United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division
Michael F. Urbanski, Chief United States District Judge
matter is before the court on a motion to intervene filed by
Juan Valoy, Edgar Alfredo Ramos-Ramos, Marcelino
Ramirez-Sanchez, Cesar Augusto Gramajo, and Gerson Castro
Segeda. ECF No. 8. The matter has been fully briefed. The
court dispenses with oral argument because the legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
For the following reasons, the motion to intervene is
Insurance Company ("RLI") and Nexus Services, Inc.
("Nexus") entered into an indemnity agreement on
January 20, 2016 ("Indemnity Agreement") as
consideration for RLI's agreement to issue immigration
bonds. As detailed in the court's opinion on the
extensively litigated preliminary injunction, RLI alleges
that Nexus breached the Indemnity Agreement for a variety of
reasons, including failure to provide access to Nexus'
books, records and accounts. ECF No. 59. The court granted
RLI a preliminary injunction that required Nexus to give
access to a selection of its books, records and accounts. ECF
the course of briefing and argument for the preliminary
injunction, Juan Valoy, Edgar Alfredo Ramos-Ramos, Marcelino
Ramirez-Sanchez, Cesar Augusto Gramajo, and Gerson Castro
Segeda (the "Intervenors") moved to intervene as
defendants in this action. ECF No. 8. The Intervenors claim
they have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a) because (1) they have a legally protected
interest at stake-their sensitive and confidential personal
information located in documents held by Nexus and requested
by RLI; (2) their interest is impaired once the personal
information is disclosed; and (3) neither RLI nor Nexus
adequately represents their interests because of the
parties' financial interests in compliance with the bond
terms. ECF No. 8, at 3-10. The Intervenors also argue that
the court could grant permissive intervention under Rule
24(b) because they intend to directly oppose the relief
sought by RLI and their defenses share the same questions of
law and fact at issue in this action. ECF No. 8, at 10-12.
Additionally, the Intervenors note that they have standing
because disclosure of their personal information is an injury
directly caused by RLI's request, which would be
redressed by a favorable decision by this court. ECF No. 8,
objects to the intervention as a Nexus-created strategy to
frustrate RLFs enforcement of its contractual rights. ECF No.
71, at 2. RLI argues that the Intervenors have not carried
their burden of demonstrating their right to intervention or
that circumstances support permissive intervention. ECF No.
71, at 4-14. RLI claims: (1) the alleged harm of the
information's future use is speculative; (2) the
Intervenors and Nexus have nearly identical interests in
opposing enforcement of the Indemnity Agreement for privacy
purposes, as well as defenses and relief sought; (3) orders
in this proceeding preclude RLI from disclosing this
information to most third parties; (4) the Intervenors have
not shown adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance;
and (5) the Intervenors have not pled facts connecting them
to the Indemnity Agreement or the immigration bonds,
including for purposes of standing. Id. Moreover,
RLI contends that intervention could open the floodgates to
the 2, 400 other bond principals, their families, and
friends, and could prejudice RLI because the Intervenors may
work with Nexus to frustrate RLI's enforcement efforts
through dilatory litigation tactics. ECF No. 71, at 14-17.
response, the Intervenors denied RLI's accusations that
their proposed intervention was a litigation tactic
benefiting Nexus. ECF No. 75, at 2. Nexus, for its part,
agreed with the Intervenors' motion and notes that
counsel for the Intervenors possesses knowledge about
immigration proceedings and Nexus' clients. ECF No. 78.
24(a)(2) governs intervention by right, and provides as
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect
its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Thus, in addition to demonstrating
timeliness of the motion, an applicant must show: (1)
interest in the subject matter of the action; (2) that the
protection of this interest would be impaired because of the
action; and (3) that the applicant's interest is not
adequately represented by existing parties to the litigation.
See Teague v. Bakker, 931 F.2d 259, 260-61 (4th Cir.
1991). "[A] district court is 'entitled to the full
range of reasonable discretion' to determine whether the
requirements of intervention as a matter of right have been
met." Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lumber
Liquidators. Inc., 314 F.R.D. 180, 183 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(quoting Com, of Va. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976)).
24(b) provides for permissive intervention of parties. Rule
24(b)(1)(B) states that on timely motion, the court may
permit anyone to intervene who "has a claim or defense
that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1)(B). The court enjoys
substantial discretion over allowing or rejecting motions to
intervene under Rule 24(b). See Smith v. Pennington,
352 F.3d 884, 892 (4th Cir. 2003); Hill v. Western Elec.
Co., 672 F.2d 381, 385-86 (4th Cir. 1982).
Interveners argue that they are entitled to intervene as a
matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a),
or alternatively, that the court should permit them to
intervene under Rule 24(b). The court finds that the