United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
WILLIAM F. MILGRIM, JR., Plaintiff,
HAROLD W. CLARKE, et al., Defendants.
Jackson L. Kiser Senior United States District Judge.
William F. Milgrim, Jr., a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se,
has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.The matter before the court is the motion
for summary judgment filed by defendants Harold W. Clarke,
Bernard Booker, Nurse Pamela Shipp, Stacy Meinhard, and
Carmen Rodriguez. Upon review of the record, I conclude that
the defendants' motion must be granted.
filed this § 1983 action against defendants Virginia
Department of Corrections ("VDOC") Director Clarke,
Warden Booker, Nurse Shipp, Grievance Coordinator
("GC") Meinhard, and Regional Ombudsman
("RO") Rodriguez for alleged constitutional
violations.Milgrim seeks only injunctive relief. The
defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment and
Milgrim has responded, making the matter ripe for
disposition. Liberally construed, Milgrim's claims are
that: (1) Nurse Shipp, Director Clarke, and Warden Booker
acted with deliberate indifference to Milgrim's serious
medical needs; (2) GC Meinhard and RO Rodriguez restricted
his access to the courts; (3) defendants did not follow
proper VDOC procedure with respect to Milgrim's
grievances; and (4) the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA") is unconstitutional.
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court should
grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "As to
materiality, . . . [o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242. 248
(1986). The dispute over a material fact must be
genuine, "such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Id; see also JKC
Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d
459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001). As such, the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment if the evidence supporting a
genuine issue of material fact "is merely colorable or
is not significantly probative." Anderson. 477
U.S. at 249.
moving party bears the burden of proving that judgment on the
pleadings is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.
477 U.S. 317. 322-23 (1986). If the moving party
meets this burden, then the nonmoving party must set forth
specific, admissible facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of
fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In considering a
motion for summary judgment, the court must view the record
as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex. 477
U.S. at 322-24; Shaw v. Stroud. 13 F.3d 791, 798
(4th Cir. 1994). However, the nonmoving party may not rely on
beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Baber v. Hosp.
Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992).
Instead, the nonmoving party must produce "significantly
probative" evidence from which a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in his favor. Abcor Corp. v. AM
Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 930 (4th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Anderson. 477 U.S. at 249-50).
is proceeding pro se and, thus, entitled to a liberal
construction of the pleading. See, e.g.,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 90-95 (2007).
However, "[principles requiring generous construction of
pro se complaints are not . . . without limits."
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985). "A court considering a motion [for
summary judgment] can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Notably, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege a
defendant's personal act or omission leading to a
deprivation of a federal right. See Fisher v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Author., 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th
Cir. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds by Cty. of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991)). Negligent
deprivations are not actionable under § 1983. See,
e.g., Daniels v. Williams. 474 U.S. 327, 330
(1986); Pink v. Lester. 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir.
uncontested evidence establishes that Milgrim is confined at
Buckingham, a prison facility operated by Virginia Department
of Corrections ("VDOC"). Milgrim was transferred to
Buckingham from Nottoway on January 29, 2016.
Milgrim's transfer to Buckingham, on January 29, 2016,
the medical staff conducted an Intrasystem Transfer Medical
Review. (See Shipp Aff. 1, [ECF No. 59-1]). Milgrim
receives treatment and medication for a chronic cardiac
condition, hypertension, diabetes, allergies, and other
ailments. (Id. at 2-3). Per VDOC Operating Procedure
("OP"), Milgrim has follow up appointments
approximately every six months for his chronic care
conditions. See VDOC OP 720.2(V)(2).
February 10, 2016, Milgrim was seen for his first chronic
care appointment at Buckingham. (Shipp Aff. 3). Milgrim
reported chest pains at that appointment and was transported
to VCU Pauley Heart Center for evaluation and treatment.
(Id.) At ...