United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
Michael F. Urbanski Chief United States District Judge
Meyers, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, commenced this
civil rights action against three judges of this court;
Virginia Department of Corrections Director Harold Clarke;
and "Red Onion State Prison [("ROSP")]
Employees." Plaintiff is upset about the conditions of
confinement he experiences at ROSP and with judges of this
court who have ruled adversely on his motions and cases, many
of which were malicious, frivolous, and
vexatious. Plaintiff seeks $15 billion in damages, an
"independent inquiry" into the Clerk of Court's
and judges' alleged conspiracy of corruption, and for the
"United States Inspector General" to monitor ROSP
and commence criminal proceedings against ROSP staff. This
matter is before the court for screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. After reviewing the complaint, the court
dismisses the action as frivolous and malicious.
court must dismiss an action or claim filed by an inmate if
it determines that the action or claim is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1);
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). "Frivolous" includes
claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal
theory," "claims of infringement of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist," or claims where
the "factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
"Malicious" includes claims deemed irresponsible,
repetitive of pending or previously litigation, harassment,
threatening, insulting to the court, or abusive of the
judicial process. See, e.g., Abdul-Akbar v. Dep't of
Corr., 910 F.Supp. 986, 999 (D. Del. 1995); Daves v.
Scranton, 66 F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Although the
court liberally construes pro se complaints, Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), the court does not
act as an inmate's advocate, sua sponte
developing statutory and constitutional claims not clearly
raised in a complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107
F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring);
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985); see. also Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that a district court
is not expected to assume the role of advocate for a pro se
action for damages against the judges is frivolous and
malicious, and they cannot provide the equitable relief he
seeks. See, e.g.. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d
79, 81 (4th Cir.1985); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d
1, 5 n.l 1 (4th Cir. 1972). Also, Plaintiff pursues an
indisputably meritless legal theory by naming all "ROSP
Employees" as one defendant. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Morgan, No. 1:90cv06318, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8295, at *2-4, 1991 WL 115759, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.June 20,
1991) (recognizing that a group of personnel, like
"medical staff," is not a "person" for
purposes of § 1983). Plaintiffs reliance on conclusory
assertions of respondeat superior against Director
Clarke is a frivolous attempt to vex and harass, especially
when viewed in the context of all the repetitive cases
Plaintiff has filed in this court within the past eighteen
months. See, e.g.. Pittman v. Moore, 980
F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that harassing,
repetitive litigation is malicious); see also Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (relying on
labels and conclusions is insufficient); Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.7, 691-94
(1978) (discussing respondeat superior under §
foregoing reasons, the court dismisses the action as
frivolous and malicious. The court notes that Plaintiff does
not have an absolute and unconditional right of access to
courts to prosecute frivolous, malicious, abusive, or
vexatious motions or actions. See, e.g.. Demos
v. Keating, 33 Fed.Appx. 918, 920 (10th Cir. 2002);
Tinker v. Hanks, 255 F.3d 444, 445 (7th Cir. 2001);
In re Vincent, 105 F.3d 943, 944-46 (4th Cir. 1997).
Federal courts may issue pre-filing injunctions when
vexatious conduct hinders the court from fulfilling its
constitutional duty. See. e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)-(c); Vestal v. Clinton,
106 F.3d 553, 555 (4th Cir. 1997). Before barring frivolous,
malicious, abusive, or vexatious filings, the court must
afford Plaintiff notice and opportunity to be heard.
Cromer v. Kraft Foods of N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812,
819 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Plaintiff is given notice
of the court's intention to enter a pre-filing injunction
against him, and he may file any opposing argument in this
action within fifteen days.
 The court held a hearing on August 16,
2018, concerning his original allegation of imminent danger
in one of the cases, Meyers v. U.S. Postal Service,
No. 7:18-cv-00029. The magistrate judge has recommended that
the court allow Plaintiff to proceed without prepaying the
filling fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) based on
allegations in that case about specific ROSP staffs and
inmates' conduct around January ...