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United States v. Jones

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Abingdon Division

July 15, 2019


          Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for United States.

          Brian J. Beck, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Abingdon, Virginia, for Defendant.


          James P. Jones United States District Judge.

         The defendant has filed a motion to reduce sentence pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (2018) (“2018 FSA” or “Act”), which made retroactive certain provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010) (“2010 FSA”). I find the defendant eligible for relief, and I will grant the motion.


         Section 2 of the 2010 FSA reduced the penalties for offenses involving cocaine base by increasing the threshold drug quantities required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). After the enactment of the 2010 FSA, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) must involve at least 280 grams of cocaine base, rather than 50 grams, to trigger the 10-years-to-life penalty range of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and 28 grams of cocaine base, rather than five grams, to trigger the 5-to-40 years penalty range of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The 2018 FSA provides that the court may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence as if the 2010 FSA were in effect at the time the defendant's crime was committed. 2018 FSA § 404(b).

         While a defendant whose crack cocaine drug crime was committed before August 3, 2010, may be eligible for reduction in sentence, 2018 FSA § 404(a), the Act provides that the court is not required to reduce any sentence, id. at § 404(c). Thus, the court must first consider whether the defendant is eligible for a reduction in sentence. Second, if the defendant is eligible for reduction, the court must determine whether, and to what extent, a reduction is warranted. Cf. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010) (setting forth procedures for modifying sentences under retroactive guideline amendments). If eligible, a plenary resentencing is not appropriate, since the statute only authorizes the court to impose a “reduced sentence.” 2018 FSA § 404(b).


         The defendant was indicted in this court on September 24, 2008, and charged with conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846.

         On December 16, 2008, a jury found the defendant guilty. According to the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the defendant was held accountable for approximately 1.41 kilograms of cocaine base. He was determined to have a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of VI, yielding a guideline range of 210 to 262 months imprisonment.

         On February 12, 2009, the defendant was sentenced under the advisory guidelines to 156 months imprisonment, to be followed by eight years of supervised release. The court varied below the guideline range on the grounds that many of Jones' coconspirators received a lower base offense level because of favorable plea agreements even though they may have distributed a greater quantity of drugs, and because Jones was a marginal member of the overall conspiracy. Sent. Tr. 24-26, ECF No. 117. The Bureau of Prisons calculates his current projected release date to be June 10, 2020. The Probation Office estimates that he has served approximately 125 months of his sentence.


         The United States argues that the defendant is ineligible for a reduction in sentence in light of the drug weight attributed to him at sentencing. The United States contends that because the offense involved at least 1.41 kilograms of cocaine base, as established by the PSR, it involved a drug quantity over the revised threshold of 280 grams established in the 2010 FSA. The government argues that Jones was thus properly sentenced to 156 months - within the statutory range of 10 years to life under § 841(b)(1)(A). The government contends that the court may rely on the drug weight found in the PSR, despite the principles announced in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because it has been held that these principles are not applicable retroactively on collateral review. Alternatively, the government contends that even if Jones is eligible for a reduction below the statutory range set out in § 841(b)(1)(A), the court should not exercise its discretion to do so. It bases this argument in part on the ground that the court should at least take into account the drug weight found in the PSR, to reflect the serious nature of Jones's crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (providing that in determining a sentence, the court should consider the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense). Jones contends that the principles announced in Alleyne and Apprendi, even if held not to be retroactive when seeking collateral relief, are applicable here because § 404(b) is “a new statutory remedy that Congress expressly made retroactive.” Reply 6, ECF No. 169.

         Pursuant to § 404, a defendant is eligible for reduction if he was convicted of a “covered offense” before the effective date of the 2010 FSA and is not otherwise excluded by the limitations of § 404(c).[1] Jones was convicted of a covered offense since he was convicted pre-2010 FSA of “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by [the 2010 FSA].” § 404(a). None of the exclusions of § 404(c) apply to him. Under the 2018 FSA, the quantity of drugs involved in the conviction are not a condition of eligibility, whether such quantity was charged in the indictment, found by a jury, ...

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