United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
VALERIE D. MORGAN, Plaintiff,
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al., Defendants.
E. Payne Senior United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on DEFENDANT NVR MORTGAGE FINANCE,
INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 9); the MOTION TO
DISMISS (ECF No. 18) filed by Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
("Bayview"), E*Trade Bank ("E*Trade"),
and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
PMERS"); DEFENDANT BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (ECF No. 20); and Plaintiff
Valerie D. Morgan's MOTION[S] TO AWARD PLAINTIFF FEDERAL
& STATE CRIME VICTIMS RIGHTS, and DENY DEFENDANTS ANY/ALL
FORMS OF RELIEF - PER 18 USC 3771 (d)(1) (ECF Nos. 28, 34,
36, 38, and 39). For the following reasons, the
defendants' motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 9, 18, and 20)
will be granted, and Morgan's MOTION [S] TO AWARD
PLAINTIFF FEDERAL & STATE CRIME VICTIMS RIGHTS, and DENY
DEFENDANTS ANY/ALL FORMS OF RELIEF - PER 18 USC 3771 (d)(1)
(ECF Nos. 28, 34, 36, 38, and 39) will be denied. But,
because Morgan has recently retained counsel, the dismissal
will be without prejudice.
proceeding pro se, filed this action on June 21,
2018 against five defendants. See ECF No. 1. Morgan
alleges that NVR Mortgage Finance Inc. ("NVR") is
the original lender of her loan. Id. at
NVR owned the original mortgage loan, but it sold her
mortgage to Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of
America") over a decade ago. Morgan alleges that Bayview
is the current servicer of her loan, that E*Trade is the
current owner of the loan, and that MERS is the beneficiary
of her loan. Id. at 4. It is not clear why Morgan
named Bank of America as a defendant, see id. at 5,
but she alleges that Bank of America was a prior servicer.
Id. at 6.
Complaint, Morgan alleges that she has been trying to get
information from the defendants for over nine years to verify
that her mortgage's chain of title is correct and to
ensure that the party collecting payments has a legal right
to collect her mortgage. Id. at 5. Morgan says that
she has never been in default or submitted any late payments,
but she acknowledges that she still must send in payments to
avoid default. See id. at 6.
Complaint lacks logical flow, making it difficult to discern
Morgan's legal claims and which claims apply to which
defendants. Morgan labeled the Complaint as a "QUIET
TITLE ACTION." See id. at 2. She insinuates
that she did not know that her mortgage would be sold and
securitized, although she recognizes that the defendants had
a right to do so, and she alleges that the defendants engaged
in fraud by selling her mortgage. See id. at 3-6.
She also alleges that there is a "cloud" over her
title because she thinks that she may have to defend her
ownership against some unknown party at some unknown time in
the future. Id. at 8. She further includes a
conclusory litany of other claims without explanation as to
how they apply to her case or which of the defendants she
thinks violated which of the laws which she mentions,
including: (1) a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for alleged
manipulation of the London Inter-bank Offered Rate
("LIBOR"); (2) racketeering under 18 U.S.C. §
1957; (3) money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956; (4)
use of an "illegal currency" in a deal under Code
of Virginia § 6.2-203; (5) fraud that can result in
rescission of a contract under U.C.C. § 3-202; (6) an
unfair or deceptive acts or practices claim under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45)
(the "FTCA"); (7) a trademark claim under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125; (8) an unfair or deceptive acts or practices
claim promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau; and (9) a securities claim under Section 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)).
See generally id. She requests multiple remedies,
which, in essence, ask the Court to nullify her mortgage, to
hold that the defendants have no legal or equitable interest
in the property, and to order the defendants to give her
response to the Complaint, each defendant filed a motion to
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See DEFENDANT NVR
MORTGAGE FINANCE, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 9);
MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 18); DEFENDANT BANK OF AMERICA,
N.A.'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (ECF
No. 20). Morgan also filed five separate documents titled
MOTION TO AWARD PLAINTIFF FEDERAL & STATE CRIME VICTIMS
RIGHTS, and DENY DEFENDANTS ANY/ALL FORMS OF RELIEF - PER 18
USC 3771 (d)(1). See ECF Nos. 28, 34, 36, 38, and 39. Her
motions ask the Court to ignore the Defendants' arguments
and to grant her relief.
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and views
the Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176,
180 (4th Cir. 2009). But the Court does not need to accept
the plaintiff s legal conclusions drawn from those facts.
Id. The Court can take judicial notice of matters of
public record, and it can consider documents attached to the
complaint and motions to dismiss "so long as they are
integral to the complaint and authentic." Id.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief" to "give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A complaint attacked by a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, but
it does require "more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do." Id. The complaint "must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id. The plausibility
standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant acted unlawfully." Id.
construe pro se complaints liberally. As the Supreme
Court has instructed, "[a] document filed pro
se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to
Morgan Pails To State A Claim for Quiet Title
complaint is styled as a "QUIET TITLE ACTION,"
see ECF No. 1 at 2. So, the Court ...