Sirleaf v. Northam

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Robert E. Payne, Senior United States District Judge.

         Priest Momolu V.S. Sirleaf, Jr., a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and Bivens. The action proceeds on the PARTICULARIZED COMPLAINT FOR CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION. (``Particularized Complaint," ECF No. 23.) The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. As discussed below, the action will be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

         I. PRELIMINARY REVIEW

         Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (``PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) ``is frivolous" or (2) ``fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e) (2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon ``an indisputably meritless legal theory, ” or claims where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

         ``A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943<sub>,</sub> 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller<sub>,</sub> Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and ``a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only `a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted) . Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274_, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

         II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         A. Preliminary Order

         Sirleaf, a frequent litigant in this Court, has a tendency to refuse to follow the directives of the Court. This case is no exception.^[1] The initial Complaint was transferred here from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. (ECF No. 2.) The Complaint was seventy-five, rambling pages naming every federal and state official who Sirleaf perceives has wronged him either directly or indirectly during his criminal proceedings and subsequent incarceration. By Memorandum Order entered on July 2, 2019, the Court directed Sirleaf to file a particularized complaint. The Memorandum Order explained as follows:

As a preliminary matter, the Complaint in this action fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). That rule provides:

(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may-include relief in the alternative or ...