United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division
Elizabeth K. Dillon, United States District Judge.
thirteen Virginia inmates proceeding pro se, filed a
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
challenging actions taken by defendants at the Southwest
Virginia Regional Jail in Haysi (“SWVRJ-Haysi”),
where plaintiffs were confined at the time of the challenged
actions. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that on
January 17, 2019, defendant C/O Corporal Patterson announced
that everyone in Pod 2B, which is an “open dorm,
” was going to be moved “because he had been
having problems with the dorm” and “he wanted
to” move them. They allege that the pod they were in
was a “low level A custody” dorm and that the
transfer resulted in them being in a higher custody dorm.
This housing change meant that, instead of being out all day,
they were on lockdown twenty hours per day and allowed out
only four hours each day. The move also took away
plaintiffs’ good conduct time and/or the ability to
earn it. (Compl. 3, Dkt. No. 1.)
section titled “legal claims, ” the complaint
references violations of due process and “collective
punishment” violating the Eighth Amendment. It also
alleges “racial discrimination under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.” Plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory
and injunctive relief. (Id. at 3–4.) All of
the named plaintiffs signed the complaint.
court conditionally filed the action and assessed a filing
fee against each plaintiff, directing each plaintiff either
to pay the filing fee or to comply with certain requirements
to request to proceed in forma pauperis. See
Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 855–56 (7th Cir.
2004) (explaining that when multiple prisoner plaintiffs
proceed in a single suit, each must pay the full filing fee);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The
court’s order warned each plaintiff that a failure to
comply with its directions could result in the dismissal of
the plaintiff’s case without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 3.)
that time, nine of the plaintiffs have failed to file the
requested forms, and the court dismissed their claims without
prejudice, terminating them from this case. (Dkt. Nos.
34–42.) Of the remaining four plaintiffs, three of them
(Terry Kiser, Bobby Vandyke, and Charles Mickens) failed to
file a consent-to-fee form as ordered. (Dkt. No. 21 (ordering
the filing of a consent-to-fee form by Kiser); Dkt. No 30
(same as to Vandyke); Dkt. No. 33 (same as to Mickens).)
Their claims will therefore be dismissed without prejudice,
and they will be stricken from the active docket of the
court. Each of those plaintiffs may refile his claims in a
separate action once he is prepared to comply with the noted
conditions. In light of those dismissals, the only remaining
plaintiff is Robert Shrader.
to the pending motions in this case, two of them were filed
by now-dismissed plaintiffs. The first is a motion to amend
or correct the complaint, filed and signed only by Mickens
(Dkt. No. 15), in which he seeks to add a retaliation claim.
The second is a motion for this case to be deemed a class
action, filed and signed only by Jackson (Dkt. No. 19).
Because neither Mickens nor Jackson complied with the filing
requirements to be a part of this action and have now been
dismissed from this case, those motions (Dkt. Nos. 15, 19)
will be denied as moot. Moreover, no pro se prisoner
plaintiff can prosecute a case on behalf of another
plaintiff, see Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405,
1407 (4th Cir. 1975), and so all plaintiffs must sign any
filing submitted to the court. Thus, the court cannot
consider Jackson’s motion to amend as having been filed
on behalf of any other plaintiff. Nor can this case go
forward as a class action. Pro se plaintiffs may not
represent one another, and pro se class actions are
not permissible. Id.
only other pending motion was filed by Shrader, who is the
sole remaining plaintiff. In that motion (Dkt. No. 32),
Shrader seeks a preliminary injunction. The entirety of his
I . . . am writing in concern of my situation at this time.
Since I’ve filed [this case], I’ve experienced a
change in the way [I’m] being treated. I don’t
feel safe at this facility any longer. Could you please
address Steven Clear of this matter. I’m not trying
to get injured and don’t want any trouble while this
case takes place. I just want to be treated fair.
(Dkt. No. 32 at 1.)
injunctive relief is an “extraordinary” remedy
that courts should grant only “sparingly.”
See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp.,
952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991). The party seeking the
preliminary injunction must demonstrate that: (1) he is
likely to succeed on the merits at trial; (2) he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
(3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 22 (2008);
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina,
769 F.3d 224, 249 (4th Cir. 2014). The remedy may be granted
only on a “clear showing” of entitlement to
relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
party seeking relief must show that the irreparable harm he
faces in the absence of relief is “neither remote nor
speculative, but actual and imminent.” Direx
Israel, Ltd., 952 F.2d at 812. Without a clear showing
that the plaintiff will suffer imminent, irreparable harm,
the court cannot grant preliminary injunctive relief. See
Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that a “possibility” of irreparable
harm is insufficient to satisfy the movant’s burden).
has not demonstrated that he is likely to suffer
“actual and imminent” irreparable harm in the
absence of the preliminary injunctive relief he seeks.
Instead, his motion references a vague concern that he might
be injured and an assertion that he does not “feel
safe.” Such speculative allegations of possible harm do
not come close to a “clear showing” that he will
suffer irreparable harm and so do not warrant preliminary
injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court will deny
Shrader’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
appropriate order ...