United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
E. Payne, Senior United States District Judge.
Lavonn Snowden, a Virginia prisoner proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action. The action proceeds on the PARTICULARIZED
COMPLAINT. (ECF No. 9.) The matter is before the Court for
evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A. As discussed below, the action will be dismissed as
legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the
Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or
(2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based
upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,
'" or claims where the "'factual
contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v.
Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The
second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992) (citing 5A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true
and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual
allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require only *a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson/
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this
standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action." Id. at 555
(citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," Id. (citation omitted),
stating a claim that is "plausible on its face,"
id. at 570, rather than merely
"conceivable." Id. "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Therefore, in order for a claim
or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a
claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to
state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,
309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United
States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)) .
while the Court liberally construes pro se
complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151
(4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's
advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and
constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on
the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107
F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring);
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
faults law enforcement officials, the prosecutor and his
defense attorneys for perceived unconstitutional errors in
his arrest and criminal proceedings in state
court. Snowden's Particularized Complaint is
comprised primarily of a recitation of legal standards with
sparse factual allegations in support. Snowden contends
Officer M. Rios participated in violating Plaintiff's
Fourth Amendment rights on June 17, 2016, when he illegally
seized his person denying him equal protection of the law;
all under the guise of officers in search of (3) robbery
suspects. Officer M. Rios obstructed justice after having
been subpoena[ed] to attend and testify. But because of
conspiratorial' actions did not and violated
Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right by not allowing him to
confront his accuser, who was an arresting officer.
Det. C. Matherson, also on the night of June 17, 2016,
unlawfully ran Plaintiff down (which is not against the law)
and apprehended him. This is a Fourth Amendment violation of
his person being secure. [He] then furthered constitutional
violations with the Fifth Amendment in his engaging to do,
and cause, in this object of conspiracy, by not processing an
alleged crime scene for material evidence that was
exculpatory in nature, causing the due process of law
Sgt. J. Yunker was the 3rd officer on the night of June 17,
2016, who was in joint participation in the Plaintiff's
unlawful seizing of his own person, violating this security
that is to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. In addition,
with the title and rank in the forensic unit, [he] should
have processed the alleged crime scene if in fact he was not
trying to deny a U.S. citizen equal protection that the law
affords. Thus, securing his participation in violating
Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment due process of law.
[The] Portsmouth Police Department is responsible for the
conspiratorial actions by their officers who were hired,
trained, and bonded in order to ensure the security of equal
protections of law. But one June 17, 2016, [the] Portsmouth
Police Department is responsible and liable for the Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment violations against this
Plaintiff while on duty in uniform under their shield.
Det. D. Misiewicz, 54 min after the illegal chase and capture
of the intoxicated Plaintiff; [she] interrogated, Mirandized,
and forged initials and signature on the Miranda form. Thus,
violating Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right, because he
did not give her power of attorney to do so. Also Det. D.
Misiewicz violated his equal protection under the law,
violating Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment due process of law.
Brandon Wrobleski in his conspiratorial actions that are in
support of denying Plaintiff with the equal protection of the
law. Brandon Wrobleski knew about the witness subpoena issued
to Officer M. Rios and all other parties involved. But behind
his malicious prosecutorial misconduct towards a citizen,
[he] became engrossed and was not able to seek out justice,
acts of impeachment, or credibility as he swore under oath to
uphold, but instead opted to violate Plaintiff's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights.
Sgt. R. McDaniel attested to a grand jury about events that
he had no direct knowledge of, denied Plaintiff the right to
confront or rebut anything that was brought before the court,
violating his Sixth and Fifth Amendment constitutional right
to confront his accuser along with the due process of law.
Johnita Coston failed to protect the remedies of due process
law and the equal protection under the law and did not
protect Plaintiff's representation of fact. She furthered
the conspiratorial tactics attached to M. Rios, officer, when
she did not make it known to Plaintiff that his right to
confront his accuser was violated but instead tried to cover
it up, violating his Sixth Amendment [right], and did ...