United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division
A. Gibney, Jr. United States District Judge.
Lee Hinton, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on March 29,
2018, the Court granted Defendant Dr. Calhoun's Motion
for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 91, 92.) In his remaining
claim, Hinton contended that Nurse Patricia McCabe denied him
adequate medical care during his incarceration in the
Lawrenceville Correctional Center ("LCC").
Defendant McCabe filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
provided Hinton with notice pursuant to Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). Hinton did not
respond. Accordingly, by Memorandum Opinion and Order entered
on June 12, 2018, the Court granted Defendant McCabe's
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the action.
Hinton credibly asserted that he never received the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant McCabe on March 29,
2018. Accordingly, by Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on
August 17, 2018, the Court vacated the June 12, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order, mailed the Motion for Summary
Judgment and accompanying Memorandum in Support to Hinton,
and permitted Hinton time to file a response. (ECF No. 114,
115.) After an extension of time, Hinton filed a "Motion
to Deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment."
("Opposition," ECF No. 120 (capitalization
corrected).) By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on
October 2, 2018, the Court granted Defendant McCabe's
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the action. (ECF
Nos. 123, 124.)
Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on January 31, 2019, the
Court denied Hinton's Rule 59(e) Motion. (ECF Nos. 129,
130.) On March 19, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal. (ECF No. 133.)
Although the case is closed and will remain so, Hinton
continues to submit various motions and memoranda. For
example, on April 4, 2019, Hinton submitted a "Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment with Newly Discovered Evidence"
(ECF No. 135) and "Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Recusal" (ECF No. 137). As preliminary matter, and as
the Court has already explained to Hinton in denying his
first request for recusal of the undersigned (see
ECF No. 129, at 3), contrary to his belief, unfavorable
"judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for bias" or a valid reason to demand recusal of a
judge. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994) (citation omitted). Hinton has not demonstrated that
the undersigned harbors any bias against him or any
circumstance where the impartiality of the undersigned might
be reasonably questioned. See 28 U.S.C. §§
144, 455. Hinton demonstrates no persuasive reason for the
undersigned to recuse himself in this closed civil action.
Accordingly, any request to have the undersigned recuse
himself is DENIED.
April 4, 2019, Hinton also filed a "Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment with Newly Discovered Evidence." (ECF No.
135.) He has filed two submissions entitled "BRIEF
OPPOSITION" (ECF Nos. 137, 138), that the Court believes
support his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. In the
supporting briefs, Hinton continues to argue the merits of
his claims. The Court entered final judgment in this case on
October 2, 2018 (ECF Nos. 123, 124), and denied his first
Rule 59(e) Motion on January 31, 2019. (ECF Nos. 129, 130.)
Thus, Hinton's "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
with Newly Discovered Evidence" pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) is untimely and must be considered
brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
("Rule 60(b) Motion"). See MLC Auto., LLC v.
Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2008)
(stating that filings made within twenty-eight days after the
entry of judgment are construed as Rule 59(e) motions (citing
Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir.
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to "relieve
a party...from a final judgment, order, or proceeding."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). It is an extraordinary remedy requiring a
showing of exceptional circumstances. May field v.
Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674
F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Ackermann v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950)). The party seeking
relief under Rule 60(b) "must make a threshold showing
of timeliness, 'a meritorious claim or defense,' and
lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party."
Coleman v. Jabe, 633 Fed.Appx. 119, 120 (4th Cir.
2016) (quoting Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501
(4th Cir. 2011)). A party must also demonstrate
"exceptional circumstances." Dowell v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48
(4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d
204, 207 (4th Cir. 1984)). After a party satisfies this
threshold showing, "he [or she] then must satisfy one of
the six specific sections of Rule 60(b)." Id.
(quoting Werner, 731 F.2d at 207).
Rule 60(b) Motion, Hinton alleges that he has newly
discovered evidence, but a review of his submissions reveals
nothing more than an attempt to continue to litigate his
dismissed claims. Hinton fails to identify any exceptional
circumstances that would permit the Court to reconsider its