United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
JACKSON L. KISER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Crumpton, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
prison officials deprived him of shower shoes and violated
his due process rights related to a disciplinary proceeding.
After review of his submissions, I conclude that the action
must be summarily dismissed.
is currently confined at Keen Mountain Correctional Center
("KMCC"), a prison facility operated by the
Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC"). On
March 13, 2019, Institutional Investigator Mitchell moved
Crumpton to a special housing unit, pending an investigation.
When officers brought Crumpton's personal property to his
new cell, his Reebok shower shoes were missing. He refused to
sign a property inventory sheet, because he did not have his
shoes, which were never returned to him. For two months,
until he could purchase a new pair, Crumpton "had to
shower in unsanitary conditions" with no shower shoes.
Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.
April 1, 2019, Crumpton was served with a Disciplinary
Offense Report "for Offense Code: 122E/198A."
Id. At first, his disciplinary hearing was scheduled
for April 8, 2019. On that date, however, a officer served
him with a Notice of Authorized Continuance, rescheduling the
hearing for April 11, 2019. According to the notice, the
continuance was "due to Staff/Witnesses are off
duty/Away on date of Hearing." Id. Crumpton
contends that this notice was "a complete false."
Id. Mitchell, as the reporting officer, was
allegedly the only staff member expected at Crumpton's
disciplinary hearing. According to Crumpton, Mitchell was on
duty at KMCC on April 11, 2019.
§ 1983 complaint, Crumpton sues the VDOC director, the
KMCC warden, the hearing officer, and Mitchell. He contends
that deprivation of his shower shoes was cruel and unusual
punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that
falsifying the continuance notice deprived him of a liberty
interest without due process. As relief, Crumpton seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, directing KMCC officials
to stop violating VDOC disciplinary procedures, and
compensatory and punitive damages.
court must "dismiss any action brought with respect to
prison conditions under [§ 1983] by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the
court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious,
[or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). To state a cause
of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that
he has been deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and that this deprivation
resulted from conduct committed by a person acting under
color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42
Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual
living conditions. Rhodes v. Chapman. 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981). "In order to establish the imposition
of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must prove two
elements-that the deprivation of a basic human need was
objectively sufficiently serious, and that
subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind." Shakka v. Smith. 71
F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
[T]o demonstrate that a deprivation is extreme enough to
satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim,
a prisoner must "produce evidence of a serious or
significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions," ... or demonstrate a substantial
risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's
unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions.
Id. Crumpton fails to show that he suffered any
serious or significant physical or emotional injury from
being without shower shoes for two months. Accordingly, his
Eighth Amendment claim fails, and I will summarily dismiss
retain rights under the Due Process Clause, but because
prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, the full array of rights due a defendant in such
proceedings does not apply. Wolff v. McDonnell 418
U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). Federal due process protections in
prison disciplinary proceedings are limited to: (1) advance
written notice of the charges; (2) a written statement of the
evidence and reasons supporting the disciplinary action; (3)
a hearing with rights to call witnesses and present evidence
when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety
and correctional concerns; (4) the opportunity for a staff
advisor; and (5) a neutral decision-maker. Id. at
564-71. Substantive due process is satisfied if the
disciplinary hearing decision was based upon "some
evidence." Superintendent Mass. Corr. Inst, v.
Hill 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
due process claim does not allege denial of any right
recognized under Wolff. Rather, he attempts to
equate state prison disciplinary procedures with federal due
process. No. such correlation exists. Officials' alleged
violations of VDOC disciplinary procedures do not implicate
any constitutionally protected right and so are not
actionable under § 1983. Weller v. Dep't of
Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1990).
stated reasons, Crumpton's allegations do not provide the
factual or legal basis for any constitutional claim
actionable under § 1983. Accordingly, I will summarily
dismiss the complaint without prejudice, pursuant to §
1997e(c)(1), as frivolous. An appropriate order will enter
this day. Dismissal without prejudice leaves Crumpton free to
refile his claims in new and separate civil actions if he can
correct the noted deficiencies, subject to the applicable
statute of limitations.
clerk will send a copy of this memorandum opinion and the