United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
A. GIBNEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Brown, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
requesting to proceed in forma pauperis, filed this
civil action. For the reasons that follow, the Court will
grant Brown's request to proceed in forma
pauperis, file the action, and dismiss it pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A as frivolous and
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by an individual
proceeding in forma pauperis if the Court determines
the action "is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The first standard includes claims based upon "an
indisputably meritless legal theory, " or claims where
the "factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
(1989)). With respect to second standard, this Court has
A litigant may be deemed to act maliciously if his actions
[i]mport a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another, or an
intent to do a wrongful act, and may consist in direct
intention to injure, or in reckless disregard of
another's rights. Therefore, the court must assess the
character of the allegations insofar as they indicate a
motive on the part of the plaintiff to merely harass or vex
the defendants rather than to seek redress for a legitimate
Cain v. Virginia, 982 F.Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Va.
1997) (alteration in original) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Further, "[t]he courts have long recognized
that inmate complaints against state officials are a
particularly fertile arena for frivolous and malicious
litigation." Id. (citing Daye v.
Bounds, 509 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1975). This
is true, in part, because incarcerated litigants
"possess both time and dissatisfactions in
abundance." Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310,
1316 (4th Cir. 1996). Further, in assessing whether an action
is frivolous or malicious, the Court is informed by a
plaintiffs past litigious conduct and the tone of his or her
current allegations. Id.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND BROWN'S OTHER
limited factual allegations in Brown's complaint assert
that Sergeant Dickerson entered private property and
conspired with others to "kidnap" Brown and hold
him for "ransom." (ECF No. 1, at l.) Brown contends
that he is now being held for ransom at the Hampton Roads
Regional Jail. (Id.) Brown asserts that such actions
violate, inter alia, a host of federal criminal
statutes (including provisions that criminalize threatening
the President, 18 U.S.C. § 871, and prohibit violence
against maritime fixed platforms), "the Treaty of Peace
& Friendship 1787, " and "the Clock of
Destiny/Zodiac Constitution." (Id.) Elsewhere
in his Complaint, Brown makes a variety of references which
indicate that he subscribes to the Moorish-American ideology.
(Id.) Brown demands billions of dollars in damages.
records before the Court reflect that Brown has not been
kidnapped and held for ransom. Rather, Brown is currently
serving a sentence of three years and six months imposed by
the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News. Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Brown v. Virginia,
3:18CV136 (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 28, 2018). In his Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Brown once again characterizes his
detention as a form of "kidnapping." Id.
Brown also contends that his detention is illegal based on
his status as a Moorish American. Id. at 6. Further,
since February 28, 2018, Brown has filed nearly thirty
actions with the Court. In those cases, Brown advances
demands for relief based on his status as a Moorish American.
both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended
discussion of the utter lack of merit of Brown's theories
for relief. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310,
1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that "abbreviated
treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision for
the disposition of frivolous or "insubstantial
claims" (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989))). "[I]t is well-recognized that... the
Moorish American Nation ... [is a] notorious organization! ]
of scofflaws and ne'er-do-wells who attempt to benefit
from the protections of federal and state law while
simultaneously proclaiming their independence from and total
lack of responsibility under those same laws."
Metaphyzic El-Ectromagnetic Supreme-El v. Dir., Dep
't of Corr., No. 3:14CV52, 2015 WL 1138246, at *3
(E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting
Abdullah, v. New Jersey, No. 12-4202 (RBK), 2012 WL
2916738, at *5 (D.N.J. July 16, 2012)). Neither the Zodiac
Constitution, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, nor any of
Brown's other silly theories provide a viable basis for
relief. See Id. at *6. "Notwithstanding
[Brown's] personal subscription to the Zodiac
Constitution ... and his belief that the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship between Morocco and the United States ... deprive
the state courts of jurisdiction over him, courts have
soundly rejected these claims." Id; see El Ameen Bey
v. Stumpf, 825 F.Supp.2d 537, 558 (D.N.J. 2011)
("[A] litigant's reliance on any Barbary Treaty,
including on the Treaty with Morocco, for the purposes of a
civil suit raising claims based on the events that occurred
within what is the United States' geographical territory
is facially frivolous."); Jones-El v. South
Carolina, No. 5:13-cv-01851-JMC, 2014 WL 958302, at *8
(D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2014) (rejecting habeas claims under the
Zodiac Constitution and Treaty of Peace and Friendship as
"completely frivolous, whether raised under § 2254,
§ 2241, or by way of civil complaint").
Accordingly, the Court finds the action is subject to
dismissal as frivolous.
the Court finds the action is subject to dismissal as
malicious. Brown demands billions of dollars of damages
against Sergeant Dickerson, who apparently arrested Brown.
Brown provides no coherent explanation for this outlandish
demand. Under similar circumstances, courts have observed:
when there is no recital of credible probative facts that
support the allegations that the plaintiff is attempting to
make, the Plaintiff sues those involved in securing his
incarceration, and the tone of all the Plaintiffs allegations
indicates that he is bringing his suit merely to satisfy his
desire for vengeance against the Defendants and not to
rectify any wrong done to him, then the suit is a MALICIOUS
v. Virginia,982 F.Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(quoting Spencer v Rhodes,656 F.Supp. 458,
463-64 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 19, 1987)). Brown has filed dozens of
suits of this ilk in recent months. The sum of all of this
compels the conclusion that Brown filed the present action
"to merely harass or vex the defendants rather than to