United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
NORMAN
K. MOON SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
As will
become important, this case started its journey in the
Western District with Judge Conrad. (Dkt. 1). It was
transferred to me on December 15, 2017. (Dkt. 87). At that
time, motions to amend the complaint, to compel discovery,
and for summary judgment were pending. On February 16, 2018,
the Court entered an order denying the motion to amend the
complaint, denying the motion to compel discovery, and
granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
(Dkt. 96). The plaintiffs filed motions for reconsideration
of the orders denying the motion to compel and granting
summary judgment on March 19, 2018. (Dkts. 98 & 100).
They filed a notice of appeal later that same day. (Dkt.
102).
A
threshold question concerns this Court's jurisdiction to
entertain the motions for reconsideration. “Generally,
a timely filed notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction of a
case to the court of appeals and strips a district court of
jurisdiction to rule on any matters involved in the
appeal.” Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246,
258 (4th Cir.2014). However, in Fobian v. Storage
Technology Corp., 164 F.3d 887 (4th Cir.1999), the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set out a limited exception
for matters “in aid of the appeal.”
[W]hen a Rule 60(b) motion is filed while a judgment is on
appeal, the district court has jurisdiction to entertain the
motion, and should do so promptly. If the district court
determines that the motion is meritless, as experience
demonstrates is often the case, the court should deny the
motion forthwith; any appeal from the denial can be
consolidated with the appeal from the underlying order. If
the district court is inclined to grant the motion, it should
issue a short memorandum so stating. The movant can then
request a limited remand from this court for that purpose.
Id. at 891. Accordingly, the Court has limited
jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' motions during
the pendency of the appeal.
The
Court held the motion to compel was denied by operation of
Judge Conrad's scheduling order, which required the
plaintiffs to schedule a hearing or advise the Court that the
motion was ripe for decision within 45 days of filing that
motion. (Dkt. 52 at ECF 3; dkt. 62 at ECF 3; see
also Local Rule 11(b) (“[A] motion is deemed
withdrawn if the movant does not set it for hearing (or
arrange to submit it without a hearing) within 60 days after
the date on which the motion is filed.”)). The motion
had been filed during discovery, but had never been heard,
and the defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The
defendants represented “Plaintiffs never noticed [the
motion] for a hearing.” (Dkt. 84). When the case was
transferred, the defendants also submitted a letter
indicating they believed the dispute to be resolved and
providing citations to the documents that had been produced.
(Dkt. 90). The plaintiffs never responded to this letter. In
light of this information, the Court decided the plaintiffs
had failed to ask for a hearing or submit it without a
hearing in the time frame set by Judge Conrad, and
accordingly denied the motion as moot.
However,
with its motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs attached
various emails between themselves, the defendants, and Judge
Conrad's chambers. These emails indicate that the
plaintiffs had attempted to schedule a hearing with the
defendants and Judge Conrad's chambers, but the parties
had been unable to set the hearing before the case was
transferred to me. These communications began in October
2017, within the time frame the parties were required to set
a hearing or submit the motion without a hearing.
To
prevail on a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b), “a party must demonstrate (1)
timeliness, (2) a meritorious defense, (3) a lack of unfair
prejudice to the opposing party, and (4) exceptional
circumstances.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. AMH Roman
Two NC, LLC, 859 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2017). The
party then must satisfy one of six specific subsections of
the rule. Id. As relevant here, Rule 60(b)(1) states
that “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” See
also Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403,
413 (4th Cir. 2010). And Rule 60(b)(6) additionally provides
a catch-all category for relief (“any other reason that
justifies relief.”).
The
Court is inclined to grant the motion for reconsideration of
the motion to compel. See Fobian, 164 F.3d at 891.
The motion for reconsideration was filed thirty days after
the entry of judgment. C.f. CVLR Performance Horses, Inc.
v. Wynne, No. 6:11-CV-00035, 2012 WL 5465024, at *3
(W.D. Va. May 23, 2012). It provides undisputed evidence that
the defendants and Judge Conrad's chambers were aware the
plaintiffs had sought a hearing on the motion. C.f.
Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting
Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 812 (4th Cir. 1988) (“A
meritorious defense requires a proffer of evidence which
would permit a finding for the defaulting party or which
would establish a valid counterclaim.”). Because the
defendants were aware, the Court finds that any prejudice is
not unfair. And the communications with Judge Conrad's
chambers and the subsequent transfer of the case provide the
necessary exceptional circumstance. The motion to compel was
denied on the mistaken belief the plaintiffs had let the
motion languish without discussing it with the Court or the
defendants. Accordingly, this is the rare situation where the
Court is inclined to grant the motion for reconsideration.
The
Court is also inclined to grant the motion for
reconsideration of its order granting the motions for summary
judgment. As the Court noted in its order granting those
motions, the plaintiffs' opposition to the motions for
summary judgment did not address many of the facts
established by the defendants and it contained only two pages
of response to the defendants' arguments in favor of
summary judgment. (Dkt. 77 at ECF 7-9). This brevity was
partially due to the plaintiffs' belief that some
discovery materials had not been provided. The above issues
surrounding the motion to compel are intertwined with the
motions for summary judgment. Because the Court is inclined
to reconsider its order denying the motion to compel, it is
also inclined to reconsider its order granting the motions
for summary judgment.
Given
the pendency of the appeal, the Court cannot issue an order
addressing these motions at this point, but “[p]ursuant
to the procedure outlined in Fobian, the parties may
request a limited remand from the Fourth Circuit for this
purpose.” Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cty., Va.,
No. 4:11CV043, 2014 WL 10402067, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 4,
2014); Fobian, 164 F.3d at 891 (“If the
district court is inclined to grant the motion, it should
issue a short memorandum so stating.”). The ...