United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
E. Payne Senior United States District Judge
Jenkins, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. The action proceeds on the SECOND
PARTICULARIZED COMPLAINT. ("Complaint," ECF No. 21)
. The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the
Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or
(2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based
upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or
claims where the "factual contentions are clearly
baseless." Clay v. Yates/ 809
F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard
is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true
and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "require  onlyxa short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,' in order toxgive the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with
complaints containing only "labels and conclusions"
or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level," id.
(citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible
on its face," id. at 570, rather than merely
"conceivable." Id. "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all
the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.
2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States,
289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court
liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not
act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte
developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate
failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See
Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir.
1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) .
Complaint, Jenkins argues that his First, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during his state
criminal proceedings. (Compl. 3.) Jenkins identifies as
Defendants, the City of Virginia Beach, Va Municipality, Will
Sessoms, the former Mayor of Virginia Beach, David L. Hansen,
the City Manager of Virginia Beach, and Carmen Widgeon, a
city employee of Virginia Beach. (Id.) Jenkins
On October 13, 2017, I was tried by a jury in Va Beach, Va.
As soon as my trial began, I refused to relinquish my right
to an attorney and wished to present myself inpropria
persona. Right then I was removed from the courtroom and my
trial continued without my presence violating my Sixth
Amendment right to be present at my trial. The things that
were discussed outside of my presence had a direct influence
on the outcome of my trial, in the process, violating my 1st,
5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment right to due process. I went on
to be convicted in an unfair trial with no lawyer. That
violated my constitutional rights numerous times all done
within a municipality that created customs and policies for
such violations of rights to be condoned within its
During the process of my trial, I had a biased judge who
criticized me numerous times, would not recognize my
religion, and would not recognize my status as inpropria
persona sui juris nor as a living man, natural person (28
U.S.C. 1391). The judge violated my 6th Amendment rights by
not holding a colloquy with me concerning my decision to
proceed without an attorney, did not hold [a] competency
hearing with me even though I take psych medication, used a
witness who perjured herself many times on the stand, causing
me deprivation of life and liberty, also mental, physical,
and psychological injury. All [of] this was done under a
municipality that created customs and policies that condoned
such violations of my rights.
(Id. at 1-2 (paragraph numbering
omitted).) Jenkins argues that I. 1st, 5th, 6th, and
14th Amendment rights violator (Will Sessoms) former Mayor of
Va Beach, Va, at the time of violation of my rights. The
mayor created a policy and custom under which my
constitutional rights were violated and his administration
allowed such a policy and custom to continue.
The mayor was grossly negligent in that he did not adequately
supervise or train his subordinates who violated my rights
that being the Va Beach, Va municipality.
II. (David L. Hansen) is the City Manager who failed to train
officers and employees under his management that resulted in
the violation of my constitutional rights.
Under his management of the city, he created a custom and
policy that led to the violation of my constitutional rights.
III. (Carmen Widgeon) is a city employee who was a witness
for the Commonwealth who committed perjury on the witness
stand violating my 1st, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment rights
and intentionally inflicting emotional distress and