United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division
E. CONRAD, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Maceo Dandridge, III, proceeding pro se, filed this appeal
from an order entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Virginia, in which the bankruptcy
court approved a settlement agreement between W. Stephen
Scott, the Chapter 7 Trustee ("Trustee"), and
Thompson Davis & Co, Inc. ("Thompson Davis"),
an investment management firm based in Richmond, Virginia.
The settlement agreement provided, among other things, for
the payment of $65, 000.00 by Thompson Davis to the Trustee
in exchange for the transfer and assignment of certain assets
of the bankruptcy estate, including the debtor's shares
of common stock in Thompson Davis. On October 19, 2018, the
court granted the Trustee's motion to dismiss the appeal.
A subsequent filing by the appellant, which was construed as
motion for reconsideration, was denied by the court on
November 15, 2018. The appellant has now filed a second
motion for reconsideration. For the following reasons, the
appellant's motion will be denied.
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8022 (formerly Rule 8015)
"provides the sole mechanism for filing a motion for
rehearing from a final order of the district court sitting in
[its] capacity" as a bankruptcy appellate court. Bli
v. USA Farm Serv. Agency, 465 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also Aycock v. Eaton, 943 F.2d 536, 538 (5th
Cir. 1991) (same). Under Rule 8022, a motion for rehearing
must be filed within fourteen days after entry of judgment.
Fed. R. Bank. P. 8022. The rule further provides that the
"motion must state with particularity each of point of
law or fact that the movant believes the district court...
has overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support of
the motion." Id. Although Rule 8022 is silent
as to the appropriate standard for granting a motion for
rehearing, district courts in this circuit have applied the
same standard applicable to motions for reconsideration under
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
e.g., Kelly v. Schlossberg, No. 8:17-cv-03846,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153540, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 12, 2018)
(holding that "the standard used to evaluate motions to
alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) is appropriate"). Under Rule 59(e),
district courts may alter or amend a judgment to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.
Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto
Racing, 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012). "It is
an extraordinary remedy that should be applied
sparingly" and only in "exceptional
these principles, the court concludes that the appellant is
not entitled to relief under Rule 8022. In dismissing the
instant appeal, the court concluded that the appellant lacked
standing to challenge the approval of the settlement and the
sale of the assets at issue, since the appellant had not
shown that an alternative agreement could have been reached
that would have rendered the bankruptcy estate solvent or
resulted in a surplus being distributed to the appellant.
See Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4th
Cir. 1985) (concluding that a Chapter 7 debtor lacked
standing to challenge the proposed sale of the bankruptcy
estate's primary asset because the debtor failed to show
that an alternative sale of the property would return
solvency to the estate or provide the debtor with a surplus);
see also Hoy v. Atkeson, No. 3:15-cv-04860, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73184, at *9 (D.S.C. June 6, 2016)
("The general rule in the Fourth Circuit is that a
Chapter 7 debtor has standing only if he can demonstrate that
he has a 'pecuniary interest in the distribution of his
assets among his creditors.' To establish a pecuniary
interest, a debtor must show a reasonable probability of a
surplus distribution after all creditors' claims have
been satisfied.") (quoting Willemain, 764 F.2d
at 1022); In re Miller, No. 8:10-cv-02466, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 94994, at *IO (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2011) ("A
reversal of the Bankruptcy Court's order would not render
the estate solvent and would not produce a surplus for
Appellants. Accordingly, under the holding of
Willemain, Appellants lack standing to pursue this
seeking reconsideration, the appellant argues that the fact
that some of his debts have been declared non-dischargeable
affords him standing to pursue this appeal. The appellant
contends that if the challenged sale of Thompson Davis stock
is reversed and the stock sells for what the appellant
believes is its actual value, more money will be available to
pay the non-dischargeable debts for which he will remain
responsible after bankruptcy. In support of this argument,
the appellant relies primarily on the decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in McGuirl
v. White, 86 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
McGuirl, the Court held that insolvent debtors had
standing to challenge the trustee's application for
administrative expenses because all of their debts were
non-dischargeable. Id. at 1235-36. The Court
reasoned that an excessive award of administrative expenses
would reduce the funds otherwise available to pay the
creditors to whom the debtors remained directly liable.
Id. at 1236. Thus, the Court concluded that the
debtors had a direct, non-remote financial interest in
challenging the fee application that was sufficient to give
them standing. Id. at 1235- 36. Although the Court
recognized that limitations on standing in bankruptcy
proceedings serve to ensure that bankruptcy proceedings are
not unreasonably delayed by protracted litigation, the Court
determined that granting standing in the "limited
circumstances" presented "should not unreasonably
delay bankruptcy proceedings." Id. at 1236-37.
considering the parties' arguments, the court finds the
appellant's reliance on McGuirl unpersuasive.
Unlike the debtor in McGuirl, the appellant has not
shown that reversing the bankruptcy court's decision will
result in a non-speculative, direct financial benefit to him.
See In re Miller, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94994, at
*I2 (distinguishing McGuirl on this ground).
Instead, the appellant argues that if the order approving the
sale of Thompson Davis stock is reversed and the stock
eventually sells for what the appellant believes is its
actual value, he stands to benefit financially. The court
remains convinced that such "speculative
'benefits' which might flow from reversal" of
the order at issue are insufficient to establish standing.
Id.; see also Friedberg v. Neier, 634
Fed.Appx. 333, 335 (2d Cir. 2016) (rejecting the debtor's
argument that he had standing "based on the surplus that
he imagines would have remained had the Property been sold
for what he believes was its true value," and observing
that the "the assertions regarding the Property's
'true' value are conclusory and speculative");
Peoples v. Radloff, 494 B.R. 395, 398 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that "[s]tanding may not be
conferred when the interest alleged is speculative or
contingent."); In re Adams, 424 B.R. 434, 437
(Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2010) (finding that Chapter 7 debtors lacked
standing to object to the proposed sale of assets and noting
that "granting standing to every debtor who happens to
be subject to some nondischargeable claim would interfere
with the administration of chapter 7 cases").
Accordingly, the appellant is not entitled to rehearing on
even if the appellant could satisfy the standing
requirements, his appeal would be subject to dismissal as
equitably moot. The doctrine of equitable mootness is
"[a]pplied principally in bankruptcy proceedings because
of the equitable nature of bankruptcy judgments."
Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625
(4th Cir. 2002). The doctrine "allows a district court
to dismiss an appeal when it becomes impractical and
imprudent to upset the bankruptcy court's order at a late
date." Parsons v. Matson, No. 3:17-cv-00827,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXI 65804, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2018)
(citing Behrman v. Nat'l Heritage Found., Inc.,
663 F.3d 704, 713 (4th Cir. 2011)). In making this
determination, courts consider: "(1) whether the
appellant sought and obtained a stay; (2) whether the parties
have substantially consummated the sale of the property; (3)
the extent to which the relief requested would affect the
success of the sale of the property; and (4) the extent to
which the relief requested would affect the interest of third
parties." Id. (citing Mac Panel, 283
F.3d at 625).
case, the court agrees with the Trustee that the relevant
factors support the determination that the instant appeal is
equitably moot. First, Dandridge did not timely seek or
obtain a stay of the bankruptcy court's order in the
underlying proceeding. Second, the transactions contemplated
by the settlement agreement, including the sale of Thompson
Davis stock, have been consummated. On July 19, 2018, the
Trustee filed a report advising that he had received the $65,
000.00 payment for the sale of the appellant's assets on
June 30, 2018, and that he had executed and mailed
assignments transferring the debtor's interests in the
identified assets. With respect to the third and fourth
elements, the relief requested would undo the sale and
substantially affect the rights of third parties. Considering
all of these factors, the court concludes that the instant
appeal would be subject to dismissal as equitably moot even
if the appellant could establish standing. See id.;
see also Myers v. Offit Kurman, P.A., 773 Fed.Appx.
161, 162 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding that an appeal from a
bankruptcy court's order granting the Chapter 7
trustee's motion for approval of a settlement agreement
was equitably moot given that the agreement had been fully
consummated and funds had been distributed accordingly).
of these reasons, the appellant's second motion for
reconsideration will be denied. The Clerk is directed to send
copies of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order
to the appellant and all counsel of record.
 The appellant has moved to submit new
evidence in support of the pending motion, particularly two
pages of what appears to be a 2018 tax form. For the reasons
stated in the Trustee's response, that motion will be
denied. The evidence was not part of the record before the
bankruptcy court, it has no identifiable author, and it does
not undermine the bankruptcy court's finding that the
settlement at issue, including the transfer of assets, was
fair and equitable.
 In light of the court's rulings,
the court finds it unnecessary to address the Trustee's
remaining arguments in opposition to the ...