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Prasad v. Federal Trade Commission

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division

May 16, 2018

SUNDARI K. PRASAD, Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          M. Hannah Lauck, United States District Judge

         Sundari K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.[1] The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

         I. Preliminary Review

         Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory, '" or claims where the "'factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994).

         The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

         "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5 A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, " id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face, " id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

         II. Prasad's Complaint

         The action proceeds on Prasad's Particularized Complaint ("Complaint, " ECF No. 10).[2]As an initial matter, the Court notes that Prasad's Complaint consists of rambling allegations, conclusory statements, and mere phrases. Moreover, the Court notes that in some instances, Prasad's Complaint is not legible. The Court makes its best attempt to decipher words and recites the most relevant factual information for each Defendant.[3]

         In her Complaint, Prasad names the Federal Trade Commission, Sprint PCS, Verizon Wireless, Richard Locke, Stephen Bloomquest, David Arnold Carpenter, Hamilton Lee Hendrix, Jonathan D. Headlee, and Jane "Justice" a/k/a "Paradox Jane, " as Defendants. (Compl. 1.) As pertinent here, Prasad's factual allegations state,

This entire issue arises out of pornographic photos of myself and content being transferred between cellular networks that was/is unauthorized . . . and illegally taken and videos that I was unaware were being recorded and did not agree to - as well as nude photos of my infant son being transferred as well between lawyers with no legal action taken - between people as well - which was child pornography. (Police report taken) and threats from Hendrix, Headlee, and Bloomquest over two networks. Stephen Boomquest [and] Richard Locke -attorney(s) of Hamilton Hendrix - was told about everything and did nothing .... [Defendants Carpenter, Hendrix, Headlee, and Jane Justice] all spoke/texted/recorded words that tended to violence and breach of peace (on cell phones) . . . [M]y "private property" (my and my son's body) was "taken" via photo on cellphone for public use and distributed illegally; I was not compensated for my photos as I was a nude model

(Compl. 1-2.) Prasad then alleges the various Defendants violated, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 2258, [4] the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 8.01-45 of the Virginia Code, [5] the Virginia State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, the Constitution of Virginia, "copyright over a cell network, " the First Amendment, [6] Fifth Amendment, [7] Ninth Amendment, [8] Tenth Amendment, [9] and the Thirteenth Amendment.[10] (Id. at 2-4.) Prasad requests, inter alia, that this Court grant her and her son "monetary relief of 193 million dollars for failure to act [and] prosecute, [and] legal remedy of jail time enacted on all parties." (Id. at 7.)

         III. Analysis

         It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of Prasad's theories for relief. See Cochran v. Morris,73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))). Ultimately, Prasad's Complaint will be dismissed for ...


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