF FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND IMMIGRATION LAW; COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES; INTERFAITH GROUP OF RELIGIOUS AND INTERRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CLERGY MEMBERS; TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES; INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS; KAREN KOREMATSU; JAY HIRABAYASHI; HOLLY YASUI; FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW & EQUALITY; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR; CITY OF NEW YORK; MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNSEL, INC., Amici Supporting Appellee. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD MASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs - Appellants, and PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants - Appellees. T.A., A U.S. Citizen of Yemeni Descent; RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER; NEW YORK; CALIFORNIA; CONNECTICUT; DELAWARE; ILLINOIS; IOWA; MAINE; MARYLAND; MASSACHUSETTS; NEW MEXICO; OREGON; RHODE ISLAND; VERMONT; VIRGINIA; WASHINGTON; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; CATO INSTITUTE; MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE; MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL; COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, California; IMMIGRATION EQUALITY; THE NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT; THE NATIONAL QUEER ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER ALLIANCE; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES; THE LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW YORK; LESBIAN AND GAY BAR ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO; GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS; BAY AREA LAWYERS FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM; IMMIGRATION LAW PROFESSORS ON STATUTORY CLAIMS; CITY OF CHICAGO; CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE; THE AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS; SCHOLARS OF IMMIGRATION LAW; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; PROFESSORS OF FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND IMMIGRATION LAW; COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES; INTERFAITH GROUP OF RELIGIOUS AND INTERRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CLERGY MEMBERS; TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES; INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS; KAREN KOREMATSU; JAY HIRABAYASHI; HOLLY YASUI; FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW & EQUALITY; CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR; CITY OF NEW YORK; MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNSEL, INC., Amici Supporting Appellants, THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; ALABAMA; IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE; ALABAMA; ARKANSAS; ARIZONA; FLORIDA; KANSAS; LOUISIANA; MISSOURI; OHIO; OKLAHOMA; SOUTH CAROLINA; TEXAS; WEST VIRGINIA, Amici Supporting Appellee.

          Argued: December 8, 2017

         Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:17-cv-00361-TDC; 8:17-cv-02921-TDC; 1:17-cv-02969-TDC)

         ARGUED:

          Hashim M. Mooppan, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

          Cecillia D. Wang, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

         ON BRIEF:

          Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Jeffrey B. Wall, Deputy Solicitor General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Douglas N. Letter, Sharon Swingle, H. Thomas Byron III, Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Stephen M. Schenning, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

          Karen C. Tumlin, Nicholas Espiritu, Melissa S. Keaney, Esther Sung, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, Los Angeles, California; Omar C. Jadwat, Lee Gelernt, Hina Shamsi, Hugh Handeyside, Sarah L. Mehta, David Hausman, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York; Justin B. Cox, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, Atlanta, Georgia; Kathryn Claire Meyer, Mariko Hirose, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, New York, New York; David Rocah, Deborah A. Jeon, Sonia Kumar, Nicholas Taichi Steiner, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Cody H. Wofsy, Spencer E. Amdur, San Francisco, California, David Cole, Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., for Appellees/Cross-Appellants International Refugee Assistance Project, Hias, Inc, .

          John Doe #1 & 3, Jane Doe #2, Middle East Studies Association of North America, Inc., Muhammed Meteab, Arab American Association of New York, Yemeni-American Merchants Association, Mohamad Mashta, Grannaz Amirjamshidi, Fakhri Ziaolhagh, Shapour Shirani, Afsaneh Khazaeli, John Doe #4, John Doe #5. Johnathan Smith, Sirine Shebaya, MUSLIM ADVOCATES, Washington, D.C.; Richard B. Katskee, Eric Rothschild, Andrew L. Nellis, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, Washington, D.C.; Mark H. Lynch, Mark W. Mosier, Herbert L. Fenster, Jose E. Arvelo, John W. Sorrenti, Katherine E. Cahoy, Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Karun Tilak, COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Iranian Alliances Across Borders, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Jane Doe #4, Jane Doe #5, Jane Doe #6, Iranian Students' Foundation.

          Charles E. Davidow, Robert A. Atkins, Lisa Velazquez, Andrew J. Ehrlich, Steven C. Herzog, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, New York, New York; Lena F. Masri, Gadeir Abbas, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.; Faiza Patel, Michael Price, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, New York, New York; Jethro Eisenstein, PROFETA & EISENSTEIN, New York, New York, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Eblal Zakzok, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Jane Doe # 2, John Doe #3, Jane Doe #3.

          Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Jordan Sekulow, Craig L. Parshall, Matthew R. Clark, Benjamin P. Sisney, Washington, D.C., Edward L. White III, Erik M. Zimmerman, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Francis J. Manion, Geoffrey R. Surtees, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, New Hope, Kentucky, for Amicus The American Center for Law and Justice.

          Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, J. Campbell Barker, Deputy Solicitor General, Ari Cuenin, Assistant Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Austin, Texas; Steve Marshall, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, Montgomery, Alabama; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona; Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS, Little Rock, Arkansas; Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, Tallahassee, Florida; Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS, Topeka, Kansas; Jeff Landry, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Joshua D. Hawley, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI, Jefferson City, Missouri; Michael DeWine, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio; Mike Hunter, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Alan Wilson, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina; Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Amici State of Texas, State of Alabama, State of Arizona, State of Arkansas, State of Florida, State of Kansas, State of Louisiana, State of Missouri, State of Ohio, State of Oklahoma, State of South Carolina, and State of West Virginia.

          Christopher J. Hajec, Julie B. Axelrod, Michael M. Hethmon, Elizabeth A. Hohenstein, Mark S. Venezia, IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Immigration Reform Law Institute.

          Richard D. Bernstein, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus T.A. Amir H. Ali, RODERICK & SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center.

          Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor General, Zainab A. Chaudhry, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, New York, New York; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, Sacramento, California; George Jepsen, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT, Hartford, Connecticut; Matthew P. Denn, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware; Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, Chicago, Illinois; Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IOWA, Des Moines, Iowa; Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE, Augusta, Maine; Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Maura Healey, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, Boston, Massachusetts; Hector Balderas, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OREGON, Salem, Oregon; Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISLAND, Providence, Rhode Island; Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VERMONT, Montpelier, Vermont; Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON, Olympia, Washington; Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C., for Amici State of New York, State of California, State of Connecticut, State of Delaware, State of Illinois, State of Iowa, State of Maine, State of Maryland, State of Massachusetts, State of New Mexico, State of Oregon, State of Rhode Island, State of Vermont, State of Virginia, State of Washington, and the District of Columbia.

          Lynne Bernabei, Alan R. Kabat, BERNABEI & KABAT, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amici National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Advocates for Youth, Center for Reproductive Rights, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under the Law, The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Mississippi Center for Justice, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Urban League, People for American Way Foundation, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, and The Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs.

          Daniel Braun, Peter Jaffe, Washington, D.C., David Y. Livshiz, Cameron C. Russell, Karen Wiswall, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS & DERINGER U.S. LLP, New York, New York, for Amicus Cato Institute.

          Amy Briggs, John W. McGuinness, Sirena Castillo, Matthew Bottomly, Olufunmilayo Showole, Ketakee Kane, Benjamin G. Shatz, MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Muslim Justice League, Muslim Public Affairs Council, and Council on American-Islamic Relations, California.

          Jonathan Weissglass, Rebecca C. Lee, ALTSHULER BERZON LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici International Labor Organizations.

          Nicole G. Berner, Deborah L. Smith, Leo Gertner, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Service Employees International Union.

          Judith Rivlin, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, Washington, D.C., for Amicus American Federation of State, County And Municipal Employees.

          David J. Strom, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., for Amicus American Federation of Teachers.

          Jody Calemine, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Communications Workers of America.

          Niraj R. Ganatra, Ava Barbour, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, Detroit, Michigan, for Amicus International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace And Agricultural Implement Workers Of America.

          Mario Martínez, MARTÍNEZ AGUILASOCHO & LYNCH, APLC, Bakersfield, California, for Amicus United Farm Workers of America.

          Nicholas Clark, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, Washington, D.C., for Amicus United Food and Commercial Workers.

          Eric J. Gorman, Matthew E. Sloan, Noelle M. Reed, Allison B. Holcombe, Richard A. Schwartz, Alyssa J. Clover, Sarah Grossnickle, Jonathan Fombonne, Jennifer H. Berman, Joseph M. Sandman, Brittany Ellenberg, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Aaron Morris, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, New York, New York; Virginia M. Goggin, NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT, New York, New York; Glenn Magpantay, THE NATIONAL QUEER ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER ALLIANCE, New York, New York, for Amici Immigration Equality, New York City Gay And Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance, LGBT Bar Association of Los Angeles, LGBT Bar Association of Greater New York, Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom.

          Fatma Marouf, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Fort Worth, Texas; Sabrineh Ardalan, Philip L. Torrey, Nathan MacKenzie, Law Clerk, Dalia Deak, Law Student, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Geoffrey Hoffman, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER, Houston, Texas; Karla McKanders, VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL, Nashville, Tennessee; Alan Hyde, RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL, Newark, New Jersey, for Amici Immigration Law Professors on Statutory Claims.

          Nick Kahlon, Chicago, Illinois, Ryan P. Poscablo, Brian Neff, Eliberty Lopez, RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA, LLP, New York, New York; Edward N. Siskel, Corporation Counsel, Benna Ruth Solomon, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Andrew W. Worseck, Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel, Jonathon D. Byrer, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Sara K. Hornstra, Carl Newman, CITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus City of Chicago.

          Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Los Angeles, California, for Amicus City of Los Angeles.

          Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, CITY OF NEW YORK, New York, New York, for Amicus Mayor and City Council of New York.

          Sozi Pedro Tulante, City Solicitor, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Amicus City of Philadelphia. John Daniel Reaves, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, Washington, D.C., for Amicus United States Conference of Mayors.

          James L. Banks, Jr., City Attorney, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Amici City of Alexandria and Mayor Allison Silberberg. Anne L. Morgan, City Attorney, CITY OF AUSTIN LAW DEPARTMENT, Austin, Texas, for Amicus City of Austin.

          Andre M. Davis, City Attorney, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amici Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

          Eugene L. O'Flaherty, Corporation Counsel, CITY OF BOSTON, Boston, Massachusetts, for Amici City of Boston and Mayor Martin J. Walsh.

          Kenneth W. Gordon, Attorney to the Town, Town of Brighton, New York, Rochester, New York, New York, for Amicus Town of Brighton.

          G. Nicholas Herman, General Counsel, THE BROUGH LAW FIRM, PLLC, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Amicus Town of Carrboro.

          Matthew T. Jerzyk, City Solicitor, OFFICE OF THE CITY SOLICITOR, Central Falls, Rhode Island, for Amicus James A. Diossa, Mayor of Central Falls, Rhode Island.

          Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney for Cook County, Office of the States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus Cook County, Illinois.

          W. Grant Farrar, Corporation Counsel, CITY OF EVANSTON LAW, Evanston, Illinois, for Amicus City of Evanston. Gregory L. Thomas, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Gary, Indiana, for Amicus City of Gary.

          Eleanor M. Dilkes, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Iowa City, Iowa, for Amicus City of Iowa City. Aaron O. Lavine, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Ithaca, New York, for Amicus Svante L. Myrick, Mayor of Ithaca.

          Susan L. Segal, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Amicus City of Minneapolis. Michael P. May, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Madison, Wisconsin, for Amicus City of Madison.

          Marc P. Hansen, County Attorney, COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Rockville, Maryland, for Amicus Montgomery County.

          Jon Cooper, Director of Law, DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Amici Mayor Megan Barry, Metropolitan Government of Nashville, and Davidson County. John Rose, Jr., Corporation Counsel, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, New Haven, Connecticut, for Amici City of New Haven and Mayor Toni N. Harp.

          Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Oakland, California, for Amicus City of Oakland.

          Lourdes Sanchez Ridge, City Solicitor, Chief Legal Officer, CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Amicus City of Pittsburgh.

          Tracy Reeve, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Portland, Oregon, for Amicus City of Portland.

          Jeffrey Dana, City Solicitor, OFFICE OF THE CITY SOLICITOR, Providence, Rhode Island, for Amici City of Providence and Mayor Jorge O. Elorza.

          Brian F. Curran, Corporation Counsel, CITY OF ROCHESTER, Rochester, New York, for Amicus City of Rochester.

          Samuel J. Clark, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for Amicus City of Saint Paul.

          Dennis J. Herrera, San Francisco City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, San Francisco, California, for Amici City and County of San Francisco.

          Richard Doyle, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, San José, California, for Amicus City of San José

          James R. Williams, County Counsel, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL, San José, California, for Amicus Santa Clara County.

          Peter S. Holmes, Seattle City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Seattle, Washington, for Amicus City of Seattle.

          Michael M. Lorge, Corporation Counsel, VILLAGE OF SKOKIE, Skokie, Illinois, for Amicus Village of Skokie.

          Stephanie Steele, Corporation Counsel, DEPARTMENT OF LAW, South Bend, Indiana, for Amicus City of South Bend.

          Michael Rankin, City Attorney, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Tucson, Arizona, for Amicus City of Tucson.

          Michael Jenkins, JENKINS & HOGIN, LLP, Manhattan Beach, California, for Amicus City of West Hollywood.

          Aaron X. Fellmeth, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR COLLEGE OF LAW, Phoenix, Arizona; Bruce V. Spiva, Elisabeth C. Frost, Amanda R. Callais, PERKINS COIE LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici International Law Scholars and Non-Governmental Organizations.

          Ilana H. Eisenstein, John M. Leitner, Ryan S. Macpherson, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Donald Francis Donovan, David W. Rivkin, Jennifer R. Cowan, Elizabeth Nielsen, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, New York, New, for Amicus International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute.

          Peter Margulies, ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Bristol, Rhodes Island; Alan E. Schoenfeld, Scott McAbee, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, New York, New York, for Amicus Scholars of Immigration Law.

          Peter Karanjia, Geoffrey Brounell, Washington, D.C., Victor A. Kovner, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, New York, New York; Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, David H. Gans, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, Washington, D.C.; Raymond H. Brescia, Professor of Law, ALBANY LAW SCHOOL, Albany, New York, for Amicus Members of Congress. Meir Feder, Rasha Gerges Shields, JONES DAY, New York, New York, for Amici Professors of Federal Courts Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, and Immigration Law.

          Thomas J. Perrelli, Lindsay C. Harrison, Tassity S. Johnson, JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Colleges and Universities and Clergy Members.

          Jennifer K. Brown, Amanda Aikman, New York, New York, Purvi G. Patel, Los Angeles, California, Marc A. Hearron, Sophia M. Brill, Sandeep N. Nandivada, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Interfaith Group of Religious and Interreligious Organizations.

          Tina R. Matsuoka, Navdeep Singh, Meredith S.H. Higashi, Rachana Pathak, Albert Giang, NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C.; Joshua David Rogaczewski, James W. Kim, Philip J. Levine, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus National Asian Pacific American Bar Association.

          Andrew J. Pincus, Paul W. Hughes, John T. Lewis, MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Technology Companies.

          Abed A. Ayoub, Samer E. Khalaf, Yolanda C. Rondon, Anton G. Hajjar, AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, Washington, D.C.; Christopher J. Wright, Adrienne E. Fowler, E. Austin Bonner, HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.

          Robert S. Chang, Lorraine K. Bannai, Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, SEATTLE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Seattle, Washington; Pratik A. Shah, Martine E. Cicconi, Washington, D.C., Robert A. Johnson, Alice Hsu, New York, New York, Jessica M. Weisel, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Los Angeles, California; Eric Yamamoto, Fred T. Korematsu, Professor of Law and Social Justice, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII WILLIAM S. RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW, Honolulu, Hawaii; Robert L. Rusky, San Francisco, California; Dale Minami, Donald K. Tamaki, MINAMI TAMAKI LLP, San Francisco, California; Peter Irons, Director Emeritus, Earl Warren Bill of Rights Project, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO, San Diego, California; Leigh-Ann K. Miyasato, Honolulu, Hawaii; Rodney L. Kawakami, Seattle, Washington, for Amici Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, Holly Yasui, The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Civil Rights Organizations, and National Bar Associations of Color. Gare A. Smith, Michael B. Keating, Kristyn M. DeFilipp, Christopher E. Hart, Daniel L. McFadden, FOLEY HOAG LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Massachusetts Technology Leadership, Council, Inc.

          Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, MOTZ, TRAXLER, KING, AGEE, KEENAN, WYNN, DIAZ, FLOYD, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

          GREGORY, Chief Judge:

         I.

         A.

         On January 27, 2017-seven days after taking the oath of office-President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 13, 769, "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" ("EO-1"), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Invoking his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), President Trump immediately suspended for ninety days the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of foreign aliens from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d 570, 586 (D. Md. 2017). The President's national security officials were taken by surprise by EO-1. See J.A. 172-74 (describing confusion in the cabinet after EO-1); 455 (declaration of Former National Security Officials, stating that EO-1 did not undergo the usual deliberative process); 786 (statements of Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, explaining that she was deliberately not consulted prior to EO-1).

         Immediately before signing EO-1, President Trump remarked that it was "the 'Protection of the Nation from Terrorist Entry into the United States.' We all know what that means." IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 586. Just after signing, President Trump stated in an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network that EO-1 would give preference to Christian refugees. Referring to Syria, President Trump stated that "[i]f you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible . . . . And I thought it was very, very unfair." J.A. 250. One day after he issued EO-1, President Trump told reporters that implementation of EO-1 is "working out very nicely and we're going to have a very, very strict ban." J.A. 173. That same day, former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, an advisor to the President, stated that President Trump told him that he wanted a "Muslim ban" and requested that Giuliani assemble a commission to show him "the right way to do it legally." J.A. 297.

         Individuals, organizations, and states across the nation challenged EO-1 in federal court, and two federal courts issued injunctions enjoining the enforcement of EO-1. See Washington v. Trump, No. 17-141, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F.Supp.3d 724, 739 (E.D. Va. 2017). In response to these injunctions, then-White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer maintained that EO-1 was lawful but promised a new order would issue soon. J.A. 127. Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller stated that the new order would be "responsive" to recent court rulings, but described the changes as "mostly minor technical differences" that would not invalidate the "basic policy outcome" of EO-1. J.A. 128.

         On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13, 780, which was given the same title as EO-1 and was scheduled to take effect on March 16, 2017. 82 Fed. Reg. 13, 209 (Mar. 6, 2017) ("EO-2"). EO-2 revoked EO-1 but nevertheless bore many similarities to its predecessor. Invoking both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), President Trump re-imposed the same ninety-day ban on entry into the United States for nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen but removed Iraq from the list. Id. at 13, 210-12. Like its predecessor, EO-2 directed various government officials to conduct a worldwide review during the 90-day suspension period to determine whether foreign governments were providing adequate information about their nationals seeking entry into the United States. Id. The Secretary of Homeland Security was to report these findings to the President, and nations identified as providing inadequate information were to be given an opportunity to improve their practices. At the conclusion of this review, the Secretary of Homeland Security was to "submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested." Id.

         Like its predecessor, EO-2 was soon challenged in multiple courts and preliminarily enjoined. See Hawai'i v. Trump, 245 F.Supp.3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017); IRAP v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d at 566. This Court (sitting en banc) and the Ninth Circuit both affirmed the injunctions on appeal. IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter "IRAP I") (en banc); Hawai'i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in both cases and left the injunctions in place pending its review except as to foreign nationals who lacked a "credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States." Trump v. IRAP, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017).

         B.

         On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (the "Proclamation"), 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 161 (Sept. 24, 2017). Invoking both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), the Proclamation succeeds EO-2 and indefinitely suspends the entry of some or all immigrants and nonimmigrants from eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (the "Designated Countries"). Id. at 45, 165-67. Six of these countries-Chad, Libya, Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen-are majority-Muslim and have a combined population of approximately 150 million people. J.A. 234-48, 852-59.

         The Proclamation indicated that the worldwide review ordered by EO-2 was complete and recited some of the review's processes and results. 82 Fed. Reg. at 45, 162. The Government did not make the report part of the record for the Court's review, and it conceded during oral argument that the validity of the Proclamation rises or falls on the rationale presented within its four corners. Oral Arg. 32:30-33:00.

         As part of the review, the Secretary of Homeland Security reportedly created a "baseline for the kinds of information required from foreign governments to support the United States Government's ability to confirm the identity of individuals seeking entry into the United States" or other benefits under the immigration laws and "to assess whether they are a security or public-safety threat." 82 Fed. Reg. at 45, 162. Three categories of baseline criteria were used to determine the quality of a country's information sharing and are listed in § 1 of the Proclamation. Id. at 45, 162-63.

         The first category involves "identity-management information, " which the Proclamation states is "needed to determine whether individuals seeking benefits under the immigration laws are who they claim to be." Id. at 45, 162. Criteria in this category "include whether the country issues electronic passports embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity, reports lost and stolen passports to appropriate entities, and makes available upon request identity-related information not included in its passports." Id.

         The second category involves "national security and public-safety information, " which the Proclamation states is needed to determine whether "persons who seek entry to this country pose national security or public-safety risks." Id. Criteria include "whether the country makes available, directly or indirectly, known or suspected terrorist and criminal-history information upon request, whether the country provides passport and national-identity document exemplars, and whether the country impedes the United States Government's receipt of information about passengers and crew traveling to the United States." Id.

         The third category involves a "national security and public-safety assessment." Id. at 45, 162-63. This category consists of various national security risk indicators, including "whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven, whether it is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program . . . that meets all of its requirements, and whether it regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States." Id.

         Applying these baseline criteria, the Department of Homeland Security identified sixteen countries as "inadequate." Id. at 45, 163. Thirty-one additional countries were classified as "at risk" of becoming inadequate. Id. Then followed a fifty-day engagement period during which all countries, including those not identified as "inadequate" or "at-risk, " were encouraged to improve their information-sharing practices. Id.

         Ultimately, the Secretary of Homeland Security recommended eight countries for entry restrictions, recommendations that President Trump adopted in full. The Secretary determined that Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen continued to be "inadequate" and recommended that nationals from these countries be subjected to entry restrictions. Id. Somalia did meet the baseline criteria but was nonetheless added to the list of countries subject to entry restrictions under the Proclamation because its "government's inability to effectively and consistently cooperate, combined with the terrorist threat that emanates from its territory, present special circumstances that warrant restrictions and limitations on the entry of its nationals into the United States." Id. at 45, 164-65, 45, 167. Iraq did not meet the baseline criteria but was exempted from entry suspensions in light of "the close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq's commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)." Id. at 45, 163. Instead, Iraqi nationals will face "additional scrutiny." Id. The Proclamation does not indicate whether any other countries that also failed the baseline were nonetheless not recommended for entry restrictions.

         The Proclamation imposes different restrictions on immigrants and nonimmigrants from the eight countries, but all restrictions are indefinite. Id. at 45, 164, 45, 169. The Proclamation suspends immigration from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen; it exempts Venezuela, which failed the baseline criteria, but includes Somalia, which passed. Id. at 45, 165-67. The Proclamation also restricts some or all categories of nonimmigrants from all countries except Somalia, whose nationals will instead undergo additional scrutiny. Id. Specifically, it bars the issuance of all nonimmigrant visas to Syrian and North Korean nationals; of all nonimmigrant visas except F, M, and J visas to Iranian nationals; and of B-1, B-2, and B-1/B-2 visas to Libyan, Yemeni, and Chadian nationals. Id. But because the Government has "alternative sources for obtaining information to verify the citizenship and identity of nationals from Venezuela, " the Proclamation only suspends B-1, B-2, and B-1/B-2 visas for "government officials . . . who are responsible for the identified inadequacies." Id. at 45, 166.

         The Proclamation only applies to foreign nationals who are outside the United States on the effective date and "do not have a valid visa" or "qualify for a visa or other valid travel document." Id. at 45, 167. The Proclamation does allow for waivers, but they are discretionary and require the foreign national to prove that denying entry would cause "undue hardship, " that entry would "not pose a threat to the national security or public safety of the United States, " and that entry "would be in the national interest." Id. at 45, 168. The Proclamation does not allow any categorical exemptions, even for the immediate relatives of American citizens. Id. at 45, 168-69.

         The entry restrictions were effective immediately for foreign nationals who 1) were subject to EO-2's restrictions and 2) lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. Id. at 45, 171. For all other affected persons, the Proclamation was scheduled to take effect on October 18, 2017. Id.

         C.

         As with EO-1 and EO-2, the Proclamation faced swift legal challenge within this circuit and in the Ninth Circuit.

         Three separate lawsuits were brought or amended in the District Court for the District of Maryland and are now consolidated before us on appeal. One challenge was brought by the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), HIAS, Inc., Middle East Studies Association (MESA), Arab-American Association of New York (AAANY), Yemeni-American Merchants Association (YAMA), John Doe Nos. 1 and 3-5, Jane Doe No. 2, Muhammed Meteab, Mohamad Mashta, Grannaz Amirjamshidi, Fakhri Ziaolhagh, Shapour Shirani, and Afsaneh Khazaeli (collectively, the "IRAP Plaintiffs"). A second was brought by the Iranian Alliances Across Borders (IAAB), the Iranian Students' Foundation (ISF), and Doe Nos. 1-6 (collectively, the "IAAB Plaintiffs"). And a third was brought by Eblal Zakzok, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, John Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe Nos. 2-3 (collectively, the "Zakzok Plaintiffs").[1]

         The three cases assert that the Proclamation and EO-2 violate some or all of the INA, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Free Speech and Free Association Clauses of the First Amendment, the equal protection and procedural due process components of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Refugee Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

         The twenty-three individual Plaintiffs are all U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and most of them have close family members who are nationals of the Designated Countries and who are in the process of applying for immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to the United States. Most of the individual Plaintiffs are also members of the Muslim faith, whether practicing or non-practicing. Three organizational Plaintiffs (IRAP, HIAS, and AAANY) "primarily provide services to clients, " who are primarily either refugees or members of the Arab-American and Arab immigrant community. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 594. The remaining organizational Plaintiffs (MESA, YAMA, IAAB, and ISF) "convene events on issues relating to the Middle East or advocate on behalf of their members." Id. All Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief.

         Each of these three separate cases names some or all of the following as Defendants: President Trump in his official capacity; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Kirstjen M. Nielsen in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; the U.S. Department of State and Rex W. Tillerson in his official capacity as Secretary of State; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Dan Coats in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence; Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, III in his official capacity as Attorney General; Kevin K. McAleenan in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and L. Francis Cissna in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

         Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the Proclamation in its entirety before it took effect. They claimed that the Proclamation violated the Establishment Clause's prohibition on disfavoring religion, exceeded the President's authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)'s prohibition on nationality discrimination in the issuance of visas, and failed to comply with § 1182(f)'s procedural requirements.[2] On October 17, 2017, the district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Proclamation's entry restrictions, subject to certain exceptions. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 633. The district court held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their § 1152(a) claim and their Establishment Clause claim but not on the merits of their § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) claims. The district court conformed the injunction to the terms of the Supreme Court's June 2017 stay, limiting it to individuals "who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States." Id. at 631 (citing Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088). But the court declined to enjoin the Proclamation as to travelers from Venezuela or North Korea because the balance of equities favors the Government. That same day, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawai'i also enjoined the Proclamation, concluding that it likely violated § 1182(f) and § 1152(a)(1). Hawai'i v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d 1140, 1160-61 (D. Haw. 2017).

         On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court granted the Government's request for a complete stay pending appellate review of the two district courts' preliminary injunctions. Trump v. IRAP, 138 S.Ct. 542, 542 (2017) (mem.). In light of the stay, the relevant agencies have fully implemented the entry restrictions laid out in the Proclamation as of December 8, 2017.[3] Dep't of State, New Court Order on Presidential Proclamation (Dec. 4, 2017) (saved as ECF opinion attachment 1) (hereinafter "State Department Statement") ("Per the Supreme Court's orders, those restrictions will be implemented fully, in accordance with the Presidential Proclamation, around the world, beginning December 8 at open of business, local time."); see also DHS, Fact Sheet: The President's Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sept. 24, 2017) (saved as ECF opinion attachment 2) (hereinafter "DHS Fact Sheet").

         On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, concluding that the Proclamation likely exceeded the scope of the President's authority under § 1182(f), failed to comply with § 1182(f)'s procedural prerequisites, and violated § 1152(a)(1)'s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination. Hawai'i v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 2017). The Government filed for a writ of certiorari on January 5, 2018, which the Supreme Court granted on January 19, 2018. Trump v. Hawai'i, No. 17-965, 2018 WL 324357, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2018).

         II.

         We evaluate a district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2012). Under this standard, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and review its legal conclusions de novo. Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011).

         A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief." Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). The plaintiff "need not establish a certainty of success, but must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 7).

         We turn first to the Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits.

         III.[4]

         "The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); accord Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (holding that Establishment Clause prohibits "one religious denomination [from being] officially preferred over another."). "When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is to take sides." McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005). "[T]he Establishment Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality, 'religious gerrymanders, ' as well as obvious abuses." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)). Similarly, "any covert suppression of particular religious beliefs" is unconstitutional. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (plurality opinion).

         The Plaintiffs allege that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause by disfavoring Muslims. We begin by considering (and rejecting) the Government's challenges to the justiciability of Plaintiffs' claim. We then turn to Plaintiffs' likelihood of succeeding on the merits. We find that Plaintiffs have met their high burden of demonstrating that the Proclamation's purported purpose is not "bona fide" under Mandel and therefore proceed to determine whether the Proclamation has a primarily secular purpose. Examining official statements from President Trump and other executive branch officials, along with the Proclamation itself, we conclude that the Proclamation is unconstitutionally tainted with animus toward Islam.

         A.

         "Concerns of justiciability go to the power of the federal courts to entertain disputes, and to the wisdom of their doing so." Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991). The Government raises two challenges to the justiciability of Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim: first, Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III, and second, Plaintiffs' claim is not ripe.[5] As we explain below, we reject both arguments and find Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim justiciable.

         1.

         First, the Government claims that Plaintiffs have not properly alleged an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy Article III's standing requirement. We disagree. For many of the same reasons as in IRAP I, we find that many of the individual Plaintiffs and two of the organizational Plaintiffs have standing because they have sufficiently alleged personal contact with unconstitutional religious animus. See 857 F.3d at 582-86.

         Article III of the Constitution gives this Court jurisdiction only over "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1. One element of a "case" or "controversy" is that the plaintiff have standing-that is, "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). The Supreme Court has articulated three requirements that together are the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The plaintiff "must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61); accord Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016). An organization has associational standing to sue "on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81.

         We review de novo the district court's finding of standing. Peterson v. Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., 478 F.3d 626, 631 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs must have standing for every claim. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). They also must have standing for every form of relief. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185. But the "Supreme Court has made it clear that 'the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement.'" Bostic, 760 F.3d at 370-71 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)). And the same injury can provide Plaintiffs with standing for multiple claims. E.g., id. at 371-72 (finding same injury provided standing for both Due Process and Equal Protection claims).

         When evaluating standing, we "must be careful not to decide the questions on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims." Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 239 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473 (1987). Plaintiffs here have alleged that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause, which bars government action that establishes or disfavors religion. U.S. Const. amend. I; Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Thus, we must assume that the Proclamation does harbor unconstitutional animus against Islam.

         The "concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases." Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991)). Unlike Free Exercise Clause claims, Establishment Clause claims do not require "proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed." Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961)). Instead, Establishment Clause injuries are often "spiritual and value-laden, rather than tangible and economic." Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

         As a result, Establishment Clause injury-in-fact "may be shown in various ways, " Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129 (2011), including through "noneconomic or intangible injury, " Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. For example, "[f]eelings of marginalization and exclusion are cognizable forms of injury, particularly in the Establishment Clause context, because one of the core objectives of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the State from sending a message to non-adherents of a particular religion 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.'" Moss, 683 F.3d at 607 (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860). A plaintiff can also suffer cognizable injury from: paying money damages to the government, McGowan, 366 U.S. at 424-25; having one's employees pay money damages to the government, Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961); receiving a letter that promotes a religious education course, Moss, 683 F.3d at 607; paying taxes, when Congress enacts legislation pursuant to its taxing and spending powers, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968); changing one's behavior or assuming special burdens, Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1088-89; participating in state-mandated religious exercises, such as school prayer, Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224-26 & n.9; being exposed to state-sponsored religious exercises, such as legislative prayer, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 n.4 (1983); experiencing employment discrimination, In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2008); and having personal contact with state-sponsored religious displays, Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. A cognizable injury need not rest on a single isolated fact but can instead arise from multiple related factors. See Moss, 683 F.3d at 607.

         The common thread among these different forms of cognizable legal injury is "personal contact" with the alleged establishment or disfavoring of religion. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. In other words, Establishment Clause injuries-like all injuries-in-fact- must be particularized: they "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548. This is because a "mere abstract objection to unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient to confer standing." Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. Nor is a "firm[] commit[ment] to the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, " Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (citation omitted), nor a general disagreement with government policy, Moss, 683 F.3d at 604. Instead, Plaintiffs must allege a "personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.[6]

         The district court concluded that numerous individual Plaintiffs had "asserted specific, intangible injuries resulting from [their] personal contact with the alleged Establishment Clause violation." IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 600. We agree. The Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Proclamation-which we must assume does unconstitutionally disfavor Islam, Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 239-has caused many Plaintiffs to suffer two related personal injuries. First, they, as members of the disfavored religion, are the "victims of this alleged religious intolerance" who are suffering "[f]eelings of marginalization and exclusion." Moss, 683 F.3d at 606-07; cf. id. (finding certain plaintiffs lacked standing because they were members of favored religion and so were "seeking to vindicate . . . the rights of others"). Second, they are experiencing prolonged separation from close family members who have been rendered categorically ineligible for visas. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 371-72 (finding same injury provided standing for two different claims). Because these are actual, concrete injuries that "affect the plaintiff[s] in a personal and individual way, " Plaintiffs have suffered a cognizable injury-in-fact. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (citation omitted); see Moss, 683 F.3d at 607 (locating cognizable injury-in-fact in several related facts).

         For example, IRAP Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 is a Muslim and U.S. citizen of Yemeni origin who is sponsoring his mother, also Yemeni, in her application for an immigrant visa. J.A. 573-75. His uncle is sponsoring his grandmother, who has Alzheimer's disease. Id. "Since the ban, " John Doe No. 5 has "heard anti-Islamic comments more frequently, " and he or someone he knows experiences Islamophobia "[a]lmost every week." Id. He says that "in the days after the ban, a man came into my grocery store and said that I make this country worse, and that he was happy with the ban." Id. IRAP Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 is a non-practicing Muslim whose Iranian wife is seeking an immigrant visa to the United States. J.A. 587-89. He states that he felt "insulted" and "demeaned" by the travel restrictions because they "felt like collective punishment" and that the Proclamation "has made [him] feel this more strongly." Id. He also notes that since the first travel ban was issued in January 2017, he gets "more suspicious looks from people" and feels that he is "being labeled as a Muslim more often." Id. IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 is an Iranian Muslim and lawful permanent resident whose mother-in-law's nonimmigrant visa application was recently denied pursuant to the Proclamation. J.A. 1174-76; Mot. Suppl. R. 2, Ex. A, Dec. 22, 2017, ECF No. 162. He states that he feels "personally attacked, targeted, and disparaged by this new Proclamation, which shows hostility to Iranians generally and to Muslims in particular." J.A. 1175. He feels "like an outsider in the country that I call my home" and fears for his safety and the safety of his loved ones. Id. Zakzok Plaintiff Fahed Muqbil is a U.S. citizen of Yemeni origin and a practicing Muslim who is sponsoring his wife, also Yemeni, for an immigrant visa. J.A. 1244-48. He states that the Proclamation makes him feel as if he and his fellow American Muslims "are unwanted, different, and somehow dangerous merely because of [their] religion." Id. He feels "condemned and penalized for practicing Islam" and treated "as a second class citizen simply because of [his] Islamic faith." Id.[7] These are personal, particularized injuries cognizable under Article III because they are suffered "as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.

         The Government argues that the district court erred by conflating the "injury-in-fact from an alleged Establishment Clause violation with the question whether the violation was of the individual's own Establishment Clause rights." First Cross-Appeal Br. 27 (hereinafter "First Br.") (emphasis omitted). We disagree. A cognizable Establishment Clause injury need "not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed, " Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 n.9, nor direct regulation or discrimination by the government. Article III standing in this context can arise from paying taxes, Flast, 392 U.S. at 106; hearing legislative prayer as a member of that body, Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786 n.4; or looking at a religious display, Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. Indeed, in Moss, we found standing based in part on simply receiving a letter promoting a religious education course. 683 F.3d at 607.[8]

         Nor is this case similar to In re Navy Chaplaincy, in which the plaintiffs based their standing on hearing a "'message' of religious preference." 534 F.3d at 759. There, the plaintiffs' expansive theory of message-based standing would have permitted "any recipient of the Navy's 'message, '" including "the judges on th[e] panel, " to have standing to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 764. But Plaintiffs do not claim standing solely because they heard about the Proclamation-mere awareness of religious animus, without more, is insufficient.

         Instead, many of the individual Plaintiffs here have alleged a violation of their own Establishment Clause rights, and they have presented evidence that the violation is particular to them: they have articulated specific feelings of "marginalization and exclusion, " Moss, 683 F.3d at 607, and they are facing prolonged separation from family members deemed categorically ineligible to enter the country.[9] Both injuries are caused by the Proclamation, which at this stage we must assume excludes Plaintiffs' relatives based on religious animus. Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 239. And both injuries can be remedied if the Proclamation is enjoined. Whether these Plaintiffs' relatives are issued visas and admitted to the country is beyond the scope of this litigation and ultimately not subject to judicial review. But a plaintiff need "not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury." Larson, 456 U.S. at 242-43 & n.15 (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge one part of state law requiring registration under charitable solicitation statute, even if plaintiffs might ultimately be required to register for different reasons); accord Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978). Instead, "a plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself, " Larson, 456 U.S. at 242-43 & n.15-here, the discrete expression of government animus against Islam and the prolonged (verging on permanent) separation of family members. Thus, the individual Plaintiffs have standing under Article III to bring their Establishment Clause claim.

         For the same reasons, we adopt and affirm the district court's finding that MESA and YAMA have associational standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim on behalf of their members. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 601. Both have identified at least one member who has suffered feelings of marginalization and exclusion in his community and who has a close family member actively seeking an immigrant visa. J.A. 556 (MESA), 612-13 (YAMA). The interests are "germane to the organization's purpose" and there is no reason the individual members must participate in the lawsuit. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81; IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 601. Thus, MESA and YAMA have associational standing as to the Establishment Clause claim.

         Unlike the plaintiffs in Valley Forge, Plaintiffs here have not "roam[ed] the country in search of governmental wrongdoing." 454 U.S. at 487. Instead, the purported government wrongdoing has found them. We conclude that many of the individual and two of the organizational Plaintiffs have standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim.

         2.

         Second, the Government argues that Plaintiffs' claim is not ripe until one of their relatives has been rejected for a visa and a waiver. During the pendency of this litigation, the mother-in-law of IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 was denied both. Mot. Suppl. R. Ex. A, Dec. 22, 2017, ECF No. 162 ("This is to inform you that a consular officer found you ineligible for a visa under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645."). The Government's argument is therefore moot and by its own statements the claim of IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 is ripe. First Br. 23 ("If any alien in whose entry a U.S. plaintiff has a cognizable interest is found otherwise eligible for a visa and denied a waiver, then that plaintiff can bring suit at that time[.]"). Nevertheless, we must also reject the Government's contention on the merits because it rests on a misapprehension of Plaintiffs' claim.

         The doctrine of ripeness is designed "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). "To determine if a case is ripe, we 'balance the fitness of the issues for judicial decision with the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.'" Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Lansdowne, LLC, 713 F.3d 187, 198 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006)). "A case is fit for judicial decision when the issues are purely legal and when the action in controversy is final and not dependent on future uncertainties." Miller, 462 F.3d at 319. And a case will cause hardship when it "create[s] adverse effects of a strictly legal kind." Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). "When considering hardship, we may consider the cost to the parties of delaying judicial review." Miller, 462 F.3d at 319.

         Ripeness here comes from the "imposition of the barrier, " not the ultimate denial of a visa or waiver. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262 (2003) (finding that a student had standing to challenge a school's affirmative action program even though the student had not actually applied, much less been rejected). As of December 8, 2017, the relevant agencies have fully implemented the travel restrictions detailed in the Proclamation. State Department Statement, supra. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' family members are now categorically inadmissible unless they meet the high standard for a waiver. Id. The relief Plaintiffs seek is not the issuance of a visa or waiver to their relatives, which is subject to the many limitations established by Congress in the INA and to the discretion of consular officials. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1201; 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). Instead, Plaintiffs merely ask that their relatives go through the same individualized vetting process that the executive branch applies to nationals from all other countries-an individualized vetting process that has already been denied them.

         Because the agencies have fully implemented the travel restrictions, the legality of those restrictions is "fit for judicial decision." Miller, 462 F.3d at 319.[10] The issues raised by Plaintiffs-including whether the Proclamation's travel restrictions violate the Constitution-are "purely legal." Id. And the agencies' implementation of these restrictions is certainly "final." Id. Therefore, the cost to the parties of delaying judicial review would be to functionally deprive them of any judicial review. Indeed, if we waited until all of Plaintiffs' family members were denied visas, the Government would surely argue that the claim is then moot because they cannot demonstrate that their relatives would apply again. We reject this circular interpretation of ripeness.

         We conclude that Plaintiffs' claim is ripe for review.

         B.

         In assessing Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause challenge, we first ask whether the proffered reason for the Proclamation is "facially legitimate and bona fide." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); see IRAP I, 857 F.3d at 588-93. The Proclamation's stated purpose is "to protect [U.S.] citizens from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats" and "to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share identity and threat information with our immigration screening and vetting systems." 82 Fed. Reg. at 45, 162.

         The Mandel standard, read through the lens of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Kerry v. Din, [11] imposes a heavy burden on Plaintiffs, but not an insurmountable one. See 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2139-41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). It clearly affords the political branches substantial deference. Yet it also accounts for those very rare instances in which a challenger plausibly alleges that a government action runs so contrary to the basic premises of our Constitution as to warrant more probing review. Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation is one of those rare instances.

         Assuming without deciding that the proffered purpose of the Proclamation is "facially legitimate, " we turn to the question of whether it is "bona fide" as required by Mandel.[12] Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Din elaborated on this "bona fide" requirement. An action is not considered "bona fide" if Plaintiffs make an "affirmative showing of bad faith, " which they must "plausibly allege[] with sufficient particularity." See id. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. Upon such a showing, a court may "look behind" the Government's proffered justification for its action. See Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 516-18 (10th Cir. 1992). Therefore, to advance their First Amendment claim, Plaintiffs must have "plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity" that the Proclamation's invocation of national security is a pretext for an anti-Muslim religious purpose.

         In the extraordinary case before us, resolution of that question presents little difficulty. Unlike Din and Mandel, in which the Government had a "bona fide factual basis" for its actions, Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), here the Government's proffered rationale for the Proclamation lies at odds with the statements of the President himself. Plaintiffs here do not just plausibly allege with particularity that the Proclamation's purpose is driven by anti-Muslim bias, they offer undisputed evidence of such bias: the words of the President. This evidence includes President Trump's disparaging comments and tweets regarding Muslims; his repeated proposals to ban Muslims from entering the United States; his subsequent explanation that he would effectuate this "Muslim" ban by targeting "territories" instead of Muslims directly; the issuance of EO-1 and EO-2, addressed only to majority-Muslim nations; and finally the issuance of the Proclamation, which not only closely tracks EO-1 and EO-2, but which President Trump and his advisors described as having the same goal as EO-1 and EO-2. See IRAP I, 857 F.3d at 591; see, e.g., J.A. 168, 756, 779, 791, 794, 808-12, 815- 17, 820.

         The President's own words-publicly stating a constitutionally impermissible reason for the Proclamation-distinguish this case from those in which courts have found that the Government had satisfied Mandel's "bona fide" prong. In Bustamante v. Mukasey, for example, the court held that "the reason given by the consular official in support of the visa denial was . . . bona fide" because there was "no reason to believe that the consular official acted . . . in anything other than good faith" in relying on information that the visa applicant "was involved in drug trafficking." 531 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008). Similarly, in Cardenas v. United States, the court held that a consular official "provided a bona fide factual reason" for denying a visa, and plaintiff made no allegations to "raise a plausible inference that the officer acted in bad faith." 826 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016). In no prior cases have plaintiffs alleged-let alone offered undisputed evidence-that any government official made public statements contradicting the asserted "bona fide" reason for the governmental action.[13] Plaintiffs have done so here.[14]

         This, of course, does not mean that Plaintiffs have established that the Proclamation violates the Constitution. As we explained in IRAP I, 857 F.3d at 592-93, to do so, Plaintiffs must show that the Government cannot meet the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). To prevail under Lemon, a governmental entity must show that its challenged action (1) "ha[s] a secular legislative purpose, " (2) with "its principal or primary effect . . . one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, " and (3) which does "not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). Moreover, the Government must satisfy all three prongs of Lemon to fend off an Establishment Clause challenge. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).

         Plaintiffs' challenge centers on the first prong. They maintain that the Government has failed to demonstrate that the Proclamation "has 'a secular legislative purpose'" that is "genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective." McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860, 864 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612). To meet this requirement, the Government must show that the primary purpose, not just a purpose, of the Proclamation is secular. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594.

         The Supreme Court has instructed that, to determine the primary purpose of a challenged government action, judges must view the challenged government action as a reasonable "objective observer." McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862. To that end, when a court examines the purpose of a challenged government action, it acts as an "objective observer" to discern the "official objective . . . from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of the drafter's heart of hearts." Id. In this role, a court must look to "openly available data" and make a "commonsense conclusion" to determine whether a "religious objective permeated the government's action." Id. at 863. The court should examine the "historical context" of the government action and the "specific sequence of events" leading to the government action. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 595.

         The Government maintains that the Proclamation's facial neutrality establishes that it is "not intended to discriminate on the basis of religion." First Br. 43. But even if the Proclamation's "stated objective is religiously neutral, " that cannot be "dispositive" as "the entire premise of our review under Lemon is that even facially neutral government actions can violate the Establishment Clause." IRAP I, 857 F.3d at 595. No "reasonable observer" would accept such a "transparent claim to secularity" without also considering context and history. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 863-84, 869. The President's own statements provide the relevant history and context here.

         Perhaps in implicit recognition of the rawness of the religious animus in the President's pre-election statements, [15] the Government urges us to disregard them. This is a difficult argument to make given that the President and his advisors have repeatedly relied on these pre-election statements to explain the President's post-election actions related to the travel ban. See, e.g., J.A. 1502-03. And, in McCreary, the Supreme Court reminded us that "the world is not made brand new every morning." McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866. Because "reasonable observers have reasonable memories, " these statements certainly provide relevant context when examining the purpose of the Proclamation. Id. However, we need not and thus do not rely on pre-election statements in assessing the constitutionality of the Proclamation.

         We need not do so because the President's inauguration did not herald a new day. Rather, only a week after taking office, President Trump issued EO-1, which banned the entry of citizens of six Muslim majority countries, provided exemptions for Christians, and lacked any asserted evidence indicating a genuine national security purpose. The very next day, January 28, 2017, Rudy Giuliani, an advisor to President Trump, explained that EO-1's purpose was to discriminate against Muslims. J.A. 808-10, 815-16. A reasonable observer could certainly conclude that in banning entry into the United States of 180 million Muslims, approximately 10% of the world Muslim population, EO-1 was crafted to deliver, as Giuliani said, on President Trump's promise to "ban Muslim immigration to the United States." See J.A. 809, 820. This is particularly so given that every federal judge who considered the matter enjoined EO-1, finding that it likely violated the Constitution.

         Shortly after issuance of these injunctions of EO-1, President Trump issued EO-2, which he and his advisors characterized as being substantially similar to EO-1. The President described EO-2 as "a watered down version of the first order." J.A. 779. Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller similarly explained that the changes to EO-2 were "mostly minor technical differences, " and promised that they would result in "the same basic policy outcomes for the country." J.A. 756. Then-White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer confirmed that "[t]he principles of the [second] executive order remain the same." J.A. 168. We subsequently found EO-2 also impermissibly motivated by religion, and upheld an injunction of it. IRAP I, 857 F.3d 554.

         In the months that followed, the President continued to express his desire to return to "the original Travel Ban, " rather than "the watered down, politically correct version" in EO-2. J.A. 791. On June 5, 2017, President Trump stated that the "Justice Dept. should ask for an expedited hearing of the watered down Travel Ban before the Supreme Court -& seek much tougher version!" and that "The Justice Dept. should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the watered down, politically correct version they submitted to [the Supreme Court]." Id. (statements issued via Twitter). The very next day, then-White House Press Secretary Spicer explained that President Trump's tweets are "official statements by the president of the United States." J.A. 794, 1521. Only nine days before issuing the Proclamation, President Trump tweeted, "The travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specific-but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!" J.A. 832.

         The President also continued to express what any reasonable observer could view as general anti-Muslim bias. In an August 17, 2017, tweet, the President endorsed an apocryphal story involving General Pershing and a purported massacre of Muslims with bullets dipped in a pig's blood, advising people to "[s]tudy what General Pershing . . . did to terrorists when caught. There was no more Radical Islamic Terror for 35 years!" J.A. 806. On November 29, 2017, President Trump retweeted three disturbing anti-Muslim videos entitled: "Muslim Destroys a Statue of Virgin Mary!" "Islamist mob pushes teenage boy off roof and beats him to death!" and "Muslim migrant beats up Dutch boy on crutches!" J.A. 1497-99. The three videos were originally tweeted by an extremist political party whose mission is to oppose "all alien and destructive politic or religious doctrines, including . . . Islam." J.A. 1508. When asked about the three videos, President Trump's deputy press secretary Raj Shah responded by saying that the "President has been talking about these security issues for years now, from the campaign trail to the White House" and "the President has addressed these issues with the travel order that he issued earlier this year and the companion proclamation." J.A. 1502-03. The Government does not-and, indeed, cannot-dispute that the President made these statements. Instead, it argues that the "statements that occurred after the issuance of EO-2 do not reflect any religious animus" but reflect "the compelling secular goal of protecting national security from an amply-documented present threat." First Br. 52. We cannot agree.

         Rather, an objective observer could conclude that the President's repeated statements convey the primary purpose of the Proclamation-to exclude Muslims from the United States. In fact, it is hard to imagine how an objective observer could come to any other conclusion when the President's own deputy press secretary made this connection express: he explained that President Trump tweets extremist anti-Muslim videos as part of his broader concerns about "security, " which he has "addressed . . . with . . . the proclamation." J.A. 1502-03.

         The Government correctly points out that the President's past actions cannot "forever taint" his future actions. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874; First Br. 18. President Trump could have removed the taint of his prior troubling statements; for a start he could have ceased publicly disparaging Muslims. But "an implausible claim that governmental purpose has changed should not carry the day in a court of law any more than in a head with common sense." McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874. In fact, instead of taking any actions to cure the "taint" that we found infected EO-2, President Trump continued to disparage Muslims and the Islamic faith.

         The Government unconvincingly claims that the substantive differences between the Proclamation and EO-1 and EO-2 reflect the elimination of any anti-Muslim bias. To be sure, the Proclamation does differ in some respects from the previous Executive Orders. For example, the Proclamation bans citizens from two non-majority Muslim countries, North Korea and Venezuela. Although the Proclamation affects only very few persons from those countries as opposed to the many tens of thousands from the other Muslim-majority countries, the Government asserts that "[t]he inclusion of those [two] non-Muslim-majority countries in the Proclamation underscores [a] religion-neutral purpose." First Br. 50. Again, we disagree. In McCreary, the Supreme Court found that despite the court-ordered addition of secular texts to a twice-challenged display of the Ten Commandments in state courthouses, "[n]o reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays." 545 U.S. at 872. Here, a reasonable observer could hardly "swallow the claim" that the addition of North Korea and Venezuela to the twice-enjoined travel ban was anything more than an attempt to "cast off" the "unmistakable" religious objective of the earlier executive orders. See id.

         Nor does the "months-long" "multi-agency review, "[16] First Br. 43, 47, on which the Proclamation assertedly rests, establish that its primary purpose is secular. Although in its briefs the Government repeatedly invoked this review, the Government chose not to make the review publicly available and so provided a reasonable observer no basis to rely on the review. Perhaps in recognition of this, at oral argument before us the Government expressly disavowed any claim that the review could save the Proclamation. Instead, the Government conceded that the Proclamation rises and falls on its own four corners. Oral Arg. at 32:27-33:00. Even if we considered the review, we could not conclude that it demonstrates that the Proclamation has a secular purpose. This is because the criteria allegedly used in the review to identify problematic countries lie at odds with the list of countries actually included in the Proclamation.[17]

         Like the district court, we do not note "the apparent disconnect between the identified problem[s]" in the review and "the broad, nationality-based travel ban to evaluate the merits" of the Proclamation as a policy. See IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 626- 27. Rather, we do so "only to assess whether the Proclamation persuasively establishes that the primary purpose of the travel ban is no longer religious animus." See id. The contradiction between what the Proclamation says-that it merely reflects the results of a religion-neutral review-and what it does "raises serious doubts" about the Proclamation's proffered purpose, and undermines the Government's argument that its multi-agency review cured any earlier impermissible religious purpose. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).

         In sum, the face of the Proclamation, read in the context of President Trump's official statements, fails to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose. To the objective observer, the Proclamation continues to exhibit a primarily religious anti-Muslim objective.

         Our constitutional system creates a strong presumption of legitimacy for presidential action and we often defer to the political branches on issues related to immigration and national security. But the disposition in this case is compelled by the highly unusual facts here. Plaintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President of the United States has openly and often expressed his desire to ban those of Islamic faith from entering the United States. The Proclamation is thus not only a likely Establishment Clause violation, but also strikes at the basic notion that the government may not act based on "religious animosity." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532, 535 (1993).

         We have long recognized that "[o]ur jurisprudence in this area is of necessity one of line-drawing, of determining at what point [an individual's] rights of religious freedom are infringed by the State." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992). And the line we draw "between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring). We therefore agree with the district court that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will likely succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.

         IV.

         Having held that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, we now consider the three remaining Winter factors. See 555 U.S. at 20. We review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion and affirm that the likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest all favor granting injunctive relief. See id.; Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 366.

         A.

         As the district court rightly states, irreparable harm occurs when the threatened injury impairs the court's ability to grant an effective remedy. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 629 (citing 11A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed. 1998)). The Supreme Court has held that the irreparable harm must be "likely, " not merely possible. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

         As the Supreme Court has stated, the "loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Violations of first amendment rights constitute per se irreparable injury."). Our sister circuits have interpreted Elrod to apply not just to freedom of speech and association but equally to Establishment Clause violations. See, e.g., Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996); Parents' Ass'n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235, 1242 (2d Cir. 1986); ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[A]n erosion of religious liberties cannot be deterred by awarding damages to the victims of such erosion."). We agree with these courts that Establishment Clause violations create the same type of immediate, irreparable injury as do other types of First Amendment violations. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 303-04. Because the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause and is already in full effect, we conclude that the injury is not only threatened and likely but already ongoing. See id. at 303 ("[W]hen an Establishment Clause violation is alleged, infringement occurs the moment the government action takes place[.]").

         We further agree with the district court that the individual Plaintiffs whose family members are categorically rendered ineligible for visas have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. Prolonged and indefinite separation of parents, children, siblings, and partners create not only temporary feelings of anxiety but also lasting strains on the most basic human relationships cultivated through shared time and experience. IRAP Plaintiff John Doe No. 5's grandmother, a Yemeni national, has Alzheimer's disease and is currently living in uncertain conditions in Jordan. J.A. 574. Zakzok Plaintiff Fahed Muqbil has a one-year-old daughter who, due to severe birth defects, has been undergoing multiple life-threatening surgeries in the United States without her mother, a Yemeni national, by her side. J.A. 1244. IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6's wife is separated from her family and will be "completely devastated" if her mother, an Iranian national, is unable to visit her in the United States. J.A. 1175. These injuries are "not compensable with monetary damages." See Hawai'i v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 699. These injuries are also likely to occur, if not already occurring, because the Proclamation is fully in effect and being enforced; indeed, IAAB Plaintiff John Doe No. 6's mother-in-law has already been denied a visa and waiver pursuant to the Proclamation during the pendency of this litigation.

         We therefore affirm the district court's determination that Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm.

         B.

         We now balance the harms likely to be suffered by the parties. We agree with the district court that the balance of equities weighs in favor of Plaintiffs, who are likely to continue suffering a violation of their Establishment Clause rights (the combination of religious marginalization with familial separation), rather than the Government, which is not likely to be harmed by an injunction against the enforcement of a likely unconstitutional Proclamation. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 630.

         While the Government asserts a national security interest behind the Proclamation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Government has not shown that national security cannot be maintained without the unprecedented multi-nation ban. Id. For one, the injunction does not result in the entry of any particular individual. It simply precludes the use of a nationality-based ban. Foreign nationals from the Designated Countries must still proceed through the standard individualized vetting process and prove that they are not inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The INA provides numerous means to exclude individuals who present a risk to the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). The injunction, therefore, neither opens our borders nor creates any vulnerabilities, and the balance of equities, overall, favors injunctive relief.

         However, as the district court recognized, we are obligated to follow the Supreme Court's rationale in partially staying the injunction of EO-2. See IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 630 (citing Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088). There, the Supreme Court concluded that the balance of equities will vary depending on the strength of the affected foreign national's connection to the United States. See Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088. Just as the Supreme Court tailored that injunction to those individuals who possess "a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, " we adopt the same approach here. We therefore affirm the district court and conclude that the balance of equities supports an injunction only to the extent that it affords relief to foreign nationals with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States. See infra Part V.

         C.

         Finally, we consider whether Plaintiffs have shown that the injunction is in the public interest. We conclude that it cannot be in the public interest for the President to violate the Establishment Clause. We also agree with the district court and the Ninth Circuit that the unlawfully issued Proclamation has a much broader deleterious effect on the public interest than the simple fact that certain foreign nationals are excluded. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 630-31; Hawai'i v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 700-01.

         On a human level, the Proclamation's invisible yet impenetrable barrier denies the possibility of a complete, intact family to tens of thousands of Americans. J.A. 868-69. On an economic level, the Proclamation inhibits the normal flow of information, ideas, resources, and talent between the Designated Countries and our schools, hospitals, and businesses.[18] On a fundamental level, the Proclamation second-guesses our nation's dedication to religious freedom and tolerance. "The basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). When we compromise our values as to some, we shake the foundation as to all. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 ("The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, 'it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.'" (citation omitted)).

         For those reasons, we affirm the district court's conclusion that enjoining the unlawful Proclamation is in the public interest.

         V.

         Finally, we review for abuse of discretion the district court's grant of a nationwide injunction against enforcement of § 2 of the Proclamation, excepting North Korea and Venezuela. Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 366. We affirm.

         In its opinion granting the preliminary injunction, the district court narrowed the scope of its nationwide injunction to apply to only those individuals "who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States." IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 631 (quoting Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088). The district court did so in accordance with the Supreme Court's partial stay of the prior nationwide injunction against EO-2 that this Court and the Ninth Circuit had affirmed. Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088. Under the Supreme Court's framework, a bona fide relationship with a person requires "a close familial relationship, " which encompasses immediate family members such as parents, children, siblings, "grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States." Hawai'i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 658 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2017) (clarifying scope of injunction against EO-2); see Trump v. Hawai'i, 138 S.Ct. 1, 1 (2017) (mem.) (declining to stay the Ninth Circuit's clarification of familial relationships). A bona fide relationship with an entity or organization must be "formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO-2." Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088.

         The district court's injunction adopts the scope laid out by the Supreme Court- with one potential exception. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 631. The district court concluded that "clients of IRAP and HIAS, and those similarly situated, are not covered by the injunction absent a separate bona fide relationship as defined above." Id. In support, the district court referenced the Supreme Court's stay of the Ninth Circuit's decision "that a refugee with a formal sponsorship assurance from a U.S. resettlement agency" categorically had "a bona fide connection to the United States." Id.; see Hawai'i v. Trump, 871 F.3d at 661-64 (concluding that refugees who have formal assurances from resettlement agencies have bona fide relationships); Trump v. Hawai'i, 138 S.Ct. at 1 (staying the Ninth Circuit's holding "with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance"). Like Plaintiffs, who asked the district court to clarify its order, J.A. 49 (No. 17-cv-361, ECF No. 226), we find the district court's holding subject to several different interpretations. To the extent that the district court held that IRAP, HIAS, and similar organizations categorically lack a qualifying bona fide relationship with their clients, we conclude that this would be an abuse of discretion. We see no need to read more into the Supreme Court's grant of a stay than what it held: that refugees with formal assurances do not categorically enjoy a bona fide relationship with a U.S. entity. Instead, IRAP, HIAS, and other organizations that work with refugees or take on clients are subject to the same requirements as all other entities under the Supreme Court's bona fide relationship standard: a relationship that is "formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose" of evading the travel restrictions imposed by the Proclamation. See Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088.

         With this caveat, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining §§ 2(a)-(c), (e), and (g)-(h) of the Proclamation, narrowed by the Supreme Court's bona fide relationship standard. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 631-32 (citing Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088). We agree that the balance of the equities favor the Government and that the injunction should not extend to § 2(d) (North Korea) and § 2(f) (Venezuela) because there is no alleged Establishment Clause violation as to either. We also agree that the injunction does not apply to the President himself but instead to the other Defendants (agencies and agency heads) charged with implementing the Proclamation. IRAP I, 857 F.3d at 605.

         For the same reasons as in IRAP I, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in adopting a nationwide injunction. Id.; IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 632. First, Plaintiffs are scattered throughout the country, making piecemeal injunctive relief difficult. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1308-09 (4th Cir. 1992). Second, "Congress has instructed that 'the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly.'" Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187- 88 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3384), affirmed by equally divided court, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016). Finally, because we find that the Proclamation was issued in violation of the Constitution, enjoining it only as to Plaintiffs would not cure its deficiencies. IRAP I, 857 F.3d at 605.

         Finally, we have adopted the bona fide relationship limitation only because this case comes to us in an interlocutory posture. We are reviewing the entry of a preliminary injunction and so must balance the equities, including the Government's interest in enforcing the Proclamation. See Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088. But if a court eventually holds on the merits that the Proclamation was issued in contravention of the Constitution (as we believe it should), then the unlawful portions of the Proclamation should be voided.

         VI.

         For all of these reasons, we affirm the preliminary injunction granted by the district court. In light of the Supreme Court's order staying this injunction pending "disposition of the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought, " we stay our decision today pending the Supreme Court's decision. Trump v. IRAP, 138 S.Ct. at 542.

         AFFIRMED

          GREGORY, Chief Judge, with whom Judge Wynn joins as to Part I, concurring:

         The statutory question is this: whether the President has the congressionally delegated authority to enact modern-day analogs of the repealed Chinese Exclusion Act or nationality-based quota system. In light of legislative and executive practice spanning centuries, I conclude that he does not.

         I.

         Plaintiffs argue that, in issuing the Proclamation, [1] the President exceeded his authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1), and violated the INA's prohibition on nationality discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, see 8 U.S.C. § 1152. Before considering Plaintiffs' arguments on the merits, I must first determine that their statutory claims are justiciable.

         The Government makes several arguments to the contrary. First, it claims that Congress has stripped the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claims. Second, it argues that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability bars judicial review. Third, it argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue. And fourth, it argues that Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action to bring their statutory claims, under the APA or otherwise. I address these arguments in turn and conclude that the statutory claims are justiciable.[2]

         A.

         Subject to limitations imposed by Congress, the Constitution extends the federal judicial power "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties Made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Since 1875, Congress has provided the federal courts with original jurisdiction over civil claims "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Judiciary Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Since 1980, Congress has provided federal courts with this original jurisdiction over federal questions irrespective of the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369.

         In their motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs allege that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause and the INA. These questions are on the face of Plaintiffs' Complaints, substantial, and central to their claims. See 13D Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3562 (3d ed. Supp. 2017). Thus, Plaintiffs have squarely presented two questions that "aris[e] under the Constitution" and "laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

         But, even where a plaintiff squarely presents federal questions, a district court may still lack jurisdiction to resolve the dispute if Congress has precluded judicial review. See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2012). Absent "clear congressional language mandating preclusion of federal jurisdiction and the nature of respondents' requested relief, " federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1331 to hear "constitutional and statutory challenges" to immigration procedures. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1991); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643-44 (2002) (holding that statute does not strip federal courts of federal question jurisdiction absent plain statement or fair implication); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (requiring "clear" showing of intent if Congress seeks to preclude judicial review of "colorable constitutional claim"); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670, 681 n.12 (1986) (reaffirming "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action"); cf. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10 (holding that congressional intent need only be "fairly discernible in the statutory scheme" in cases where Congress has not foreclosed all judicial review but merely limited or redirected it (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994))).

         The Government argues that the INA forecloses any judicial review of Plaintiffs' statutory claims. First Cross-Appeal Br. 19-20 (hereinafter "First Br."). In support, it points to two discreet statutory provisions: 6 U.S.C. § 236(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). But neither provision applies to this case, much less provides the clear expression of congressional intent needed to strip this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction here.

         The first, § 236(f), does not actually strip federal courts of anything. Instead, it denies prospective plaintiffs a cause of action to challenge individual decisions by consular officers in granting and denying visas. 6 U.S.C. § 236(f) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or authorize a cause of action to challenge a decision of a consular officer or other United States official or employee to grant or deny a visa."). But the absence of a statutory cause of action is irrelevant to this Court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. To the contrary, it is "firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642-43 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)); see Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2029 n.2 (2014) (noting that § 1331 "gives a district court subject-matter jurisdiction to decide any claim alleging a violation of" federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, even if plaintiffs may ultimately lack statutory cause of action). Moreover, as I discuss in Part I.B, Plaintiffs are not challenging a consular officer's denial of visas to their family members; instead, they are challenging the President's authority to issue a policy that makes Plaintiffs' family members categorically ineligible to be considered for visas. Section 236(f) therefore does not affect this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction.

         The second provision that the Government cites, § 1201(i), strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review decisions by a consular officer or the Secretary of State to "revoke" a visa that has already been issued. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). But the Proclamation explicitly states that "[n]o immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date under section 7 of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation." 82 Fed. Reg. at 45, 171. And the Proclamation applies only to foreign nationals who "do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date." Id. at 45, 167. Because no visa can or will be revoked under the Proclamation, Plaintiffs' claims do not fall within § 1201(i).

         That the Government cannot point to an INA provision clearly stripping this Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' statutory claims is not surprising. One need only glance through the INA to see that Congress has taken a careful and narrow approach to jurisdiction, precluding judicial review over only discrete exercises of executive authority. See, e.g., McNary, 498 U.S. at 492 (finding that INA provision stripping jurisdiction to review individual denials of Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) status did not strip jurisdiction over "general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing [SAW] applications"). When courts have treaded beyond the lines drawn by Congress in the INA, the legislative branch has taken quick action to reestablish its intended jurisdictional boundaries. Compare I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (finding that several jurisdiction-stripping provisions then-recently added to INA § 242 did not repeal habeas jurisdiction over certain removal orders), with Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310-11 (2005) (adding language to INA § 242 expressly stripping courts of habeas jurisdiction).

         Congress's precision is exemplified by 8 U.S.C. § 1182, the INA section in which one of the purported authorizations for the Proclamation, § 1182(f), is located. Section 1182 includes ten express preclusions of jurisdiction, each tied to a narrow exercise of executive authority, but none applies to actions taken under § 1182(f). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(5)(C) (stating that certain decisions by Secretary of Health and Human Services related to admissibility of foreign health-care workers "are not subject to further administrative or judicial review"), 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (precluding judicial review of decisions by Attorney General to waive inadmissibility for certain undocumented immigrants), 1182(a)(10)(C)(ii)(III) (giving Secretary of State "sole and unreviewable discretion" over certain inadmissibility decisions related to child abduction), 1182(a)(10)(C)(iii)(II) (giving Secretary of State "sole and unreviewable discretion" over certain designation related to child abduction), 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) (precluding judicial review of determination by Secretary of State to waive inadmissibility for certain nonimmigrants who would otherwise be ineligible for terrorism-related reasons), 1182(d)(12) (precluding judicial review of decisions by Attorney General to grant or deny waiver for individuals subject to certain civil penalties), 1182(h) (precluding judicial review of determination by Attorney General to waive inadmissibility for individuals convicted of certain crimes), 1182(i) (precluding judicial review of decision by Attorney General to waive inadmissibility for certain individuals who committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact), 1182(n)(2)(G)(vii) (precluding judicial review of certain determinations by Secretary of Labor related to nonimmigrant labor visas) 1182(n)(5)(D)(i)‒(iii) (giving federal courts jurisdiction to "review only the actions of the Attorney General under clause (ii)" and to "set aside such actions only on the grounds described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section 706(a)(2) of Title 5").

         In the more than sixty-five years since § 1182(f) was written, and despite more than five dozen amendments to § 1182 overall, Congress has never precluded judicial review of executive actions taken pursuant to the President's authority under § 1182(f). Nor did Congress preclude judicial review in the almost quarter-century since the Supreme Court reviewed an executive order issued under § 1182(f). See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155');">509 U.S. 155 (1993). Congress also has not precluded judicial review of the President's exercise of authority under § 1185 (the other INA provision on which the Proclamation relies), nor of a challenge to executive action for violating § 1152 (the INA provision that prohibits nationality discrimination). Accordingly, I see no clear statement of intent, much less a fair implication, that would deprive this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction here. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 643-44; McNary, 498 U.S. at 483-84.

         I thus conclude that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' statutory claims: Plaintiffs have sued under § 1331 for (among other things) violation of the INA, the Government has appealed from an interlocutory order granting Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and Congress has not stripped this Court's power to review challenges to the exercise of executive authority under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1).

         B.

         The Government next argues that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability precludes this Court from reviewing any statutory challenge to the President's authority to exclude classes of noncitizens, no matter how unlawful that decision may be. No case from either this Court or the Supreme Court supports such a sweeping proposition.

         The consular nonreviewability doctrine provides that, absent congressional authorization, courts lack jurisdiction to review a consular officer's decision to grant or deny a visa. Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The doctrine developed from the Supreme Court's recognition that Congress has plenary power over immigration matters and may vest the exclusive authority to enforce its stated policy in the Executive Branch. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that power to exclude foreign nationals is "incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, " and Congress's determinations regarding whom to exclude are conclusive and binding on judiciary); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892) (noting that Congress may delegate authority to exclude foreign nationals to executive officers, in which case courts cannot second-guess decisions by those officers acting within delegated authority); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895) ("The power of congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled."). The doctrine thus serves "to honor Congress's choices in setting immigration policy" by shielding implementation of that policy from judicial interference. Hawai'i v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 2017).

         But Plaintiffs do not ask this Court to second-guess Congress's policy decisions, nor do they ask this Court to review the substance of the Executive Branch's exercise of discretion in enforcing those policy decisions. The Complaints do not challenge any individual visa denials or ask the district court to order the Executive Branch to grant any visas. Rather, Plaintiffs claim that the President exceeded the authority that Congress delegated to him in § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1), and that in issuing the Proclamation, the President supplanted Congress's immigration policy with his own. The consular nonreviewability doctrine-applicable only to individualized visa determinations and designed to protect Congress's plenary power in immigration matters-plainly does not bar review here. See Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1158-59.[3]

         The Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, on which the Government heavily relies, further illustrates the doctrine's purpose and inapplicability to this case. See 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). There, Congress had passed a statute (the "1941 Act") specifically authorizing the President to restrict immigration during a proclaimed national emergency. Id. at 539-40. The President had in turn issued a proclamation authorizing the Secretary of State and Attorney General to promulgate regulations imposing additional immigration restrictions, which they proceeded to do. Id. A foreign national, whom the Attorney General had excluded from the United States without a hearing pursuant to those regulations, argued that the 1941 Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 542. Responding to this constitutional question, the Court explained that "the decision to admit or to exclude an alien may be lawfully placed with the President, " and "it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien." Id. at 543 (citing Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659-60, among other cases). In other words, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle that, so long as the political branches act within constitutional limits, courts may not question their combined wisdom in immigration matters. See id.

         But this principle does not apply when determining whether the Executive Branch has complied with the Legislative Branch's commands. Like Plaintiffs here, the foreign national in Knauff also argued that her exclusion was inconsistent with congressional intent-that the Executive Branch had frustrated rather than implemented the policy embodied in another statute, the War Brides Act. Id. at 545. Notwithstanding the consular nonreviewability doctrine, the Court adjudicated this statutory claim on the merits. See id. at 545-47 (interpreting 1941 Act and War Brides Act and ultimately concluding executive action was consistent with both statutes). In fact, three dissenting justices not only would have decided the statutory claim on the merits but would have held that the executive had exceeded its delegated authority. See id. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

         Knauff thus highlights the distinction between a challenge to the substance of the executive's decision and a challenge to the authority of the executive to issue that decision. Whereas the former invites courts to controvert the political branches' joint decisions regarding whom to exclude and therefore falls within the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, see id. at 542-43, the latter presents precisely the type of question that the Constitution entrusts courts with deciding. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (explaining that judicial review-not bicameral process-operates as check on executive lawmaking).

         Finally, the Government contends that even if the consular nonreviewability doctrine does not apply to the President's decision to categorically exclude a class of foreign nationals, the rationale behind the doctrine does. But that rationale-that the political branches, not the judiciary, set and implement immigration policy-applies only where the executive acts within the scope of its delegated authority. See Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660 ("It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive branches of the national government." (emphasis added)). It has no bearing on Plaintiffs' claims that the President exceeded the scope of his authority.

         For these reasons, I conclude that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not bar Plaintiffs' statutory claims.

         C.

         I turn next to the Government's argument that the Plaintiffs lack standing. The district court determined that numerous individual and organizational plaintiffs have standing to make out an INA claim. The Government has challenged only the imminence of Plaintiffs' injuries, but the Court has "an obligation to assure ourselves of litigants' standing under Article III." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006) (citation omitted). I conclude that sixteen individual Plaintiffs and four organizational Plaintiffs have standing to bring claims under the INA.

         The Supreme Court has articulated three requirements to make out Article III standing. The plaintiff "must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). An organization can have associational standing to sue "on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81. An organization can also sue on its own behalf, in which case it must meet the same three minimum requirements. Lane v. Holder, 703 F.3d 668, 674 (4th Cir. 2012). It can demonstrate the requisite injury-in-fact by showing "concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities-with the consequent drain on the organization's resources." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).

         Plaintiffs must have standing for every claim, but the same injury can provide standing for multiple claims and one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370-71 (4th Cir. 2014); see generally ante 29-30. Because courts must "assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims, " Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 239 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)), I assume for standing purposes that the Proclamation exceeds the scope of the President's power under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) and violates § 1152(a)(1).

         I turn first to the individual Plaintiffs. Twelve individual Plaintiffs "have immediate family members who are nationals of the Designated Countries and currently in the process of securing a visa to come to the United States as immigrants."[4] Int'l Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d 570, 596 (D. Md. 2017). They are: IRAP Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 4, and John Doe No. 5; IAAB Plaintiffs Doe No. 1, Doe No. 3, Doe No. 4, and Doe No. 5; and Zakzok Plaintiffs Eblal Zakzok, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, John Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe No. 2. The other four individual Plaintiffs have immediate family members seeking nonimmigrant visas to the United States. They are: IRAP Plaintiff Afsaneh Khazaeli; IAAB Plaintiffs Doe No. 2 and Doe No. 6; and Zakzok Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 3.

         These sixteen individual Plaintiffs express fear and apprehension at the possibility of prolonged separation from their close family members. E.g., J.A. 587-89 (IRAP Plaintiff John Doe No. 4, stating that being apart from his Iranian wife is "excruciatingly difficult" and is adversely affecting his professional and personal life); J.A. 1174-76 (IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6, stating that he has been "extremely anxious, sad, and worried" since the Proclamation and fears that his wife will be "completely devastated" if her family members are barred from receiving nonimmigrant visas); J.A. 1244-48 (Zakzok Plaintiff Fahed Muqbil, stating that he was "devastated" when he heard about the Proclamation and is "very worried at the thought of my wife being permanently banned from rejoining me and our young daughter in the United States, " in large part because his daughter has had several life-threatening surgeries for birth defects and cannot travel to see her mother).

         As of December 8, 2017, the relevant agencies have fully implemented the entry restrictions laid out in the Proclamation. Dep't of State, New Court Order on Presidential Proclamation (Dec. 4, 2017) (saved as ECF opinion attachment 1) (hereinafter "State Department Statement"); see also DHS, Fact Sheet: The President's Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sept. 24, 2017) (saved as ECF opinion attachment 2) (hereinafter "DHS Fact Sheet"). Even though the visa applications for Plaintiffs' relatives are still pending, Plaintiffs' relatives are now categorically ineligible for visas.[5] Indeed, during the pendency of this litigation, the mother-in-law of IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 was denied a visa and a waiver pursuant to the Proclamation. Mot. Suppl. R. Ex. A, Dec. 22, 2017, ECF No. 162 ("This is to inform you that a consular officer found you ineligible for a visa under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645."). According to the Government's own statements, this means that IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 has standing to bring suit. See First Br. 23 ("If any alien in whose entry a U.S. plaintiff has a cognizable interest is found otherwise eligible for a visa and denied a waiver, then that plaintiff can bring suit at that time . . . ."); Oral Arg. at 15:58-16:23 (stating that sole challenge Government made to Article III standing was one of imminence).

         I further conclude that the fifteen other individual Plaintiffs, whose relatives have not received visa decisions, also have standing. First, the Government does not contest that an executive action "prolong[ing] the separation of immediate family members" constitutes injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy Article III. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep't of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs (LAVAS), 45 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996) (per curiam); see also Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).[6] There is no question that these Plaintiffs have a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"-the chance of seeing their close relatives again depends on it. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Second, it is undisputed that the Proclamation has caused these injuries by categorically rendering these Plaintiffs' relatives ineligible for visas, which prolongs their separation. Finally, enjoining the Proclamation will redress these injuries by allowing these Plaintiffs' relatives to proceed through the individualized vetting process. Whether these Plaintiffs' relatives are issued visas and admitted to the country is beyond the scope of this litigation and ultimately not subject to judicial review. See Part I.B, supra. But a plaintiff need "not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 242-43 & n.15 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge one part of state law requiring registration under charitable solicitation statute, even if plaintiffs might ultimately be required to register for different reasons); accord Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978). Instead, "a plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself, " Larson, 456 U.S. at 242-43 & n.15-here, the prolonged (verging on permanent) separation caused by Plaintiffs' relatives' categorical ineligibility. Therefore, I conclude that these sixteen individual Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Proclamation for violating the INA.

         In addition, the district court concluded that MESA and YAMA had associational standing because both "identify at least one individual member who is a U.S. citizen or [lawful permanent resident] seeking to secure an immigrant visa for a close relative from one of the Designated Countries." IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 599. I agree and adopt the district court's reasoning. Both organizations have at least one member who has or will imminently sponsor a close family member from one of the Designated Countries for an immigrant visa. J.A. 556 (MESA), 612-13 (YAMA). The interests raised by their claims are "germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81; IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 599. Thus, MESA and YAMA have associational standing.

         Finally, the district court held that IRAP, MESA, and IAAB had organizational standing because the Proclamation injures their proprietary and organizational interests. IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 597-98. I again agree with the district court and adopt its reasoning. For example, the Proclamation prevents an IRAP staff member who is Syrian from traveling to New York for IRAP's annual week-long retreat, which is critical to its organizational and strategic activities. J.A. 577-78. The Proclamation also prevents many of MESA's members (many of whom are nationals of the Designated Countries and live abroad) from attending its annual meeting, the revenue from which amounts to half of MESA's annual budget. J.A. 87-90, 555-60. And the Proclamation will prevent nationals from the Designated Countries from attending and speaking at IAAB's International Conference, scheduled for April 2018, and already has prevented foreign nationals from attending its overnight camps. J.A. 1152-54. These constitute concrete, actual injuries to each organization's activities, caused by the Proclamation and redressible by this Court, see Larson, 456 U.S. at 242-43 & n.15-making them cognizable under Article III. See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379 (holding that perceptible impairment of organization's activities and services constitutes injury in fact); IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 597- 98.

         In sum, although only one Plaintiff need allege facts sufficient to establish Article III standing, Bostic, 760 F.3d at 370-71, I find that sixteen individual Plaintiffs and four organizational Plaintiffs have standing to bring claims under the INA.

         D.

         Finally, the Government claims that Plaintiffs lack a cause of action to sue under the INA. A "cause of action"-often referred to synonymously (and confusingly) as a "private right of action"-is a term of art "employed specifically to determine who may judicially enforce" certain "statutory rights or obligations." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979). Whether Plaintiffs have "asserted a cause of action . . . depends not on the quality or extent" of their legal injuries but "on whether the class of litigants" of which Plaintiffs are members "may use the courts to enforce the right at issue." Id. at 239 n.18.[7]

         I conclude that Plaintiffs have a cause of action under the APA to challenge the final action of the agencies now implementing the Proclamation. I also conclude that this Court has inherent authority to review allegations that executive action exceeds a legislatively delegated grant of authority.

         1.

         The APA provides for judicial review of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704. This "omnibus judicial-review provision" allows plaintiffs to sue "for violations of numerous statutes of varying character that do not themselves include causes of action for judicial review." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014). To bring a claim under the APA, a plaintiff must be "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702. But the APA is unavailable if the "statute[] precludes judicial review, " or "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Id. § 701(a).

         The Government challenges Plaintiffs' ability to invoke the APA on four grounds: First, the Proclamation is not agency action; second, whatever agency action may exist is not final; third, Plaintiffs are not "adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of the INA; and fourth, whatever agency action may exist is committed to agency discretion by law.[8] I disagree.

         First, the Plaintiffs have properly challenged agency action. The APA applies only to agency action, which "includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Relevant here, the APA defines "relief" to include the "taking of other action on the application or petition of, and beneficial to, a person, " and a "sanction" to include the "withholding of relief." Id. § 551(10)(B), (11)(C).

         The Government correctly points out that the "President is not an agency within the meaning" of the APA and therefore cannot take "agency action." See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (plurality opinion). But "[r]eview of the legality of Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President's directive." Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that whether an agency's actions are "based on the President's Executive Order hardly seems to insulate them from judicial review under the APA, even if the validity of the Order were thereby drawn into question").

         Here, Plaintiffs have sued some or all of the following agencies and agency heads: DHS and Kirstjen M. Nielsen in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; the State Department and Rex Tillerson in his official capacity as Secretary of State; ODNI and Daniel R. Coats in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence; Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, III in his official capacity as Attorney General; Kevin K. McAleenan in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of CBP; and L. Francis Cissna in his official capacity as Director of USCIS. These agencies and agency heads have fully implemented, as of December 8, 2017, the entry restrictions laid out in the Proclamation. State Department Statement, supra ("Per the Supreme Court's orders, those restrictions will be implemented fully, in accordance with the Presidential Proclamation, around the world, beginning December 8 at open of business, local time."); see also DHS Fact Sheet, supra. As a result, nationals of the Designated Countries will no longer be issued some or all types of immigrant, nonimmigrant, and diversity visas. State Department Statement, supra; see also IRAP v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d at 608.[9] Rather than considering all visa applications under the standard individualized vetting process, consular officers will now "make a determination whether an applicant otherwise eligible for a visa is exempt from the Proclamation or, if not, may be eligible for a waiver under the Proclamation and therefore issued a visa." State Department Statement, supra.

         Functionally, therefore, the relevant agencies are implementing the Proclamation by categorically rejecting visa applications from nationals in the Designated Countries who do not meet the high standard for a waiver not applicable to other nationalities. See id. (stating that to receive a waiver, individual must show that "issuance [of a visa] is in the national interest, the applicant poses no national security or public safety threat to the United States, and denial of the visa would cause undue hardship"); e.g., Mot. Suppl. R. Ex. A, Dec. 22, 2017, ECF No. 162 ("This is to inform you that a consular officer found you ineligible for a visa under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645."). This categorical refusal to issue visas satisfies the APA's definition of a sanction: it is the "withholding" of "beneficial" "action on the application[s]" for immigrant and nonimmigrant visas submitted by foreign nationals of the Designated Counties. 5 U.S.C. § 551(10)(B), (11)(C); see Abulkhair v. President of U.S., 494 Fed.Appx. 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing § 551(11)(C) in discussion about an individual's naturalization application).

         Second, the Plaintiffs have alleged final agency action. The APA limits judicial review of agency actions with no other adequate remedy in court to final agency decisions. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Government claims that there "has been no 'final' agency decision denying a visa based on the Proclamation to any of the aliens abroad identified by plaintiffs." First Br. 22; accord Third Cross-Appeal Br. 8 (hereinafter "Third Br."). During the pendency of this litigation, one of the individual Plaintiffs' relatives was denied both a visa and a waiver pursuant to the Proclamation, rendering the Government's argument moot. Mot. Suppl. R. Ex. A, Dec. 22, 2017, ECF No. 162. But I also reject the Government's argument on the merits, as it misapprehends Plaintiffs' claims.

         There is no talismanic measurement of final agency action. Rather, the Court looks to whether the action "mark[s] the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process" and whether the action is "one by which rights or obligations have been determined[] or from which legal consequences will flow." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties." Franklin, 505 U.S. at 797 (plurality opinion). Final agency action is not "tentative" or "interlocutory" but instead has a "direct and immediate" effect. Id.; see Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. But the measure of finality is also "pragmatic"; an agency action is "immediately reviewable" when it gives notice of how a certain statute will be applied even if no action has yet been brought. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S.Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016).

         In implementing the Proclamation's travel restrictions, the agencies have determined the "rights or obligations" of foreign nationals, with immediate "legal consequences." Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. "[S]ubject to exceptions and waivers, " nationals of the Designated Countries will be denied immigrant and certain nonimmigrant visas. State Department Statement, supra. And the implementation of this policy is not "tentative" or "interlocutory." Franklin, 505 U.S. at 797. To the contrary, a final decision has been made to upend the normal individualized vetting process. Covered nationals are now categorically inadmissible-and their visa applications will be categorically rejected-unless they meet the ...


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