United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
SUNDARIK. PRASAD, Plaintiff,
HAMPTON CIRCUIT COURT, et al., Defendant.
Hannah Lauck United States Judge
K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. The matter is before the Court for
evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the
Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or
(2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first
standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably
meritless legal theory, " or claims where the
"factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
(1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994).
The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5 A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and
the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" BellAtl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with
complaints containing only "labels and conclusions"
or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level, " id.
(citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible
on its face, " id. at 570, rather than merely
"conceivable." Id. "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing BellAtl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all
the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.
2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States,
289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court
liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not
act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua
sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the
inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her
complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243
(4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Memorandum Order entered on October 17, 2017, the Court
directed Prasad to file a particularized complaint. (ECF No.
14.) Prasad complied with that order. (ECF No. 16.)
Thereafter, Prasad filed an Amended Particularized Complaint
("Complaint, " ECF No. 19). As an initial matter, the
Court notes that Prasad's Complaint is comprised of
seventeen pages of rambling allegations and 220 pages of
attached exhibits consisting of additional ramblings and
copies of court documents, correspondence, and statutes.
Further, in many instances, Prasad's Complaint and the
attached exhibits are not legible. The Court makes its best
attempt to decipher words and recites the most relevant
factual information for each Defendant.
is currently detained pending her trial in the Circuit Court
for the City of Hampton, Virginia. Prasad alleges that the
named Defendants discriminated against her and violated her
various constitutional rights during her detention and
ongoing criminal proceedings, and during a previous family
law matter in which she was involved. (Compl. 10-16). Prasad
requests, inter alia, "attorney's fees and
costs, and such additional relief as the Court may deem just
and proper, " and "declaratory relief of all
violations and injunctive relief as well on all
parties." (Id. at 17.)
both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended
discussion of Prasad's theories for relief. See
Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)
(emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is
consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of
frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))).
Ultimately, Prasad's Complaint will be dismissed for
failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous.
contends that Hampton Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
Judge Deborah Roe, Hampton General District Court Judge
Patrick, and Hampton Circuit Court Judge Hutton violated her
constitutional rights and her rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). (Compl. 3-4, 8, 10, 13.)
are absolutely immune from suits under § 1983 for acts
committed within their judicial discretion. Stump v.
Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). "Absolute
judicial immunity exists 'because it is recognized that
judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted must be
able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively,
without apprehension that they will be subjected to
burdensome and vexatious litigation.'" Lesane v.
Spencer, No. 3:09CV012, 2009 WL 4730716, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Dec. 8, 2009) (citations omitted) (quoting McCray v.
Maryland,456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972), overruled
on other grounds, Pink v. Lester,52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th
Cir. 1995)). A judge is entitled to immunity even if
"the action he [or she] took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his [or her]
authority." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Only two
exceptions apply to judicial immunity: (1) nonjudicial