THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY Frederick G.
Rockwell, III, Judge
Murphy Goad (Gordon, Dodson, Gordon & Rowlett, on brief),
Anne Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Humphreys, Petty and Chafin Argued at
WILLIAM G. PETTY JUDGE
Taylor was convicted of driving under the influence, third
offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Before trial,
Taylor filed a motion to suppress the results of a
warrantless seizure of a sample of his blood, referred to in
the trial court as the blood draw. The motion was denied, and
Taylor was subsequently convicted. On appeal, Taylor first
argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the warrantless blood draw. Secondly, Taylor argues
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
driving under the influence, third offense. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below, granting to it the benefit of any reasonable
inferences; we review issues of law de novo.
Hall v. Commonwealth, 55 Va.App. 451, 453 (2009).
William Boelt of the Virginia State Police was traveling
southbound on Interstate 95 in Chesterfield County. The speed
limit on that portion of Interstate 95 was 60 miles per hour,
and the trooper was passed by a car traveling at 82 miles per
hour. Trooper Boelt initiated a stop of the car; Taylor was
the driver. Trooper Boelt noticed the smell of alcohol and
marijuana coming from the car. Taylor admitted that he had
been drinking and smoking marijuana "earlier."
Trooper Boelt asked Taylor to step out of the vehicle and
perform field sobriety tests. Taylor agreed and, as a result
of his performance, was arrested for driving under the
Taylor admitted to using both alcohol and marijuana, Trooper
Boelt transported Taylor to the hospital for a blood draw. At
the hospital, Trooper Boelt "read [Taylor] implied
consent" from a card. Although the card was not admitted
into evidence, Trooper Boelt agreed with defense counsel on
cross-examination that he "informed [Taylor] that he
could receive some sanction, some criminal sanction, if he
did not submit to the blood draw." Taylor stated that he
understood implied consent and based on that he agreed to
allow a sample of his blood to be withdrawn.
Taylor's blood was drawn, it was transported to the
Department of Forensic Science for analysis. The certificate
of analysis issued after the examination of the sample
reflected a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .128% by weight by
volume. At the time of the offense, Taylor had previously
been convicted and sentenced for two DUIs.
filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood sample,
alleging that a search warrant was required to obtain the
sample and that any consent he gave was obtained by
unconstitutional coercion. The trial court denied that
motion, and the case proceeded to trial, where the trial
court found Taylor guilty of DUI, third offense.