United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
PAUL C. THOMPSON, Plaintiff,
H. W. CLARKE, et al., Defendants.
K. MOON SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Thompson, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging retaliation and Eighth Amendment claims against
various officials employed by the Virginia Department of
Corrections. Defendants filed a joint motion for summary
judgment. Thompson responded, making this matter ripe for
disposition. Several Defendants also filed a motion for entry
of partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b). Upon review of the record, I will grant in
part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and I will grant the Rule 54(b) Motion.
previous opinions, I dismissed several defendants and
summarized Plaintiff's remaining claims. Thus, I offer
only a brief overview here.
(1) Defendants Booker, Evans, Whitt, Jones, Thompson, Doss,
and Shaffner unnecessarily prolonged seizure of his legal
materials after he was removed from suicide watch, which
adversely affected his ability to litigate his cases;
(2) Defendants Doss, Shaffner, Wright, Booker, Mullins,
Miller, Evans, and Whitt, prevented Plaintiff from obtaining
cold weather clothing for two winter months in retaliation
because they knew Plaintiff helped other inmates litigate
claims against the Commonwealth of Virginia and the VDOC;
(3) Doss and Booker retaliated against Plaintiff's
grievances by arbitrarily increasing Plaintiff's security
level, removing him from protective custody, and facilitating
Plaintiff's transfer to ROSP;
(4) Defendant King did not award sentence credit for time he
spent in pre-hearing segregation for the “212 charge,
” which unduly increased the time Plaintiff was kept
separate from his legal materials while his litigation
(5) At least two Defendants conspired to retaliate against
(6) Doss was deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of
harm regarding the razor retention policy in the shower area.
See Am. Mem. Op. 28, ECF No. 148; Am. Mem. Op. 8-12,
ECF No. 149. I will reference the claims as numbered above.
move for summary judgment as to Claims 1 through 5. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court should
grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “As
to materiality, . . . [o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The dispute over a material fact must be genuine,
“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also JKC
Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d
459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001). As such, the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment if the evidence supporting a
genuine issue of material fact “is merely colorable or
is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 250.
moving party bears the burden of proving that judgment on the
pleadings is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If the moving party meets this
burden, then the nonmoving party must set forth specific,
admissible facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact for
trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In considering a motion
for summary judgment, the court must view the record as a
whole and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-324; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th
Cir. 1994). However, the nonmoving party may not rely on
beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Baber v. Hosp.
Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 ...