United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division
FRANCISCO GUARDADO RIOS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
SCOTT JENKINS, Sheriff of Culpeper County, Virginia, in his individual capacity, Defendant.
Glen E. Conrad Senior United States District Judge.
Guardado Rios filed this action against Scott Jenkins,
Sheriff of Culpeper County, Virginia, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Rios alleges that Jenkins' policy of holding
individuals in custody for up to 48 additional hours at the
request of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE") division of the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The case is
presently before the court on the defendant's motion to
dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs
claims under § 1983 will be dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court will
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining claim of false imprisonment in violation of
and Legal Background
court begins with the relevant statutory and legal
background, which provides a framework for understanding the
facts alleged in the complaint.
federal government has "broad, undoubted power over the
subject of immigration and the status of aliens."
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012);
see also U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 4
(granting Congress the power to "establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization"). In 1952, Congress enacted the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 66 Stat.
163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et sefl. "That
statute established a 'comprehensive federal statutory
scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization'
and set 'the terms and conditions of admission to the
country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in
the country.'" Chamber of Commerce of the United
States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011) (quoting
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 359(1976)).
has empowered the Secretary of DHS to enforce the INA.
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S.Ct. 954, 959 n.2 (2019).
This includes authority to "arrest and hold an alien
'pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States.'" Id. at 959
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Although removal
proceedings are civil in nature, rather than criminal,
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984), the Supreme
Court has recognized that "[d]etention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that
process," Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 531 (2003); see also Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407
("As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable
alien to remain present in the United States .... The federal
statutory structure instructs when it is appropriate to
arrest an alien during the removal process. For example, the
Attorney General can exercise discretion to issue a warrant
for an alien's arrest and detention pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.") (citations omitted).
the Constitution grants Congress plenary authority over
immigration, state and local law enforcement officers may
participate in the enforcement of federal immigration laws
only in 'specific, limited circumstances' authorized
by Congress." Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 725 F.3d 451, 463 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410). For instance,
"[l]ocal law enforcement officers may assist in federal
immigration efforts under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1),"
which authorizes ICE to enter into written agreements with
local law enforcement agencies that allow local officers to
perform the functions of federal immigration officers.
Id. at 463-64; see also United States v.
Sosa-Carabantes, 561 F.3d 256, 257 (4th Cir. 2009)
("The 287(g) Program permits ICE to deputize local law
enforcement officers to perform immigration enforcement
activities pursuant to a written
agreement.")- "Even in the absence of a written
agreement," local law enforcement officers may
'"cooperate"' with federal immigration
enforcement efforts pursuant to § 1357(g)(10).
Santos, 725 F.3d at 464 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1357(g)(10)(B)). Because the parties focus heavily on this
provision of the INA, the court quotes it in full:
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an
agreement under this subsection in order for an officer or
employee of a State or political subdivision of a State-
(A) to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the
immigration status of any individual, including reporting
knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in
the United States; or
(B) otherwise cooperate with the Attorney General in the
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens
not lawfully present in the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).
Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court
recognized that "[t]here may be some ambiguity as to
what constitutes cooperation" under this provision of
the INA. 567 U.S. At 410. The Court ultimately concluded that
"no coherent understanding of the term would incorporate
the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien
for being removable absent any request, approval, or other
instruction from the Federal Government." Id.
"Thus, Arizona v. United States makes
clear that under Section 1357(g)(10) local law enforcement
officers cannot arrest aliens for civil immigration
violations absent, at a minimum, direction or authorization
by federal officials." Santos, 725 F.3d at 466.
way in which ICE requests cooperation of state officials
without written agreements is by issuing a Form 1-247
immigration detainer." Abriq v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville & Davidson Cry., 333 F.Supp.3d 783, 787
(M.D. Term. 2018); see also Lopez-Lopez v. Cty. of
Allegan, 321 F.Supp.3d 794, 797 (W.D. Mich. 2018)
(explaining that the issuance of a Form 1-247 immigration
detainer is "[o]ne method in which the federal
government requests the cooperation of state
authorities"). Such detainers "serve to advise
another law enforcement agency that [ICE] seeks custody of an
alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the
purpose of arresting and removing the alien." 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(a). The detainers "ask two things of the
state or local agency: that it notify ICE at least 48 hours
before a removable alien is released from custody; and that
it detain a removable alien for up to 48 hours past the time
that the alien would have otherwise been released to allow
ICE to apprehend the individual." City of
Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen, of the United States, 916
F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2019); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(a), (d).
April 2, 2017, ICE policy requires that immigration detainers
be accompanied by a signed administrative warrant attesting
to probable cause of removability from the United States.
City of Philadelphia. 916 F.3d at 281;
Lopez-Lopez, 321 F.Supp.3d at 797.
"Administrative warrants differ significantly from
warrants in criminal cases in that they are not issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate." Lopez-Lopez,
321 F.Supp.3d at 799. Instead, "the warrants are
executed by federal officers who have received training in
the enforcement of immigration law." Arizona,
567 U.S. at 408 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.2(b),
287.5(e)(3)). The use of such warrants has long been
authorized by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) ("On
a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien
is to be removed from the United States.''): see
also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234 (1960)
(noting that there is "overwhelming historical
legislative recognition of the propriety of administrative
arrest for deportable aliens").
this backdrop, the court turns to the factual allegations in
this case, which are taken from the complaint and the
attached exhibits. See Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs.
Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that the
court may consider exhibits to a complaint when ruling on a
motion to dismiss).
August 13, 2017, Rios was arrested for two misdemeanor
offenses under Virginia law: driving without a license and
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Compl. ¶ 27,
Dkt. No. 1. He was committed to the custody of the Culpeper
County Jail (the "Jail"), which is managed and
supervised by Jenkins. Id. ¶¶ 12, 27.
same day, the Jail received two forms from ICE: a DHS Form
I-247A Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action ("ICE
detainer") and a DHS Form 1-200 Warrant for Arrest of
Alien ("administrative warrant"). The ICE detainer
indicated that DHS had determined that there was probable
cause to believe that Rios was a removable alien. Compl. Ex.
A, Dkt. No. 1-2. It requested that the Jail "[n]otify
DHS as early as practicable (at least 48 hours, if possible)
before the alien is released from [the Jail's]
custody." Id. The ICE detainer also requested
that the Jail "[m]aintain custody of the alien for a
period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS beyond the time when
he/she would otherwise have been released from [the
Jail's] custody to allow DHS to assume custody."
Id. (emphasis in original). The ICE detainer
indicated that "[t]he alien must be served with a copy
of this form for the detainer to take effect."
Id. The form was signed by Immigration Officer B.
accompanying administrative warrant was directed to the
attention of "[a]ny immigration officer authorized
pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and [the associated regulations] to serve
warrants of arrest for immigration violations." Compl.
Ex. B, Dkt. No. 1 -2. The ICE warrant indicated that an
immigration officer had "determined that there is
probable cause to believe that [Rios] is removable from the
United States." Id. It "commanded"
that Rios be "arrest[ed] and take[n] into custody for
removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality
Act." Id. The warrant was signed by Immigration
Officer C. Wamsley. Id.
J. Glascock signed both ICE forms on behalf of the Jail. The
deputy indicated that the forms were served on Rios on ...