United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
A. GIBNEY, JR. UNITED SLATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Lee Hinton, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on March 29,
2018, the Court granted Defendant Dr. Calhoun's Motion
for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 91, 92.) In his remaining
claim, Hinton contended that Nurse Patricia McCabe denied him
adequate medical care during his incarceration in the
Lawrenceville Correctional Center ("LCC").
Defendant McCabe filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
provided Hinton with notice pursuant to Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). However, Hinton
did not respond. Accordingly, by Memorandum Opinion and Order
entered on June 12, 2018, the Court granted Defendant
McCabe's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the
Hinton credibly asserted that he never received the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant McCabe on March 29,
2018. Accordingly, by Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on
August 17, 2018, the Court vacated the June 12, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order, mailed the Motion for Summary
Judgment and accompanying Memorandum in Support to Hinton,
and permitted Hinton time to file a response. (ECF No. 114,
115.) After an extension of time, Hinton filed a "Motion
to Deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment."
("Opposition," ECF No. 120 (capitalization
corrected).) By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on
October 2, 2018, the Court granted Defendant McCabe's
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the action. (ECF
Nos. 123, 124.)
October 12, 2018, Hinton filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
("Rule 59(e) Motion," ECF No. 125). See MLC
Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277-78
(4th Cir. 2008) (stating that filings made within
twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment are construed
as Rule 59(e) motions (citing Dove v. CODESCO, 569
F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978))).
of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy
which should be used sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co. v.
Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recognizes three grounds for relief under Rule 59(e):
"(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial;
or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Weyerhaeuser Corp. v.
Koppers Co., 771 F.Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Md. 1991);
Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625,
626 (S.D.Miss. 1990)). Hinton does not explicitly address any
of the above recognized grounds for relief in his Rule 59(e)
Motion. However, the Court construes Hinton to argue that the
Court should grant his Rule 59(e) Motion "to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice."
Hinton takes issue with the fact that Defendant McCabe filed
a document that the Court referred to as a
"response" to Hinton's Opposition to Defendant
McCabe's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mem. Supp. Rule
59(e) Mot. 2, ECF No. 126; see ECF Nos. 122, 123, at
2.) Hinton claims he never received this
"response." (Id.) Although this submission
was called a "response," it was truly a reply to
Hinton's Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgement
filed by Defendant McCabe. Although it is unfortunate that
Hinton purportedly failed to receive this reply, his lack of
receipt of the reply does not require vacating the Memorandum
Opinion and Order granting summary judgment. Hinton was
notified of his right to file responsive materials and had
his sole procedural opportunity to present evidence opposing
the Motion for Summary Judgment when he filed his Opposition.
Hinton had no procedural right to file a response of any sort
to the reply. See E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(F). Thus,
Hinton fails to demonstrate that vacating the prior opinion
is necessary to "to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
Hinton contends that the Court is biased against him because
it has described his submissions as improperly labeled or
procedurally incorrect and because he is an inmate. (Mem.
Supp. Rule 59(e) Mot. 3.) Contrary to Hinton's belief,
unfavorable "judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for bias" or a valid reason to
demand recusal of a judge. Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citation omitted). Hinton has not
demonstrated that the undersigned harbors any bias against
him or any circumstance where the impartiality of the
undersigned might be reasonably questioned. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 144, 455. Accordingly, the Court discerns
no clear error of law or manifest injustice in the dismissal
of Hinton's complaint.
the remainder of Hinton's Rule 59(e) Motion continues to
re-argue his claims and his response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment. However, a "Rule 59(e) motion may not
be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or
prevent evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment." Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at
403 (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1810.1 at
127-28 (2d ed. 1995)).
Hinton fails to identify any clear error of law in the
Court's conclusions or any other ground for relief under
Rule 59(e), his ...