United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
Jackson L. Kiser Senior United States District Judge
Lunsford, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The matter before the court is the motion
to dismiss filed by Defendants Superintendent Winston, Dr.
Moses, Lisa Ferguson,  and the Medical Department.
Plaintiffs amended complaint, he asserts that his Eighth
Amendment rights were violated by improper medical
treatment and unsafe living
conditions. The Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting
that Plaintiff failed to allege their personal involvement.
Plaintiff responded, and Defendants filed a reply, making
this matter ripe for disposition. After reviewing the record,
I will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Standards of Review A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
argue that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
complaint need only contain "a short, plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). When evaluating a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations.
See Vitol. S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d
527, 539 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). "While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Stated differently, to survive a motion to dismiss,
"a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbak 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
need not "accept the legal conclusions drawn from the
facts" or "accept as true unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore
Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d
175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). "Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, with all
allegations in the complaint taken as true and all reasonable
inferences drawn in the plaintiffs favor, Chao v.
Rivendell Woods, Inc.. 415 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.
2005). Rule 12(b)(6) does "not require heightened fact
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Making the plausibility
determination is "a context- specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Iqbal 556 U.S. at 679.
Pro Se Pleadings
plaintiffis proceeding pro se and, thus, entitled to a
liberal construction of the pleading. See, e.g.,
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 90-95. However, "principles
requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not.
. . without limits." Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth
Circuit has explained that "though pro se litigants
cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the
clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those
trained in law, neither can district courts be required to
conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to
them." Id. at 1276; see Kalderon v.
Finkelstein, No. 08 Civ 9440, 2010 WL 3359473, at *1 n.l
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010) ("Plaintiffs complaint belongs
to the everything-but-the-kitchen sink school of
thought." "The complaint is extremely difficult to
follow because of its extreme length and purported factual
detail. The factual allegations are often repetitive,
inconsistent, and contradicted by documents referenced in the
42 U.S.C. § 1983
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Notably, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege a
defendant's personal act or omission leading to a
deprivation of a federal right. See Fisher v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Author., 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th
Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Cry, of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44(1991). Negligent
deprivations are not actionable under § 1983. See,
e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330
(1986); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir.
amended complaint, Plaintiff does not allege personal
involvement on behalf of any defendant. In fact, he only
mentions Defendants in the case caption. Although a complaint
need only provide "a short, plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"
Plaintiff fails to allege any claim against any defendant
that would entitle him to relief under § 1983. See
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.. 324 F.3d
761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) ("While a plaintiff is not
charged with pleading facts sufficient to prove her case, as
an evidentiary matter, in her ...