United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
K. MOON, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Alexander, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se,
filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The matter before the Court is Defendant
Nurse Stump's motion for summary judgment. I will grant the
motion for the reasons that follow.
April 15, 2017, Alexander assaulted a corrections officer at
Red Onion State Prison. Officers eventually forced Alexander
to the floor, restrained him, and escorted him from
A-Building to a segregation cell in B-Building. When Stump
arrived to evaluate Alexander, Alexander told her that he had
been slammed twice and that he was bleeding everywhere. Exh.
B, at 9:30-10:00. He alleges the same in his current
complaint, and he contends that his restraints were painfully
tight. See Compl. 5. When Stump assessed him, she
observed that he only had abrasions on his left knee, left
shoulder, and left eyebrow, and a red place on top of his
head. Exh. B, at 9:30-10:00. She did not observe any active
bleeding and suggested that the injuries resembled rug burn.
Id. Stump also checked Alexander's ambulatory
restraints and was able to place two fingers under both the
wrist and ankle restraints. Id.; Stump Aff. ¶6,
Dkt. No. 44-1.
was present when officers removed Alexander from the
restraints the following morning, on April 16, 2017. Stump
asked Alexander if he required medical attention. Alexander
responded affirmatively, complaining about his right hand.
Exh. D, at 1:45-1:55. Stump observed that the hand appeared
swollen and advised Alexander to keep the hand elevated as
much as possible until he could be seen by a doctor. Exh. D.,
at 4:45. Stump inquired if Alexander had any other issues,
and Alexander responded that he did not. Id. Stump
prescribed Tylenol and placed Alexander on the schedule to be
seen by the institutional physician. Id. at 6:05;
Health Services Complaint & Treatment Form, Dkt. No.
did not complain on April 16, 2017 about any injuries related
to being sprayed with oleoresin capsicum (“OC”)
spray, his restraints being too tight, the skin being ripped
from his legs, face, torso, or arms, swelling of his eye
socket, a knot on his head, his testicles, or his fingers. An
x-ray of Alexander's right hand on June 2, 2017 came back
normal and showed no evidence of acute fracture, dislocation,
or osseous lesion. Exh. A, Attach. 3, Dkt. No. 44-1.
alleges that Stump violated his constitutional rights by
being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Furthermore, he asserts that much of Stump's statements
are lies, that officers intimidated Stump into saying that
she treated Alexander, and that the videos have been altered.
He requests a declaration that Stump's actions violated
his rights, court costs, an apology, and monetary damages.
Standards of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court
should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“As to materiality, . . . [o]nly disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The dispute over a material fact
must be genuine, “such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports
Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001). As
such, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the
evidence supporting a genuine issue of material fact
“is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
moving party bears the burden of proving that judgment on the
pleadings is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If the moving party meets this
burden, then the nonmoving party must set forth specific,
admissible facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact for
trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In considering a motion
for summary judgment, the court must view the record as a
whole and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-324; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th
Cir. 1994). However, the nonmoving party may not rely on
beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Baber v. Hosp.
Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The
evidence set forth must meet the “substantive
evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on
the merits.” Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12
F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993).
Pro Se Pleadings
is proceeding pro se and, thus, entitled to a
liberal construction of his pleadings. See, e.g.,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 90-95 (2007).
However, “principles requiring generous construction of
pro se complaints are not . . . without
limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit has explained
that “though pro se litigants cannot, of
course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity
and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in
law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up
and decide issues never fairly presented to them.”
Id. at 1276; see Kalderon v. Finkelstein,
Case No. 08 Civ 9440, 2010 WL 3359473, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 2010) (“Plaintiff's complaint belongs to
the everything-but-the-kitchen sink school of thought.”
“The complaint is extremely difficult to follow because
of its extreme length and purported factual detail. The
factual allegations are often repetitive, inconsistent, and
contradicted by documents referenced in the