United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
SUNDARI K. PRASAD, Plaintiff,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.
Hannah Lauck, United States District Judge
K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. The matter is before the Court for
evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the
Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or
(2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first
standard includes claims based upon "'an
indisputably meritless legal theory, '" or claims
where the "'factual contentions are clearly
baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417,
427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091
(4th Cir. 1994).
second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5 A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and
the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give
the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Ail. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with
complaints containing only "labels and conclusions"
or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level, " id.
(citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible
on its face, " id. at 570, rather than merely
"conceivable." Id. "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all
the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.
2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States,
289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court
liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not
act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua
sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the
inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her
complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243
(4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
action proceeds on Prasad's Particularized Complaint
("Complaint, " ECF No. 10).As an initial matter, the
Court notes that Prasad's Complaint consists of rambling
allegations, conclusory statements, and mere phrases.
Moreover, the Court notes that in some instances,
Prasad's Complaint is not legible. The Court makes its
best attempt to decipher words and recites the most relevant
factual information for each Defendant.
Complaint, Prasad names the Federal Trade Commission, Sprint
PCS, Verizon Wireless, Richard Locke, Stephen Bloomquest,
David Arnold Carpenter, Hamilton Lee Hendrix, Jonathan D.
Headlee, and Jane "Justice" a/k/a "Paradox
Jane, " as Defendants. (Compl. 1.) As pertinent here,
Prasad's factual allegations state,
This entire issue arises out of pornographic photos of myself
and content being transferred between cellular networks that
was/is unauthorized . . . and illegally taken and videos that
I was unaware were being recorded and did not agree to - as
well as nude photos of my infant son being transferred as
well between lawyers with no legal action taken - between
people as well - which was child pornography. (Police report
taken) and threats from Hendrix, Headlee, and Bloomquest over
two networks. Stephen Boomquest [and] Richard Locke
-attorney(s) of Hamilton Hendrix - was told about everything
and did nothing .... [Defendants Carpenter, Hendrix, Headlee,
and Jane Justice] all spoke/texted/recorded words that tended
to violence and breach of peace (on cell phones) . . . [M]y
"private property" (my and my son's body) was
"taken" via photo on cellphone for public use and
distributed illegally; I was not compensated for my photos as
I was a nude model
(Compl. 1-2.) Prasad then alleges the various Defendants
violated, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 2258,
Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 8.01-45 of the
Virginia Code,  the Virginia State Bar Rules of
Professional Conduct, the Constitution of Virginia,
"copyright over a cell network, " the First
Amendment,  Fifth Amendment,  Ninth Amendment,
Tenth Amendment,  and the Thirteenth
Amendment. (Id. at 2-4.) Prasad
requests, inter alia, that this Court grant her and
her son "monetary relief of 193 million dollars for
failure to act [and] prosecute, [and] legal remedy of jail
time enacted on all parties." (Id. at 7.)
both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended
discussion of Prasad's theories for relief. See
Cochran v. Morris,73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)
(emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is
consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of
frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing
Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))).
Ultimately, Prasad's Complaint will be dismissed for